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From those who are working to recover

from the Challenger loss

to those Americans who will be flying in space

in the near future.
Preface 
This final status report describes the 
actions taken by NASA in response to the 
recommendations of the Presidential Com-
mission on the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Accident (Mission 51-L). The Commission 
recommendations and NASA's responses to 
them are summarized in the Executive Sum-
mary, which is accompanied by a schedule 
showing significant program milestones.
Part 1 of the report provides a detailed dis-
cussion of the activities undertaken by 
NASA to implement each of the nine Com-
mission recommendations; Part 2 discusses 
other related NASA actions required for safe 
return to flight. A copy of the interim plan 
submitted to the President one year ago and 
other significant reference documents are 
included as appendixes. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Overview 
In the year since the Presidential Commis-
sion made its report on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger accident, NASA has prosecuted an 
intensive, across-the-board effort dedicated to 
returning to safe, reliable space flight. This 
recovery activity has three key aspects: the 
technical engineering changes being selected 
and implemented; the new procedures, safe-
guards, and internal communication processes 
that have been or are being put in place; and 
the changes in personnel, organizations, and 
attitudes that have come about. 
• The design of the solid rocket motor has 
been changed. The new design eliminates 
the weakness that led to the accident and 
allows incorporation of a number of desir-
able improvements as well. The new 
rocket motors will be tested in a series of 
full-scale firings before the next Shuttle 
flight. 
• Every element of the Shuttle system has 
been reviewed, and improved hardware 
and software are being added to enhance 
safety. For example, the landing system is 
being improved, the main liquid-fueled 
engines are being modified to provide 
additional operating margin, and many 
other technical improvements to both 
flight and ground systems are being devel-
oped, tested, and incorporated into the 
overall National Space Transportation 
System.
Significant new procedures are being 
implemented to provide independent 
safety, reliability, maintainability, and 
quality assurance functions. A completely 
new organization, reporting directly to the 
NASA Administrator, now provides inde-
pendent oversight of all critical flight 
safety matters. The new office contributes 
directly to the solution of technical prob-
lems by working with the responsible pro-
gram organization but retains its separate 
identity as final arbiter of safety and 
related matters. 
Sweeping personnel and organizational 
changes begun immediately after the acci-
dent are now complete. A new, stream-
lined management team has been put in 
place at NASA Headquarters, with new 
people well down within the field centers. 
Special attention is being given to the criti-
cal issues of management isolation and the 
tendency toward technical complacency, 
which, combined with schedule pressure, 
led to an erosion in flight safety. It is 
imperative that return to safe, reliable 
space flight be accompanied by an intensi-
fied awareness that no space flight is with-
out risk, and that NASA's responsibility is 
to control and contain that risk without 
claiming its elimination. This philosophy 
of space flight operations is the controlling 
one in today's Space Shuttle Program.
This status report on the implementation 
of the Presidential Commission recommenda-
tions records the successful steps taken and 
those yet to be taken before committing again 
to send Americans into space. The Presiden-
tial Commission investigating the accident 
issued a formal, in-depth report on June 6, 
1986, that grouped its findings and recommen- 
dations under nine headings; those same nine 
headings were used to organize the interim 
NASA response of June 13, 1986, and are 
faithfully repeated here, both in this summary 
and in Part 1 of the full report. Virtually all of 
NASA's ongoing Shuttle recovery effort is 
described under the appropriate headings, 
including work undertaken in addition to the 
Commission recommendations. For complete-
ness, Part 2 of the report records a number of 
related NASA activities falling outside the 
scope of the nine recommendations but inte-
gral to the recovery effort. 
RECOMMENDATION I 
The Commission recommended that the 
design of the solid rocket motor be changed, that 
the testing of the new design reflect the operational 
environment, and that the National Research 
Council form a committee to provide technical 
oversight of the redesign effort. 
NASA has performed a thorough evalua-
tion of the solid rocket motor design. This 
effort, although centered on the rocket motor 
field joint, resulted in design changes to other 
components of the motor. The field joint has 
been redesigned to provide high confidence in 
its ability to seal under all operating condi-
tions. The redesign includes a new tang cap-
ture latch that controls movement between 
the tang and clevis in the joint, a third 0-ring 
seal, insulation design improvements, and an 
external heater with integral weather seals. 
The nozzle-to-case joint, the case parts, insula-
tion, and seals have been redesigned to pre-
clude seal leakage observed in prior flights. 
The nozzle metal parts, ablative compo-
nents, and seals have been redesigned to 
improve redundancy and to provide a capabil-
ity for pressure verification of seals. Other noz-
zle modifications include improvements to the 
inlet, cowl/boot, and aft exit assemblies.
Modifications have been incorporated 
into the igniter case chamber and into the fac-
tory joints to improve their margins of safety. 
The igniter case chamber wall thickness is 
being increased. Additional internal insula-
tion and an external weather seal have been 
added to the factory joint. 
Ground support equipment has been rede-
signed to minimize case distortion during stor-
age and handling, to improve case measure-
ment and rounding techniques for assembly, 
and to improve leak testing capabilities. 
Component laboratory tests, combined 
with subscale simulation tests and full-scale 
tests, are being conducted to meet verification 
requirements. Several small-scale and full-
scale joint tests have been successfully com-
pleted to date, confirming insulation designs 
and joint deflection analyses. One engineering 
test, two developmental, and three qualifica-
tion full-scale motor test firings will be com-
pleted before the next flight. The engineering 
test motor was fired on May 27, 1987, and 
early analysis of the data indicates that the 
test met its objectives. 
The horizontal attitude was selected as the 
optimum position for static firing, and a sec-
ond test stand, with capability to introduce 
dynamic loads at the external tank/solid 
rocket motor aft attach struts, is under con-
struction and will support testing for first 
flight. 
Improved nondestructive evaluation tech-
niques are being developed, in conjunction 
with the Air Force, to perform ultrasonic 
inspection and mechanical testing of propel-
lant and insulation bonding surfaces. Com-
plete X-ray testing of all segments will be rein-
stated for near-term flights. 
Contingency planning includes develop-
ment of alternate designs, which do not utilize 
existing hardware, for the field and nozzle-to-
case joints and for the rocket motor nozzle. 
A National Research Council Solid 
Rocket Motor Independent Oversight Panel, 
chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever, former sci-
ence advisor to President Nixon, reports 
directly to the NASA Administrator. The 
panel is actively reviewing the solid rocket 
motor design, verification analyses, and test 
planning and is participating in the major pro-
gram reviews, including the preliminary 
requirements and the preliminary design 
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reviews. Three reports containing the panel 
observations and recommendations have been 
submitted to the Administrator. The recom-
mendations have been carefully reviewed and 
appropriate actions have been taken by 
NASA. 
Separate from the oversight panel and 
working directly with the solid rocket motor 
design team is a technical advisory group con-
sisting of 12 senior engineers from NASA and 
the aerospace industry and a separate group of 
representatives from four major solid motor 
manufacturers. The advisory -group reviews 
the redesign status and provides suggestions 
and recommendations to NASA and to Mor-
ton Thiokol, the design contractor. 
The solid rocket motor manufacturers-
Aerojet Strategic Propulsion Company; 
Atlantic Research Corporation; Hercules 
Incorporated; and United Technologies Cor-
poration, Chemical Systems Division—were 
requested under special contracts to review 
and comment on the present design approach 
and to propose alternate approaches that they 
felt would enhance the design. As a result of 
these and other studies under way, NASA has 
initiated a definition study for a new advanced 
solid rocket motor. 
RECOMMENDATIONS I-I AND V 
The Commission recommended (II) that the 
Space Shuttle Program management structure be 
reviewed, that astronauts be encouraged to make 
the transition into management positions, and that 
a flight safety panel be established. 
The Commission recommended (V) that the 
tendency for management isolation be eliminated, 
that a policy on launch constraints be developed, 
and that critical launch readiness reviews be 
recorded. 
In March 1986, the newly appointed Asso-
ciate Administrator for Space Flight, former 
astronaut Rear Admiral Richard Truly, initi-
ated a review of the Shuttle program manage-
ment structure and communications. After 
the Commission report was issued, Captain 
Robert L. Crippen, a veteran of four Shuttle 
flights, was assigned responsibility for develop-
ing the response to Commission recommenda-
tions II and V. This effort resulted in the estab-
lishment of a Director, National Space
Transportation System (NSTS), reporting 
directly to the Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight, and other changes necessary to 
strengthen the Shuttle program management 
structure and improve lines of authority and 
communication. 
The Director, NSTS, has two deputies: the - 
Deputy Director, NSTS Program, a NASA 
Headquarters employee located at the John-
son Space Center USC), responsible for day-
to-day management and execution of the 
NSTS program; and the Deputy Director, 
NSTS Operations, a headquarters employee 
located at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), 
responsible for all operational aspects of the 
program. 
The Director of the Shuttle Projects Office 
at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has 
been designated as a NASA Headquarters 
employee, reporting to the Deputy Director, 
NSTS Program, and is responsible for man-
agement and technical coordination of the 
MSFC project elements. 
To ensure direct involvement in program 
activities, the Flight Crew Operations, Mis-
sion Operations, and Mission Support direc-
torates at JSC have been designated as NSTS 
project elements. 
At KSC, Shuttle Operations and Engi-
neering have been consolidated under the 
Director of STS Management and Opera-
tions, who is responsible for all Shuttle proces-
sing activities and reports to the Center Direc-
tor. Other KSC organizational realignments 
have strengthened payload operations and 
safety, reliability, and quality assurance. 
Substantive key personnel changes in the 
NASA leadership have occurred since the 
accident. NASA has a new Administrator, 
Deputy Administrator, and Associate Deputy 
Administrators for Policy and for Institutions; 
new associate administrators for Space Flight, 
for Space Station, for Science and Applica-
tions, for External Affairs, and for Safety, Reli-
ability, Maintainability, and Quality Assur-
ance; a new Center Director at KSC and at 
MSFC; and a new Director and Deputy Direc-
tor at JSC. 
At MSFC, several personnel changes have 
been made, including the Director of Shuttle 
Projects, Solid Rocket Booster Project Man-
ager, and Director of Science and Engineering. 
Additional changes have been made within 
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these organizations to provide strong techni-
cal management and leadership. 
The Office of Space Flight Management 
Council has been revitalized. This council, 
consisting of the Associate Administrator and 
the directors of JSC, KSC, MSFC, and 
National Space Technology Laboratories, 
meets on a regular basis to review program 
progress, major decisions and issues, and to 
provide the Associate Administrator with an 
independent assessment of program status. 
The Director, NSTS, and his organizational 
elements support the management council as 
required. 
The flight readiness review and mission 
management team processes have been 
strengthened. The Director of Flight Crew 
Operations will participate in both of these 
activities and the flight crew commander, or a 
representative, will attend the flight readiness 
review. These meetings will be recorded, and 
formal minutes will be published. 
Program management requirements and 
directives have been updated to ensure that 
clear, concise direction exists to implement the 
organizational changes, improve communica-
tion among involved program elements, and 
formalize the overall management of the 
NSTS Program. 
The NSTS funding process has been 
revised, and the Director, NSTS, now has full 
control over program funding at the centers. 
Since the accident, several current and 
former astronauts have been assigned to top 
management positions, including the Associ-
ate Administrator for Space Flight; Associate 
Administrator for External Affairs; Acting 
Assistant Administrator, Office of Explora-
tion; Chief, Headquarters Operational Safety 
Branch; Deputy Director, NSTS Operations; 
JSC Deputy Center Director; Chairman of 
the Space Flight Safety Panel; and the former 
Chief of the Astronaut Office as Special 
Assistant to the JSC Director for Engineering, 
Operations, and Safety. 
A Space Flight Safety Panel, chaired by 
astronaut Bryan O'Connor, has been estab-
lished. The panel reports to the Associate 
Administrator for Safety, Reliability, Main-
tainability, and Quality Assurance. The pan-
el's charter is to promote flight safety for all 
NASA space flight programs involving flight
crews, including Space Shuttle and Space 
Station. 
RECOMMENDATION III 
The Commission recommended that the criti-
cal items and hazard analyses be reviewed to iden-
tify items requiring improvement prior to flight to 
ensure safety and that the National Research 
Council verify the adequacy of this effort. 
Failure modes and effects analyses, critical 
item lists, and hazard analyses are techniques 
used by the NSTS to identify the potential for 
failure of critical flight hardware; to determine 
the effect of the failure on the crew, vehicle, or 
mission; and to ensure that the criticality of 
the item is reflected in the program 
documentation. 
Several reviews were initiated by program 
management in March 1986 to reevaluate fail-
ure analyses of critical hardware items and 
hazards. These reviews are providing 
improved analyses and identifying hardware 
designs requiring improvement prior to flight 
to ensure mission success and enhance flight 
safety. 
A review of critical items, failure modes 
and effects analyses, and hazard analyses for 
all Space Shuttle systems is well under way. 
Detailed instructions for preparation of these 
items were developed to ensure that common 
ground rules are applied to each project ele-
ment analysis. 
Each NASA element project office and its 
prime contractor are reviewing their systems 
to identify any areas in which the design does 
not meet program requirements; to verify the 
assigned criticality of items; to identify new 
items; and to update the documentation. The 
Astronaut Office and Mission Operations 
Directorate are participating in these reviews. 
A parallel review for each element is being 
conducted by an independent contractor. 
Upon completion of this effort, each element 
will submit those items that have failure 
modes which cannot meet full design objec-
tives to the Program Requirements Control 
Board, chaired by the Director, NSTS. The 
board reviews the documentation, concurs in 
the proposed rationale for safely accepting the 
item, and issues a waiver to the design 
requirement, if appropriate. 	 - 
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The National Research Council Commit-
tee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard 
Analysis Audit, chaired by retired USAF 
General Alton Slay, reports directly to the 
NASA Administrator. It is responsible for ver-
ifying the adequacy of the proposed actions 
for returning the Space Shuttle to flight status. 
The committee has visited several Shuttle ele-
ment prime contractors, JSC, KSC, and 
MSFC and has hosted a series of technical 
reviews in Washington, D.C. 
In its interim report of January 13, 1987, 
the committee expressed concern that critical 
items are not adequately prioritized to high-
light items that may be most significant. 
NASA is implementing a critical items 
prioritization system for the Shuttle program 
that is expected to alleviate the committee's 
concerns. 
The committee is continuing its audit by 
examining the Shuttle risk management 
approach, including design qualification and 
flight certification criteria, launch commit cri-
teria and waiver policy, structural margin 
analyses, software risk management, and the 
payload safety process. A final committee 
report is anticipated this year. 
RECOMMENDATION IV 
The Commission recommended that NASA 
establish an Office of Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance, reporting to the NASA 
Administrator, with responsibility for related func-
tions in all NASA activities and programs. 
The NASA Administrator established a 
new NASA Headquarters organization, the 
Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, 
and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA), and 
appointed Mr. George Rodney as the Associ-
ate Administrator. The Operational Safety 
Branch of that office is headed by astronaut 
Fred Gregory. The new organization central-
izes agency policy in its areas of responsibility, 
provides for NASA-wide standards and proce-
dures, and establishes an independent report-
ing line to top management (up to the NASA 
Administrator, if required) for critical problem 
identification and analysis. The new office 
exercises functional management responsibil-
ity and authority over the related organiza-
tions at all NASA field centers and major 
contractors.
The new organization is participating 
actively and directly in specific NSTS activi-
ties such as the hardware redesign, failure 
modes and effects analysis, critical item identi-
fication, hazard analysis, risk assessment, and 
space flight system assurance. This approach 
allows the NSTS Program line management at 
headquarters and in the field to benefit, on a 
continuing basis, from the professional safety 
contributions of an independent office with-
out interrupting the two different reporting 
lines to top management. 
Additional safeguards have been added by 
both the line project management and the 
SRM&QA organization to ensure that there 
is free, open, rapid communication upward 
and downward within all agency activities 
responsible for safety of flight. Such robust 
multiple communication pathways should 
eliminate the possibility of serious issues not 
rising to the attention of senior management. 
RECOMMENDATION VI 
The Commission recommended that NASA 
take action to improve landing system safety mar-
gin and to determine the criteria under which 
planned landings at Kennedy would be 
acceptable. 
NASA is improving the performance, reli-
ability, and safety of the orbiter landing sys-
tems and providing additional capability at 
the various landing sites to reduce risks to 
crew and equipment during nominal and 
abort landings. 
Several orbiter landing system modifica-
tions will be incorporated for the first flight. A 
tire pressure monitoring system will provide 
the crew and the Mission Control Center 
with tire pressure status before deorbit and 
landing. These data will contribute to the 
landing runway selection decisions and to 
overall safe operations. A thick-stator beryl-
lium brake will increase brake energy margin. 
A change to the flow rates in the brake 
hydraulic system, a stiffer main gear axle, and 
a balanced brake pressure application feature 
will contribute to decreased brake wear upon 
landing and provide additional safety margin. 
Tests at the Langley Research Center test 
track have defined tire cornering forces and 
wear characteristics. These data were used in 
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Ames Research Center simulations to verify 
landing system performance. Nose wheel 
steering system gains verified in the Ames sim-
ulations are being incorporated into the flight 
software. A proposed anti-skid system modifi-
cation was verified by utilizing the flight anti-
skid equipment in the Ames simulations. 
Several other changes are being evaluated 
to support longer-term upgrading of the land-
ing system. A new structural carbon brake, 
with increased energy capacity, has been 
approved and will be available in 1989. A fail-
operational/fail-safe nose wheel steering 
design, including redundant nose wheel 
hydraulics capability, is being reviewed by the 
Orbiter Project Office for later implementa-
tion. 
The initial Shuttle flights are scheduled to 
land at the Edwards Air Force Base complex. 
Total understanding of landing performance 
data, successful resolution of significant land-
ing system anomalies, and increased confi-
dence in weather prediction capabilities are 
preconditions to resuming planned end-of-
mission landings at the Kennedy Space 
Center. 
RECOMMENDATION VII 
The Commission recommended that NASA 
make every effort to increase the capability for an 
emergency runway landing following loss of two or 
three engines during early ascent and to provide a 
crew escape system for use during controlled glid-
ing flight. 
Launch and launch abort mode definition, 
flight and ground procedures, range safety, 
weather, flight and ground software, flight 
rules, and launch commit criteria have been 
reviewed. Changes resulting from this activity 
are being incorporated into the appropriate 
documentation, including ground operating 
procedures, and the on-board flight data file. 
Abort trajectories, vehicle performance, 
weather requirements, abort site locations, 
support software, ground and on-board proce-
dures, and abort decision criteria were 
reviewed to ensure that the requirements pro-
vide for maximum crew safety in the event an 
abort is required. The review resulted in three 
actions: the landing field at Ben Guerir, 
Morocco, was selected as an additional trans-
atlantic abort landing site (landing sites avail-
able on the European and African conti-
nents); ground rules for managing nominal 
and abort performance were established and 
the ascent data base was validated and docu-
mented; and a permanent Launch Abort 
Panel was established to coordinate all opera-
tional and engineering aspects of ascent-phase 
contingencies. 
The external tank range safety system is 
being reviewed by representatives from 
NASA and the Air Force. This review read-
dresses the issue of whether the range safety 
system is required to ensure propellant disper-
sal capability in the event of an abort during 
the critical first minutes of flight. The results 
of this analysis will be available in early 1988. 
Other aspects of the range safety process have 
been reviewed, and no unresolved issues were 
identified. 
Flight rules (which define the response to 
specific vehicle anomalies that might occur 
during flight) are being reviewed and updated. 
The Flight Rules Document is being reformat-
ted to include both the technical and opera-
tional rationale for each rule. The review pro-
cess is validating the performance limits set for 
each system and the data source for those 
limits. 
Launch commit criteria (which define 
responses to specific vehicle and ground sup-
port system anomalies that might occur dur-
ing launch countdown) are being reviewed 
and updated. These criteria are being modified 
to include the technical and operational 
rationale and to document any procedural 
work-arounds that would allow the count-
down to proceed in the event one of the crite-
ria was violated. 
Although a final decision to implement a 
Space Shuttle crew escape capability has not 
been made, the requirements for a system to 
provide crew egress during controlled gliding 
flight have been established. Requirements for 
safe egress of up to eight crew members were 
determined through a review of escape routes, 
time lines, escape scenarios, and proposed 
orbiter modifications. 
The options for crew egress involve man-
ual and powered extraction techniques. 
Design activities and wind tunnel assessments 
for each have been initiated. The manual 
egress design must ensure that the crew mem-
ber does not contact the vehicle immediately 
after exiting the crew module. Several 
approaches being assessed for reducing poten-
tial contact include a deployable side hatch 
tunnel that provides sufficient initial velocity 
to prevent crew/vehicle contact and an 
extendable rod and/or rope that places the 
crew release point in a region of safe exit. Both 
approaches provide for crew egress through 
the orbiter side hatch. 
The powered extraction technique 
involves additional weight and crew compart-
ment complexity and must be thoroughly 
evaluated to ensure that no safety hazards or 
additional risks would result from its 
implementation. 
Development of a rocket-powered extrac-
tion capability for use in a crew egress/escape 
system has been authorized by the Director, 
NSTS. Crew escape would be initiated during 
controlled gliding flight at an altitude of 
20,000 feet and a velocity of 200 miles per 
hour. The system consists of a jettisonable 
crew hatch (which has been approved for 
installation and is also applicable to the man-
ual bail-out mode) and individual rockets to 
extract the crew from the vehicle before it 
reaches an altitude of 10,000 feet. 
Ground egress procedures and support sys-
tems are being reviewed to determine their 
capability to ensure safe emergency evacua-
tion from the orbiter at the pad or following a 
nonnominal landing. An egress slide, similar 
to that used on commercial aircraft, is being 
designed for use should an emergency escape 
be required after a runway landing. 
A study has been initiated to evaluate the 
feasibility of future escape systems that would 
potentially expand the crew survival envelope 
to include first-stage (solid rocket boosters 
thrusting) flight. Study objectives include 
determination of system cues to indicate the 
need for escape, methods of escape initiation, 
and escape system design. 
In support of this overall study, NASA has 
requested the Naval Air Development Center 
to lead a team of industry and Government 
escape system engineers in performing a 
detailed study of ejection seat concepts to 
determine the feasibility of using them in the 
orbiter. The NASA Langley Research Center
is performing a similar study for a system to 
provide rocket extraction from seated 
positions. 
RECOMMENDATION VIII 
The Commission recommended that the 
nation not rely on a single launch vehicle capabil-
ity for the future and that NASA establish a flight 
rate that is consistent with its resources. 
Several major actions taken over the last 
year have reduced the overall requirements for 
NSTS launches and have provided for a 
mixed fleet of expendable launch vehicles and 
the Space Shuttle to ensure that the nation 
does not rely on a single launch vehicle for 
access to space. 
Many of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) payloads previously scheduled on the 
NSTS can be launched on expendable launch 
vehicles. NASA and DOD have worked 
together to identify these payloads and to 
replan the overall launch strategy to reflect 
their launches on expendable launch vehicles. 
The presidential decision to limit the use 
of the NSTS for launch of communication sat-
ellites to those with national security or for-
eign policy implications has resulted in many 
commercial communication satellites, previ-
ously scheduled for launch on the NSTS, 
being reassigned to commercial expendable 
launch vehicles. NASA has worked actively 
with the United States commercial launch 
vehicle industry and with the satellite owners 
and operators to ensure that this is an orderly 
transition. 
The Office of Space Flight conducted a 
study to determine the NASA launch require-
ments that could be satisfied with a mixed 
fleet. This study determined that 25 percent of 
the NASA and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration payloads cur-
rently scheduled on the NSTS could poten-
tially be launched on expendable launch vehi-
cles. NASA has developed the overall 
planning required to implement a mixed fleet, 
defined the required near- and far-term launch 
capability, and identified the number and type 
of launch vehicles necessary to satisfy the 
requirements.
Each of these major actions will maximize 
the availability of the Shuttle for missions that 
require the unique capability provided by the 
vehicle and its crew. 
In March 1986, Admiral Truly directed 
that a "bottoms-up" Shuttle flight rate capa-
bility assessment be conducted. To accomplish 
this, a flight rate capability working group was 
established. Representatives from each Shuttle 
program element that affects flight rate partici-
pated in this group. 
Ground rules were developed to ensure 
that projected flight rates are realistic. These 
ground rules addressed such items as overall 
staffing of the work force, work shifts, over-
time, crew training, and maintenance require-
ments for the orbiter, main engine, solid 
rocket motor, and other critical systems. 
The group identified enhancements 
required in the Shuttle mission simulator, 
Orbiter Processing Facility, the Mission Con-
trol Center, and other areas such as training 
aircraft and provisioning of spares. With these 
enhancements and the replacement orbiter, 
NASA projects a maximum flight rate capa-
bility of 14 per year with four orbiters. This 
capacity, considering lead time constraints, 
"learning curves:' and budget limitations, can 
be achieved no earlier than 1994. 
The experience gained during flight rate 
buildup will be used to adjust future flight rate 
projections. This will further ensure that flight 
rates are realistically established and are not 
driven by other factors. 
The manifesting and scheduling of pay-
loads on the Shuttle will be constrained by 
and totally consistent with realistic flight rate 
projections as defined above. 
Controls have been implemented to 
ensure that the Shuttle program elements are 
protected from pressures resulting from late 
manifest changes. While the manifest projects 
the payload assignments several years into the 
future, missions within 18 months of launch 
are placed under the control of a formal 
change process controlled by the Director, 
NSTS. Any manifest change not consistent 
with the defined capabilities of the Shuttle sys-
tem will result in the rescheduling of the pay-
load to another mission. 
Two independent assessments of Shuttle 
flight rate capability have been made. The
National Research Council published a report 
in October 1986, which states in part: 
"With a 4-Orbiter fleet, the sustainable 
flight rate would be 11-13 per year with a 
surge rate of 15 flights per year only if 
appropriate ground support facilities are 
acquired. 
"In order to sustain such rates and take 
account of possible contingencies, the 
Shuttle scheduling should be based upon 
the availability of fewer vehicles than are 
actually in the inventory by almost one 
Orbiter?" 
The other independent assessment was 
made by the Aerospace Safety Advisory 
Panel. At the conclusion of this study, the 
panel concurred with the National Research 
Council report. 
RECOMMENDATION IX 
The Commission recommended that NASA 
develop and execute a maintenance inspection 
plan, perform structural inspections when sched-
uled, and restore the maintenance and spare parts 
program. 
NASA has updated the overall mainte-
nance and flight readiness philosophy of the 
NSTS Program to ensure that it is a rigorous 
and prominent part of the safety-of-flight 
process. 
A System Integrity Assurance Program 
has been developed that encompasses the 
overall maintenance strategy, procedures, and 
test requirements for each element of flight 
hardware and software to ensure that each 
item has been properly maintained and tested, 
and is ready for launch. 
Major features of the program ensure 
design center cognizance and involvement in 
field center maintenance and operations activ-
ities and program management awareness of 
hardware status, work progress, and technical 
problems. The NSTS Program Office has the 
primary responsibility for defining and manag-
ing the maintenance safeguards activities; 
however, the system will provide data to the 
safety organization to support independent 
assessments. 
The System Integrity Assurance Program 
Plan establishes requirements for formal verifi-
cation of vehicle configuration and mainte-
nance activities and defines requirements for 
system reliability, supportability, and perfor-
mance monitoring and trend analyses. 
Program-wide problem reporting and correc-
tive action systems are being implemented for 
both flight and ground activities. 
An information management system to 
enhance system analysis, verification of 
requirements, problem reporting, and man-
agement insight is being developed. Require-
ments for this system are being defined with 
participation from each program element and 
discipline. 
NASA has alleviated the requirement for 
the routine removal of parts from one vehicle 
to supply another by expanding and accelerat-
ing various aspects of the NSTS logistics pro-
gram. Procedures are being instituted to 
ensure that sufficient rationale is available to 
support any future requirement for such 
removal of parts and that a decision to remove 
them undergoes a formal review and approval 
process. 
A vehicle checkout philosophy has been 
defined which ensures that systems remain 
within performance limits and that their 
design redundancy features function properly 
before each launch. Requirements have been 
established for identifying critical hardware
items in the Operational Maintenance 
Requirements Specification Document 
(defines the work to be performed on the vehi-
cle during each turnaround flow) and the 
Operations and Maintenance Instruction 
(procedures used in performing the work). 
These documents are being updated and must 
have design center concurrence prior to use. 
RELATED RETURN-TO-FLIGHT 
ACTIONS 
Several tasks are under way in support of 
the return-to-flight activities that are not 
directly related to the Commission recommen-
dations. The Space Shuttle Flight and 
Ground System Specification and related doc-
uments have been updated. System design 
reviews have been held to identify modifica-
tions required to increase margins of safety. A 
design certification review, wet countdown 
demonstration test, and flight readiness firing 
will be conducted prior to flight. Continued 
astronaut and Mission Control Center train-
ing is maintaining flight proficiency as well as 
training new personnel. A new launch target 
date and flight crew for the first flight have 
been identified. These activities are discussed 
in Part 2 of this report. 
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PART 1 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation I 
11
Presidential Commission 
Recommendation I 
Design. The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint 
and seal must be changed. This could be a 
new design eliminating the joint or a redesign 
of the current joint and seal. No design 
options should be prematurely precluded 
because of schedule, cost or reliance on exist-
ing hardware. All Solid Rocket Motor joints 
should satisfy the following requirements: 
• The joints should be fully understood, 
tested and verified. 
• The integrity of the structure and of the 
seals of all joints should be not less than 
that of the case walls throughout the 
design envelope. 
• The integrity of the joints should be 
insensitive to: 
- Dimensional tolerances. 
- Transportation and handling. 
- Assembly procedures. 
- Inspection and test procedures. 
- Environmental effects. 
- Internal case operating pressure.
- Recovery and reuse effects. 
- Flight and water impact loads. 
• The certification of the new design 
should include: 
- Tests which duplicate the actual 
launch configuration as closely as 
possible. 
- Tests over the full range of operating 
conditions, including temperature. 
• Full consideration should be given to 
conducting static firings of the exact 
flight configuration in a vertical attitude. 
Independent Oversight. The Administra-
tor of NASA should request the National 
Research Council to form an independent 
Solid Rocket Motor design oversight com-
mittee to implement the Commission's 
design recommendations and oversee the 
design effort. This committee should: 
• Review and evaluate certification 
requirements. 
Provide technical oversight of the 
verification. 
Report to the Administrator of NASA 
on the adequacy of the design and make 
appropriate recommendations. 
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NASA IMPLEMENTATION OF

RECOMMENDATION I 
SOLID ROCKET MOTOR DESIGN 
NASA has reviewed the Commission 
findings and recommendations and devel-
oped a plan to provide a solid rocket motor 
(SRM) design that satisfies all program design 
requirements and addresses the Commission 
recommendations. The primary objective of 
the redesign effort is to provide a solid rocket 
motor that is safe to fly. A secondary objec-
tive is to minimize the impact on the sched-
ule by using existing hardware if it can be 
done without compromising safety. 
An SRM Redesign Project Plan was
developed to formalize the methodology for 
redesign and requalification of the solid 
rocket motor, including evaluation and 
implementation of the recommendations of 
the Commission. The plan provides an over-
view of the organizational responsibilities 
and relationships; the design objectives, cri-
teria, and process; the verification approach 
and process; and a master schedule. The 
companion Development and Verification 
Plan defines the test program and the analy-
ses required for verification of the redesigned 
and the unchanged components of the SRM. 
The solid rocket booster configuration is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Solid Rocket Motor
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Figure 2. Field Joint (Original Design) 
All aspects of the existing solid rocket 
motor have been assessed, and design 
changes required in the field joint, nozzle-to-
case joint, nozzle, igniter, factory joint insula-
tion, and ground support equipment have 
been identified. Design criteria have been 
established for each component to ensure a 
safe design with an adequate margin of safety. 
These criteria focus on loads, environments, 
performance, redundancy, margins of safety, 
and verification philosophy. 
The criteria were converted into specific 
design requirements during preliminary 
requirement reviews held in July and August 
1986. The design developed from these 
requirements was assessed at the preliminary 
design review in September 1986 and base-
lined in October 1986. The final design will 
be approved at the critical design review 
(CDR) to be held in October 1987. Manufac-
turing of the flight hardware will begin after 
the CDR and will occur in parallel with the 
hardware certification process.
The field joint metal parts, insulation, 
and seals have been redesigned to provide 
improved structural capability, seal redun-
dancy, and thermal protection. A compari-
son of the original and new design for the 
field joint is shown in Figures 2 and 3. A cap-
ture latch provides a positive metal-to-metal 
interference around the circumference of the 
tang and clevis ends of the mating segments. 
This interference limits the amount of move-
ment (deflection) between the tang and clevis 
sealing surfaces due to motor pressure and 
structural loads. The 0-ring seals are 
designed to not leak under structural deflec-
tion of twice the expected values. In the 
STS 51-L-type design, the application of 
actuating pressure to the upstream face of the 
0-ring was essential for proper joint-sealing 
performance. This was necessary because 
large sealing gaps were created by pressure-
induced deflections, 0-ring groove dimen-
sions, the 0-ring diameter, and temperature. 
The new design, with the tang capture 
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Figure 3. Field Joint (Redesign) 
latch and the use of custom-fit shims between 
the outer surface of the tang and inner sur-
face of the outer clevis leg, controls the seal-
ing gap dimension and ensures positive seal-
ing under operating conditions. The sealing 
gap and the 0-ring seals are being designed 
so that there is always a positive compression 
(squeeze) on the 0-rings. The minimum and 
maximum squeeze requirements provide for 
the effects of temperature, 0-ring resiliency 
and compression set, and pressure. The clevis 
0-ring groove dimension has been increased 
so that the O-ring, when fully compressed, 
never fills more than 90 percent of the 
groove, and will accommodate, but does not 
require, pressure actuation. 
The new design includes an additional 
leak check port to verify that there is no leak-
age after assembly and that the primary and 
secondary 0-rings are positioned in the 
proper sealing location. 
The internal case insulation has been 
modified to be sealed with a deflection relief
THIRD 0-RING ADDED
 
INTERFERENCE FIT 
CAPTURE LATCH ADDED 
INSULATION 
E
INSULATIONPROPELLANT 
J-SEAL DEFLECTION 
RELIEF FLAP 
ADDED 
INSULATION 
SEALED 
INSULATION 
INTRODUCED 
flap rather than the putty used in the original 
configuration. A third O-ring is used to seat 
the primary O-ring in the proper direction 
and serve as a thermal barrier should the 
sealed insulation be breached. Longer case-
mating pins, with reconfigured retainer 
bands, will be used to improve safety margin. 
External heaters with integral weather 
seals will maintain the field joint seal temper-
atures at or above 75°F and will ensure that a 
safe seal is maintained within specified oper-
ating environments. The weather seal will 
prevent water from entering the joint. 
Analyses and tests identified Viton as the 
0-ring seal material that best meets the speci-
fied requirements to seal under all operating 
environments with safety margin. The joint 
seal safety margin will be verified in tests that 
expose the seal to a combination of ambient 
temperature limits, storage compression, 
grease, assembly stresses, and other 
environments. 
The nozzle-to-case joint (Figure 4), which 
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REDESIGN 
experienced several instances of 0-ring dam-
age in flight, has been redesigned to meet the 
same requirements as the field joint. Sealed 
radial bolts have been added to minimize 
joint gap opening, and the insulation has 
been modified with additional adhesive and 
an interference fit. Joint closure is enhanced 
through use of a stress relief flap with a flow 
baffle and with a wiper 0-ring in front of the 
primary 0-ring. The material and size of the 
primary 0-ring have been changed. 
The nozzle metal parts, ablative compo-
nents, and seals have been redesigned. The 
seals are redundant and verifiable. Improved 
bonding techniques will be used for nozzle 
inlet, cowl/boot, and aft exit assemblies. 
Nozzle inlet assembly distortion is being min-
imized by increasing the thickness of the alu-
minum housing and improving fabrication 
processes. The angle of the carbon cloth 
phenolic tape wrap (ply), for areas of the 
throat inlet assembly and the nozzle inlet 
assembly, has been changed to improve abla-
tive insulation erosion tolerance. The cowl/ 
outer boot ring has additional structural sup-
port. These changes will increase the overall 
margin of safety in the nozzle. 
The igniter and the motor case factory 
joints are being modified. The igniter case 
chamber, which houses the igniter nozzle
insert, is being increased in thickness to 
improve the margin of safety. The factory 
joint (Figure 5) is being modified to provide 
increased margin. Additional internal insula-
tion has been added to the factory joint. The 
0-ring size and groove and the pin, retainer 
band, and weather seal of the factory joint 
0-RING SIZE 
AND GROOVE 
CHANGED
- INSULATION 
PLY LAVAP 
AND THICKNESS 
CHANGED 
LONGER PINS 
RETENTION BA 
ADDED 
Figure 5. Redesigned Factory Joint 
Figure 4. Nozzle-to-Case Joint
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Figure 6. Ground Support Equipment Assembly Aids 
have the same, or similar, modifications as 
those being incorporated into the field joint. 
Since the factory joints have sufficient insula-
tion and a continuous internal seal, they do 
not require joint heaters. 
The ground support equipment has been 
redesigned to minimize case distortion during 
handling and launch site storage; improve 
the case measurement system; improve meth-
ods for case rounding; and improve leak test-
ing capability. These improvements will 
increase the accuracy of the measurement of 
case diameters to facilitate stacking, lessen 
the risk of 0-ring damage during assembly, 
and permit verification of the integrity of the 
igniter, segment, and nozzle joints after 
assembly. 
Two ground support equipment assembly 
aids, a guide and round-out rings, shown 
schematically in Figure 6, will be used in the 
field joint assembly process. The guide unit 
clamps to the clevis joint and forces the tang 
to conform to the same shape as the clevis, 
while guiding the tang into place. The round-
out rings circularize the tang and clevis to 
assist in joint engagement. Other modifica-
tions include changes to the transportation 
pallet, shaping tools, and the lifting beam. 
These changes will resolve transportation,
handling, and assembly problems that 
occurred in the past. 
Analyses related to structural strengths, 
loads, stress, dynamics, fracture mechanics, 
gas and thermal dynamics, and materials 
characterization and behavior have been 
conducted to increase the understanding of 
the joint behavior and to support the design 
modifications. Continuing analyses will 
ensure that the design integrity and system 
compatibility are in agreement with the 
requirements. These analyses will be verified 
through correlation of test results and pretest 
predictions. 
The strength of the improved joint design 
is expected to approach that of the case walls. 
The selected joint redesign approaches will 
minimize the sensitivity to manufacturing 
tolerances, handling, assembly and test pro-
cedures, flight operating characteristics, 
water impact, recovery, and reuse. The solid 
rocket design process is summarized in 
Figure 7. 
Verification 
The SRM Development and Verification 
Plan describes the test program necessary to 
demonstrate that the SRM meets all design 
and performance requirements and that fail-
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ure modes and hazards have been eliminated 
or controlled. The verification program 
includes the development, qualification, 
acceptance, preflight checkout, flight, and 
postflight phases. 
Final hardware certification will be 
based, in part, on the results of the subscale 
tests, development and qualification motor 
firings, and data analyses. Whereas the devel-
opment tests are principally engineering-
oriented, the qualification tests will be formal 
demonstrations to verify that flight hardware 
meets the specified performance and design 
requirements. The Development and Verifi-
cation Plan defines a test program that fol-
lows a rigorous sequence in which successive 
tests build on the results of previous tests, 
leading to formal certification. 
Test activities include laboratory and
component tests, subscale tests, full-scale 
simulation, and full-scale motor static firings. 
Laboratory and component tests are used to 
determine component properties and charac-

teristics; subscale motor firings are used to 
simulate gas dynamics and thermal condi-

tions for component and subsystem design. 
Ten small-scale motor (70-pound) tests to 
evaluate both bonded (sealed) and unbonded
insulation joint configurations have been 
completed. The test results were as expected,
with no evidence of damage to the primary 
or secondary 0-rings. Four circumferential 
flow tests have been completed with 400-
pound motors, and the results were as 
predicted. 
Fourteen full-scale vertical mate/demate 
tests have been performed using the joint 
assembly device as a test article. These tests 
used the redesigned capture feature hardware 
and included eight interspersed hydrostatic 
pressure tests to simulate the flight hardware 
case growth that results from the initial pres-
surization cycles. The mate/demate test 
results were as expected and confirmed the 
predictions of joint loads. 
SRM case growth was identified as a 
potential problem contributing to improper 
joint performance during the accident inves-
tigation. The growth was suspected to have 
occurred during hydrostatic proof testing of 
the motor cases. In order to confirm this, two 
new cases were selected for measurement 
before and after several proof-testing cycles. 
Results confirmed that case growth had 
occurred during proof-testing cycles but that 
it became diminishingly smaller after three 
cycles. 
The cause of SRM case growth will be 
fully understood by NASA prior to the first 
flight, and any necessary corrective action 
DESIGN 
PRELIMINARY H CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW REVIEW 
FULL-SCALE 
DEVELOPMENT 
TESTS 
MATERIAL 
SUBSCALE, AND
FULL-SCALE
CHARACTERIZATION
TESTS
FABRICATION 
OF FLIGHT 
HARDWARE 
FLIGHT 
HARDWARE
DELIVERY
AND 
ASSEMBLY 
Figure 7. Solid Rocket Motor Design Process
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Figure 8. SRM Structural Test Article
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CLOSURE 
AFT DOME 
Configuration 
• Forward and aft casing segments (empty) 
• Forward skirt (nonflight) 
• Aft skirt (flight type) 
• Nozzle closure for pressurization 
will be taken to ensure that both new and 
refurbished segments will meet all safety and 
reliability requirements. All case segments 
will be dimensionally stabilized by multiple 
proof cycles prior to flight use. Measure-
ments will be made before stacking to con-
firm that all cases conform to engineering 
requirements. 
The structural test article (STA)—Fig-
ure 8—provides the capability to test a flight-
type forward segment, aft segment, and aft 
skirt. Tests utilizing the STA will demonstrate 
the structural integrity of the redesigned 
hardware under prelaunch and flight loads 
and will permit assessment of joint deflec-
tions under loaded conditions. 
Verification of the new design includes 
component testing of the actual launch con-
figuration over the lull range of operating 
conditions. Full-scale, short-duration compo-
nent tests of the field and nozzle joints that 
include joint flaws and flight loads will be 
used to verify analytical models and to deter-
mine hardware assembly characteristics, 
deflection characteristics, and overall perfor-
mance. The results of these tests and analyses 
will be used to determine redesigned hard-
ware structural characteristics. 
Test programs that utilize full-scale flight 
design hardware include the nozzle joint 
environment simulator, the joint environ-
ment simulator (JES), and the transient pres-
sure test article. These tests subject the SRM
design features to the maximum expected 
operating pressure, maximum pressure rise 
rate, and temperature extremes during igni-
tion tests. The transient pressure test article 
will be subjected to prelaunch loads during 
firing. Figures 9 and 10 depict test configura-
•
 
7. 
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Test Plan 
Objectives 
• Measure nozzle/case joint deflection temperatures, and 
pressures 
• Determine seal performance at low/high temperature 
• Monitor nozzle/case joint insulation performance 
Configuration 
• Nozzle-to-case joint 
• Full-scale aft dome 
• Full-scale forward dome with igniter 
• Pressurized with hot gas 
Performance 
• Burn time	 0.5 sec 
• Pressure decay time = 80 sec 
Figure 9. SRM Nozzle Joint Environment Simulator 
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Test Plan 
Objectives 
• Measure joint deflection, temperatures, and pressures 
• Determine seal performance at low/high temperature 
• Monitor case joint insulation performance 
Figure 10. SAM Joint Environment Simulator 
tions and describe the objectives for two of 
these full-scale hardware simulators. Fig-
ure 11 is a sketch of the complete transient 
pressure test article facility. 
Three nozzle joint simulator tests have 
been successfully conducted. The STS 51-L 
configuration test confirmed predicted 
nozzle-to-case joint deflection. The other two 
tests using the new configurations with the 
radial bolts confirmed predictions of nozzle 
closure at maximum motor pressure. 
Four joint environment simulator tests 
have been conducted. The JES- 1 test series of 
two tests used the STS 51-L hardware config-
uration with and without a prefabricated
Iktr 
4.pr	 •: 
Configuration 
• Full-scale case components loaded with inert propellant 
• Pressurized with hot gas 
Performance 
• Burn time = 0.6 sec 
• Pressure decay time 90sec 
defect in the putty and with joint tempera-
tures of 20°F. These tests established a struc-
tural and performance data base for the STS 
51-L configuration. 
The JES-2 tests were conducted using 
STS 51-L motor case hardware with the new 
bonded seal insulation-application tech-
nique. Tests were conducted with and with-
out flaws built into the seals in the joints, 
and neither test showed any evidence of 
0-ring erosion or blow-by. 
Full-scale motor static firings will be con-
ducted to confirm the integrated SRM per-
formance. Six full-scale motor, full-duration 
static firings are planned. These firings
include the engineering test motor (Fig-
ure 12), which was successfully fired on May 
27, 1987, and will provide a data base for the 
51-L-type field, case-to-nozzle, and factory 
joints. The engineering test motor evaluated 
changes in the nozzle and the effectiveness of 
graphite composite stiffener rings to reduce 
joint deflections. Early analysis of the data 
indicates that the test met its objectives. 
Two development motor firing tests 
(DM8 and DM9) and three qualification 
motor firing tests (QM6, QM7, and QM8) 
are planned for completion prior to the first 
flight. At least three successful qualification 
motor firings are required for final configura-
tion and performance certification. Two of 
the qualification motors (QM7 and QM8) 
will be subjected to flight dynamic loads and 
a predetermined thermal environment dur-
ing firings. 
The static firing test attitude required to 
completely verify the design changes was 
assessed. The assessment included the estab-
lishment of test objectives, definition and 
quantification of the attitude-sensitive
parameters, and evaluation of the attitude 
options. The horizontal and vertical (nozzle 
up and down) test attitudes were assessed. 
In all options, consideration was given to 
testing with and without externally applied 
loads. The horizontal attitude was deter-
mined to represent a more demanding test 
configuration for the conditions influencing 
the joint and insulation behavior and has 
been retained. 
A second horizontal test stand is being 
constructed and will support testing for first 
flight. The new stand, designated as the T-97 
Large Motor Static Test Facility (Figure 13), 
will simulate environmental stresses, loads, 
and temperatures experienced during an 
actual Space Shuttle launch and ascent. 
Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) 
NASA and several contractors are 
addressing both near-term and far-term non-
destructive inspection testing at various 
stages of the SRM manufacturing process. X-
ray of the propellant for all segments is being 
reinstated for the near-term flights. This X-
MAIN 
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Figure 11. SAM Transient Pressure Test Facility
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Test Plan 
Objectives 
• Provide a data base for 51 -L field joints 
• Evaluate new seal material 
• Evaluate addition of graphite stiffener rings 
• Evaluate new ply angle in motor nozzle 
• Evaluate new ET attach ring structure 
• Evaluate addition of field joint heaters 
Figure 12. SAM Engineering Test Motor 
ray effort will be performed at the manufac-
turing facility. For the long term, continua-
tion of full X-ray inspection versus a 
sampling approach will be assessed. This 
assessment will be based upon technology 
advancements, other inspections performed, 
and the accumulated experience base. 
NASA has consulted with the Depart-
ment of Defense in detail on the nondestruc-
tive testing plans of the Titan recovery pro-
gram. The Associate Administrator for 
SRM&QA formed an agency-level group on 
nondestructive testing of the SRM that is 
addressing both near- and far-term method-
Configuration 
• Full-scale motor containing 51 -L joint configurations and 
the above modifications 
ology. This group, chaired by Dr. Joe Hey-
man of the Langley Research Center, draws 
upon the expertise of several appropriate 
contractors. The full spectrum of possible 
techniques is being assessed, including infra-
red thermography, various ultrasonic meth-
ods, and computer tomography. 
Contingency Planning 
To provide additional program confi-
dence, both near- and long-term contingency 
planning has been implemented. Alternate 
designs, which might be incorporated into 
the flight program at discrete decision points, 
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include field joint graphite composite over-
wrap bands and alternate seals for the field 
joint and nozzle-to-case joint. Alternate 
designs for the nozzle include a different com-
posite layup technique and a steel nose inlet 
housing. 
Alternate designs with long lead time 
implications are also being developed. These 
designs focus on the field joint and nozzle-to-
case joint. Since fabrication of the large steel 
components dictates the schedule, long lead 
procurement of maximum-size steel ingots 
has been initiated. This will allow machining 
of case joints to either the new baseline or to 
an alternate design configuration. Ingot pro-
cessing will continue through forging and 
heat treating. At that time, the final design 
will be selected. A principal consideration in 
this configuration decision is the result of 
verification testing on the baseline 
configuration.
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT 
The National Research Council (NRC) 
established an Independent Oversight Panel 
to review the SRM redesign. This panel, 
chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever, reports 
directly to the NASA Administrator. The 
panel was briefed on the Shuttle system 
requirements, the original design and manu-
facturing of the SRM, the mission 51-L acci-
dent analyses, and preliminary plans for the 
redesign. 
Panel members have met with SRM man-
ufacturers and vendors and have visited 
some of their facilities. They have reviewed 
the SRM design criteria, engineering analy-
ses and design, certification program plan-
ning, verification testing, material specifica-
tion selection, and quality assurance and 
control. They will continue to review the 
design as it progresses through manufactur-
Figure 13. 1-97 Large Motor Static Firing Test Facility
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ing, assembly of the first flight SRM, and 
design certification. Panel members partici-
pated in the preliminary requirements review 
and the preliminary design review, and will 
participate in future reviews. 
The panel has held a number of full meet-
ings and numerous subpanel and individual 
member meetings, and has submitted three 
written status reports to the NASA Admin-
istrator. Although NASA has not yet for-
mally responded to these status reports, 
actions have been taken to implement most 
of the committee recommendations. NASA 
has held several meetings with the committee 
to discuss and review the status of the 
response to the recommendations. The NRC 
membership and a summary of the panel 
responsibilities are provided in Appendix A. 
In addition to the NRC panel, an advi-
sory group of 12 experienced senior engineers 
from NASA and the aerospace industry are 
supporting the redesign team. They review 
the design activities and provide recommen-
dations for major program decisions. The 
membership and a summary of the group's
responsibilities are provided in Appendix B. 
NASA requested four other major solid 
rocket motor companies—Aerojet Strategic 
Propulsion Company, Atlantic Research 
Corporation, Hercules Incorporated, and 
United Technologies Corporation's Chemi-
cal Systems Division—to participate in the 
redesign efforts. Each company was given a 
short study contract and requested to cri-
tique the present redesign approach and to 
submit concepts for alternate designs. Their 
critiques were used in finalizing the design 
criteria and ensuring that industry standards 
are implemented into the final design selec-
tion. Hercules, Atlantic Research, and 
United Technologies are continuing to sup-
port the redesign by conducting special 
design and test activities. 
As a result of the studies by these com-
panies and others by NASA, a study to 
define a new advanced solid rocket motor 
has been initiated. 
Further changes to the SRB are discussed 
in Part 2 of this report. 
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Recommendations II and V 
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Presidential Commission 
Recommendation II 
Shuttle Management Structure. The 
Shuttle Program Structure should be 
reviewed. The project managers for the vari-
ous elements of the Shuttle program felt 
more accountable to their center manage-
ment than to the Shuttle program organiza-
tion. Shuttle element funding, work package 
definition, and vital program information 
frequently bypass the National STS (Shuttle) 
Program Manager. 
A redefinition of the Program Manager's 
responsibility is essential. This redefinition 
should give the Program Manager the requi-
site authority for all ongoing STS operations. 
Program funding and all Shuttle Program 
work at the centers should be placed clearly 
under the Program Manager's authority. 
Astronauts in Management. The Commis-
sion observes that there appears to be a 
departure from the philosophy of the 1960's 
and 1970's relating to the use of astronauts in 
management positions. These individuals 
brought to their positions flight experience 
and a keen appreciation of operations and 
flight safety. 
• NASA should encourage the transition 
of qualified astronauts into agency man-
agement positions. 
• The function of the Flight Crew Opera-
tions director should be elevated in the 
NASA organization structure.
Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should estab-
lish an STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting 
to the STS Program Manager. The charter of 
this panel should include Shuttle operational 
issues, launch commit criteria, flight rules, 
flight readiness, and risk management. The 
panel should include representation from the 
safety organization, mission operations, and 
the astronaut office. 
Presidential Commission 
Recommendation V 
Improved Communications. The Commis-
sion found that Marshall Space Flight Cen-
ter project managers, because of a tendency 
at Marshall to management isolation, failed 
to provide full and timely information bear-
ing on the safety of flight 51-L to other vital 
elements of Shuttle Program management. 
• NASA should take energetic steps to 
eliminate this tendency at Marshall 
Space Flight Center, whether by changes 
of personnel, organization, indoctrina-
tion or all three. 
• A policy should be developed which gov-
erns the imposition and removal of 
Shuttle launch constraints. 
• Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission 
Management Team meetings should be 
recorded. 
• The flight crew commander, or a desig-
nated representative, should attend the 
Flight Readiness Review, participate in 
acceptance of the vehicle for flight, and 
certify that the crew is properly prepared 
for flight. 
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NASA IMPLEMENTATION 
OF RECOMMENDATIONS II 
AND  
Because of the integral relationship 
between management structure and com-
munications, the response to these two Com-
mission recommendations is combined in 
this section of the report. The changes in 
management structure and improved com-
munications will permit early detection and 
timely resolution of potential problems. Reg-
ular management reviews will provide fre-
quent, in-depth assessments of program sta-
tus and issues. This top-level review concept 
is structured for flexibility in responding to 
problems and meeting contingencies as they 
arise. 
SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE 
The National Space Transportation Sys-
tem (NSTS) Program management structure 
has been reviewed, and major changes in the 
organization, personnel, and management 
philosophy have been implemented. The 
program reporting channels have been rede-
fined and streamlined. 
In March 1986, Rear Admiral Richard 
Truly, Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight, initiated a NASA Headquarters
review of the Space Shuttle Program manage-
ment structure and other major activities 
necessary for the program to resume the 
flight schedule (Appendix Q. In May 1986, 
the NASA Administrator requested retired 
USAF Lt. General Samuel C. Phillips, for-
merly the Apollo Program Director, to 
review the overall NASA management struc-
ture and to recommend changes necessary to 
improve the management of its programs and 
people. General Phillips' management study 
group undertook an 8-month comprehensive 
assessment of NASA's management practices 
and performed a thorough evaluation of the 
overall effectiveness. This study was com-
pleted in December 1986. Major recommen-
dations were to establish centralized head-
quarters responsibility for all programs and 
to restructure the agency to improve the lines 
of communication. 
In June 1986, after receipt of the Commis-
sion report, astronaut Captain Robert L. 
Crippen was assigned the responsibility for 
developing the response to Commission rec-
ommendations II and V. The objective of the 
Crippen effort was to identify and propose 
those changes necessary to strengthen the 
management of the program. The results of 
this effort, completed in August 1986, were 
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consistent with the subsequent Phillips com-
mittee recommendation that the position of 
Director, NSTS, be established at NASA 
Headquarters. This and the other recom-
mendations of the study were implemented 
by a November 5, 1986, letter of direction 
from the Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight (Appendix D). Figures 14 and 15 por-
tray the pre-STS 51-L Office of Space Flight 
organizational structure and the revised 
structure, respectively. 
The Director, NSTS, reports directly to 
the Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
and has overall responsibility for the NSTS 
Program. The Director, NSTS, is supported 
by two deputies and the program/project 
organizational elements. 
The Deputy Director, NSTS Program, a 
headquarters employee located at the John-
son Space Center USC), is responsible for the 
day-to-day management and execution of the
program. He is specifically responsible for 
establishing, implementing, and controlling 
program requirements; providing program 
planning, direction, scheduling, and mainte-
nance for NSTS configuration management 
and control; providing system engineering 
and integration of the flight vehicle, ground 
systems, and facilities; integrating the specific 
mission requirements with the orbiter vehicle 
for each flight; and performing mission plan-
ning and integration. 
The pre-STS 51-L organization for the 
NSTS Program Office is shown in Figure 16, 
and the current organizational structure is 
shown in Figure 17. In the new organization, 
the project offices support the Deputy Direc-
tor, NSTS Program, and report programmat-
ically through him to the Director, NSTS. 
The integration and operations, engineering 
integration, management integration, safety, 
reliability, and quality assurance (SR&QA), 
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28 
and program control elements report directly 
to the Deputy Director, NSTS Program. The 
Manager for SR&QA is provided from the 
JSC Directorate of SR&QA. 
The Deputy Director, NSTS Operations, 
a headquarters employee located at the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), is responsible 
for all operational aspects of the NSTS mis-
sions and is specifically responsible for final 
vehicle preparation, mission execution, and 
return of the orbiter for processing for its 
next flight; management of the scheduling 
and presentation of flight readiness reviews; 
management of the final launch decision pro-
cess, including final authority for launch 
commitment; and chairing the mission man-
agement team. This team, composed of sen-
ior program management officials, is respon-
sible for reviewing all major launch and 
in-flight issues and for making those deci-
sions that affect mission objectives.
The operations integration offices at JSC, 
KSC, and Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC) report directly to the Deputy Direc-
tor, NSTS Operations, and are responsible 
for assessing flight plans, mission rules, 
launch commit criteria, training and mission 
preparation, launch site readiness, flight 
anomaly closeout, and other operational 
activities at their respective centers. 
The Manager of Shuttle Projects at 
MSFC, also a headquarters - employee, is 
responsible for overall management and 
coordination of the MSFC elements (solid 
rocket boosters, external tank, and Space 
Shuttle main engines). These project ele-
ments report through him to the Deputy 
Director, NSTS Program. This organiza-
tional alignment permits direct interaction 
between the Deputy Director, NSTS Pro-
gram, and the MSFC element project 
managers. 
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To ensure direct involvement in program 
activities, the Flight Crew Operations, Mis-
sion Operations, and Mission Support offices 
at JSC have been designated as project ele-
ments, reporting programmatically to the 
Deputy Director, NSTS Program. Institu-
tionally, these organizations now report 
directly to the JSC Director. 
Shuttle operations and engineering at 
KSC have been consolidated, as a project ele-
ment, under a new Director of STS Manage-
ment and Operations, who reports institu-
tionally to the Center Director. Other 
institutional realignments have strengthened 
overall Shuttle operations, including 
SR&QA, and have made center organiza-
tions compatible with the NSTS manage-
ment structure. 
The Director, NSTS, now has full 
responsibility for the NSTS Program budget 
and for balancing program content across all
elements. The NSTS funding process has 
been revised. Requirements are identified 
and reviewed by each center director, and 
the approved center request is submitted to 
the program. The Deputy Directors, NSTS, 
review the submittals and forward combined 
assessments and recommendations, includ-
ing any balancing of requirements across the 
projects or centers, to the Director, NSTS. 
These recommendations are reviewed and a 
proposed budget is submitted to the Associ-
ate Administrator for integration into the 
Office of Space Flight budget request. This 
revised process was used in the recent budget 
cycle and worked satisfactorily. The Director, 
NSTS, has full responsibility for the imple-
mentation of the approved NSTS budget. 
The NSTS project offices are institu-
tional organizations; however, they report 
programmatically through the Deputy Direc-
tor, NSTS Program, to the Director, NSTS. 
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The respective center directors are responsi-
ble and accountable for the technical excel-
lence and performance of the project ele-
ments assigned to their centers and for 
providing the institutional support required 
to manage the NSTS Program. 
The Office of Space Flight Management 
Council has been revitalized. This council, 
consisting of the Associate Administrator 
and the directors of JSC, KSC, MSFC, and 
National Space Technology Laboratories, 
meets on a regular basis to review program 
progress, major decisions, and issues, and to 
provide the Associate Administrator with an 
independent assessment of program status. 
The Director, NSTS, and his organizational 
elements support the management council as 
required. 
Many personnel changes have occurred 
within the NASA organization since the 
accident. NASA has a new Administrator;
Deputy Administrator; Associate Deputy 
Administrators for Policy and for Institu-
tions; new Associate Administrators for 
Space Flight, for Space Station, for Science 
and Applications, for External Affairs, and 
for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Quality Assurance (SRM&QA); new Center 
Directors for KSC and MSFC; and a new 
Center Director and Deputy Director at JSC. 
At MSFC, other personnel changes include 
the Manager of Shuttle Projects, the Solid 
Rocket Booster Project Manager, the Direc-
tor of Science and Engineering, and several 
key positions within their organizations. 
ASTRONAUTS IN MANAGEMENT 
NASA is continuing its policy of assign-
ing astronauts to management positions to 
benefit from their management ability and 
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specific space flight experience. At the 
present time, ten current or former astro-
nauts hold key agency management posi-
tions. The specific personnel and positions 
are listed in Table 1. NASA will continue to 
encourage astronauts to participate in the 
management process, both on a permanent 
and a rotational basis. This policy is benefi-
cial from two aspects: (1) the agency and pro-
gram acquire very capable management per-
sonnel with significant operational 
experience, and (2) astronauts who rotate 
through management positions and return to 
flight status carry with them a better under-
standing of the program process. 
SPACE FLIGHT SAFETY PANEL 
NASA has established a Space Flight 
Safety Panel, chaired by astronaut Bryan
O'Connor. To maximize the panel's indepen-
dence, it reports to the Associate Adminis-
trator for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, 
and Quality Assurance. The panel's charter 
is to promote a NASA space flight safety pro-
gram for space programs involving flight 
crews and to advise and assist the appropri-
ate associate administrators in the adminis-
tration and monitoring of flight safety 
aspects of their programs. The panel's pur-
pose is to preserve human and material 
resources and to enhance space flight opera-
tions whenever flight safety is affected. The 
panel roles and responsibilities are defined in 
NASA Management Instruction 1152.66 
(Appendix E). 
The Space Flight Safety Panel is com-
posed of an astronaut with space flight expe-
rience, a JSC flight director, an MSFC mis-
sion manager, and a KSC test director. The 
Commission recommended that the panel 
Table 1. Astronauts in Management
Astronaut Position Location 
Rear Admiral Richard Truly Associate Administrator for Space Flight NASA Headquarters 
Dr. Sally Ride Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of NASA Headquarters 
Exploration 
Captain Rick Hauck Associate Administrator for External NASA Headquarters 
Affairs (August 1986-January 1987) 
Colonel Fred Gregory Chief, Operational Safety Branch Office NASA Headquarters 
Captain Robert Crippen Deputy Director, NSTS Operations Kennedy Space Center 
Paul Weitz Deputy Director Johnson Space Center 
John Young Special Assistant to the Director for Johnson Space Center 
Engineering, Operations, and Safety 
Lt. Colonel James Adamson Assistant Manager for Engineering Johnson Space Center 
Integration, NSTS Program Office 
Colonel Charles Bolden Chief, Safety Division Johnson Space Center 
Colonel Brewster Shaw Chairman, Orbiter Modification Team Johnson Space Center 
Colonel Bryan O'Connor Assistant Manager for Operations, NSTS Johnson Space Center 
Program Office, Ohm., Flight Safety Panel
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membership include a representative from 
the Safety Office and that the panel report to 
the Shuttle Program Manager. The Chief of 
Headquarters Operations Safety Branch 
serves as advisor to the panel; and the panel 
chairman, who is Assistant Manager for 
NSTS Operations, reports organizationally 
to the Deputy Director, NSTS Program. 
These two factors satisfy the intent of the 
Commission recommendations while main-
taining maximum independence for the 
panel in the conduct of its activities. 
The panel has met ten times since Janu-
ary 1987 and has reviewed the flight safety 
programs at several NASA centers, United 
Airlines, the Air Force Flight Test Center, 
and the Air Force First Tactical Fighter 
Wing. Key flight safety officials at each of 
these locations were interviewed to compare 
the principles, functions, and capabilities of 
NASA's safety organization with those of our 
nation's best aviation safety organizations. 
A report detailing the results of this sur-
vey with recommendations will be available 
in July 1987. The report will recommend 
enhancements to the training, certification, 
and management support given to the pro-
gram safety engineers, a more aggressive mis-
hap investigation and reporting system, and 
development of a viable flight safety 
program. 
IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS 
Safety-of-Flight Communications 
The Shuttle management structure, with 
the element project managers reporting pro-
grammatically to the Director, NSTS, and 
the regular meetings of the Office of Space 
Flight Management Council will minimize 
the potential for management isolation 
observed by the Commission. The new orga-
nization, along with the revised launch con-
straint process discussed below, will ensure 
that vital program and safety-related issues 
are elevated to the proper program manage-
ment level for resolution. 
Launch Constraints 
The NSTS Program is establishing a for-
mal process for identifying and defining
launch constraints. This process will use a 
centralized, program-wide, problem report-
ing system to identify hardware and software 
discrepant conditions, from component 
acceptance testing through mission comple-
tion and postflight inspection. This system, 
discussed in detail in the response to Recom-
mendation IX, will be initialized and main-
tained by the Deputy Director, NSTS Pro-
gram. Element project managers will 
recommend launch constraints based on the 
performance of their systems. Other organi-
zational elements, including SRM&QA, 
may also recommend constraints. 
The Deputy Director, NSTS Program, 
will be responsible for evaluating proposed 
launch constraints and recommending their 
disposition. Approval for establishment, 
removal, and waiver of launch constraints 
will be the responsibility of the Director, 
NSTS. Launch constraints for each mission 
will be reviewed at the flight readiness review 
(FRR). 
Flight Readiness and Mission 
Management Team Reviews 
Major meetings leading to a decision to 
launch are the flight readiness and mission 
management team (MMT) reviews. The 
FRR, held 2 weeks before launch, is chaired 
by the Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight, with all senior program and center 
management as well as contractor officials in 
attendance. Each project manager is required 
to assess his readiness for launch by consider-
ing hardware status, problems encountered 
during launch processing and their resolu-
tion, launch constraints, and open items. 
Each NASA project manager and the respec-
tive element contractor is required to sign 
the Certificate of Flight Readiness, stating 
their readiness for launch, at the FRR. 
The mission management team convenes 
at the beginning of terminal launch count 
and meets formally on launch minus 1 day 
(L-1) for final review of launch readiness. The 
MMT reports to the Deputy Director, NSTS 
Operations, and is composed of the manage-
ment personnel responsible for launch- and 
mission-related decisions. Each project ele-
ment and contractor will sign an endorse-
ment to the certificate of flight readiness 
statement, at the L-1 day MMT meeting, 
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that reaffirms their readiness for launch. 
SRM&QA personnel will be involved in the 
FRR, L-1, and other key decision-making 
meetings prior to launch and during the mis-
sion. The proceedings of both the FRR and 
MMT will be recorded, and formal minutes 
will be published. 
Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
Participation 
The Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
is now designated as a project element. The 
director or his designated representative is a 
participant in the FRR and a member of the 
MMT. He will certify that the flight crew is 
prepared for launch and that the crew has no
unresolved issues related to the planned mis-
sion or flight hardware. The flight crew com-
mander or his designated representative will 
attend the FRR. 
Integrated Schedules 
Overall management visibility and com-
munications are being improved through 
development of a series of integrated pro-
gram schedules. These schedules, based on 
weekly detailed input data from each element 
project and the NSTS Engineering Integra-
tion Office, have improved program manage-
ment awareness of interrelated tasks and crit-
ical program paths to meet significant 
program milestones. 
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Presidential Commission 
Recommendation III 
Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. 
NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors 
should review all Criticality 1, 1R, 2, and 2R
items and hazard analyses. This review 
should identify those items that must be 
improved prior to flight to ensure mission 
success and flight safety. An Audit Panel, 
appointed by the National Research Coun-
cil, should verify the adequacy of the effort 
and report directly to the Administrator of 
NASA. 
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RECOMMENDATION III 
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS 
ANALYSIS/CRITICAL ITEMS LIST 
REVIEW 
NASA is reviewing all NSTS compo-
nents to determine that all critical items 
which must be improved prior to flight have 
been identified and that corrective actions 
are under way. 
A failure modes and effects analysis 
(FMEA) is performed on each component of 
the Shuttle system to identify hardware items 
that are critical to the performance and 
safety of the vehicle and mission. This analy-
sis begins with an identification of the func-
tional components of each system and a 
determination of the potential modes of fail-
ure for that component. Postulated compo-
nent failure modes are then analyzed to 
determine the resulting performance of the 
system and to ascertain the worst-case effect 
that could result from a failure in this mode. 
Items are categorized according to the worst-
case effect of the failure on the vehicle, crew, 
and mission. 
The Critical Items List (CIL) is a listing of 
components and their failure modes which, if 
they fail in one of the potential modes identi-
fied in the FMEA, could result in loss of vehi-
cle, life, or mission. The CIL also includes 
items that could fail in one mode and result
in loss of redundant systems capability, items 
whose failure mode is not readily detectable 
in flight, and redundant systems in which a 
single failure may result in loss of the total 
system capability. 
Critical items with these failure modes 
must be subjected to design improvements or 
to corrective action to meet the program 
redundancy requirements, or a waiver must 
be submitted to document the rationale for 
retaining an item that does not meet the 
requirements. Data elements included in the 
rationale include design, test, and inspection 
data, failure history, and operational experi-
ence. An approved waiver must support the 
decision to accept the risk represented by the 
critical item and ensure that maintenance, 
test, or inspection procedures will minimize 
the potential occurrence of the failure. 
The hazard analysis (HA) is another ana-
lytical tool used to assess the risk resulting 
from hazardous conditions that could 
develop while operating and maintaining the 
system hardware and software. In addition to 
evaluating the risk resulting from the failures 
identified in the FMEA process, these analy-
ses identify the presence of other potential 
risks caused by the environment, crew-
machine interfaces, and mission activities. 
These hazards and their causes are 
reviewed to identify areas where hazard elim-
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ination or control methods may be achieved 
by additional design, procedural changes, or 
operational constraints. Any hazards 
remaining after all feasible design or proce-
dural corrective efforts are implemented are 
termed accepted risks and require review and 
approval by the Director, NSTS. 
Each NSTS project and its prime con-
tractor is conducting a review to verify the 
completeness and accuracy of the FMEA/ 
CIL for the current design. A similar evalua-
tion of all element and integrated system-
level hazard analyses has been initiated. All 
waivers required for items whose failure 
modes would result in loss of vehicle, life, or 
mission have been rescinded and must be 
resubmitted to the Director, NSTS, for 
approval. 
The NSTS has standardized the proce-
dures for preparation of the FMEA/CIL and 
for documenting the waiver-retention ration-
ale. These procedures, documented in NSTS 
22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure 
Modes and Effects Analyses and Critical 
Items List, provide detailed instructions, data 
elements, and ground rules emphasizing 
standardization and commonality through-
out the program.
Figure 18 describes the evaluation process 
for the FMEA/CIL. Items subjected to 
FMEA review are reflected in one of five 
major criticality classifications commensu-
rate with the failure mode. These classifica-
tions are defined in Table 2. 
Independent contractors are conducting 
parallel reviews of the FMEA/CIL for each 
element and reporting the results of their 
assessments to the respective element project 
manager and to the Director, NSTS. These 
reviews emphasize any analysis results that 
differ from those identified by NASA or the 
element prime contractors. These indepen-
dent contractors are listed in Table 3. 
The FMEA/CIL review requires three 
actions to be taken for each hardware ele-
ment: (1) the failure modes, causes, and 
related effects must be identified and docu-
mented, (2) the criticality of each mode must 
be developed, and (3) the retention rationale 
for each waiver must be established. Special 
effort is directed to identifying design 
enhancements, operational/procedural 
checkout changes, or software additions that 
reduce the criticality and/or minimize the 
risk of the potential failure mode. 
NASA and the contractor jointly review 
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Table 2. FMEAICI L Criticality Classification 
Criticality Level Effect of Failure 
1 Loss of life or vehicle 
1R Failure of all redundant 
hardware items could cause 
loss of life or vehicle 
2 Loss of mission 
2R Failure of all redundant 
hardware items could cause 
loss of mission 
3 All others 
the results of the FMEA/CIL evaluation and 
identify significant items for review by the 
element project offices. Items such as newly 
identified critical items, changes in criticality, 
changes in the redundancy verification 
requirements, or changes in the flight docu-
mentation require management approval 
prior to program acceptance. 
As each element project completes its 
FMEA/CIL evaluation, the results are sub-
mitted to the Program Requirements Control 
Board (PRCB) for approval. The presenta-
tion includes significant issues resolved dur-
ing the project reviews, new CIL items or 
those with changed criticality classifications, 
critical item waiver-retention rationale, and
assessments from the independent contractor 
reviews. 
The PRCB is co-chaired by the Director, 
NSTS, and the Deputy Director, NSTS Pro-
gram. After the board presentation, a direc-
tive is issued that documents items for which 
waivers have been granted and lists actions 
assigned by the PRCB. Each critical item, 
along with its approved waiver, is maintained 
by the NSTS Program, and any subsequent 
changes affecting the CIL must be approved 
by the Director, NSTS. 
An NSTS Oversight Group, consisting 
of safety, reliability, and quality assurance 
personnel from each center, ensures that 
prime contractor reviews are consistent and 
conform to the evaluation plan. This review 
group has visited the orbiter, external tank 
(ET), and Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) 
prime contractor facilities, the Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC) vehicle processing orga-
nizations, and the Marshall Space Flight 
Center (MSFC) Spacelab Project Office. The 
solid rocket motor (SRM) prime contractor's 
facility will be visited before the critical 
design review of the redesigned hardware. 
SR&QA representatives from the NSTS 
Program Office are supporting the ongoing 
FMEA/CIL activities at each center to 
ensure that reviews are performed in accor-
dance with program guidelines and 
requirements. 
Table 3. Critical Item Review Teams
Shuttle Element Prime Contractor Independent Review Contractor 
Orbiter Rockwell International, Space McDonnell Douglas Astronautics 
Transportation Systems Division Company, Houston Division 
External tank Martin Marietta, Michoud Rockwell International, Space Trans-
Aerospace Division portation Systems Division 
Solid rocket motor Morfon Thiokol, Inc., Wasatch Martin Marietta, Denver Aerospace 
Operations Division 
Solid rocket booster United Technologies Corp., United Martin Marietta, Denver Aerospace 
Space Boosters, Inc. Division 
Space Shuttle main engine Rockwell International, Martin Marietta, Denver Aerospace 
Rocketdyne Division Division	 -
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HAZARD ANALYSIS REVIEW 
Each project office, its prime contractor, 
and the independent contractors are evaluat-
ing all hazard analyses and reports to verify 
the completeness and accuracy of the safety 
analysis for the NSTS design and operational 
use. Hazards are categorized as controlled (by 
design, procedure, etc.) or as an accepted 
risk. Figure 19 describes the evaluation pro-
cess for the hazard analyses. 
Each hazard analysis assessment is being 
conducted in accordance with the guidance 
provided in NSTS 22254, Methodology for 
Conduct of NSTS Hazard Analyses, which 
defines the policy and procedures required 
for preparing hazard analyses, reports, and 
mission safety assessments. 
The HA reviews are being conducted in a 
manner similar to that used in the FMEA/ 
CIL review process. NASA and the element 
prime contractors are assessing the systems 
hazards, and the integration contractor is 
assessing potential hazards that cross element 
interfaces. The independent contractors are 
performing similar reviews and reporting 
directly to the projects and to the NSTS Pro-
gram Office. 
The HA assessment consists of a techni-
cal safety evaluation of the source material 
used for all analyses, studies, and investiga-
tions conducted from the beginning of NSTS 
flights. Each subsystem assessment ensures 
that all hazards have been identified, that
dispositions are accurate, and that identified 
risks are acceptable. Final results of the eval-
uation will be submitted to the responsible 
project for review. 
At the conclusion of the hazard analysis 
reviews, all open hazards, accepted risk can-
didates, or controlled hazards whose cause or 
effect crosses element interfaces, and the sub-
stantiating data and closure rationale, will be 
forwarded to a Senior Safety Review Board. 
This board will evaluate all submitted haz-
ards and forward accepted risk candidates to 
the PRCB for approval by the Director, 
NSTS. 
ELEMENT INTERFACE 
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In addition to the FMEA/CIL/HA 
reviews, the NSTS is reviewing and updating 
the element interface functional analyses 
(EIFA's) for all flight elements. EIFA's are 
analyses of various functional failure modes 
that can occur at element-to-element inter-
faces as a result of a hardware failure in either 
element. The purpose of these analyses is to 
correlate element hardware failures with fail-
ure modes at the element interface to deter-
mine the effect on the mission, vehicle, or 
crew safety. This activity ensures that the 
hardware FMEA/CIL's have the correct criti-
cality classification. 
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EIFA's have been conducted on ET/ 
orbiter, SSME/orbiter, and SRB/ET/orbiter 
interfaces. These analyses have been 
reviewed by NASA and the systems integra-
tion contractor, and the results are under 
evaluation by the element project offices and 
the NSTS Engineering Integration Office. 
When this review is completed, the finalized 
EIFA's will be presented to the PRCB for for-
mal approval. 
NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL AUDIT 
The Shuttle Criticality Review and Haz-
ard Analysis Audit Committee of the 
National Research Council (NRC), chaired 
by retired USAF General Alton Slay, reports 
directly to the NASA Administrator and is 
responsible for verifying the adequacy of the 
proposed actions for returning the Space 
Shuttle to flight status (see Appendix F for 
panel membership and a summary of 
responsibilities). 
The committee has discussed the FMEA/ 
CIL/HA reevaluation process with repre-
sentatives from NASA Headquarters, JSC, 
KSC, and MSFC. Meetings have been held 
at the centers and at Rockwell Internation-
al's Space Transportation Systems and 
Rocketdyne divisions; Morton Thiokol; 
United Space Boosters, Inc.; Sundstrand 
Corporation; and NRC Headquarters. The 
committee is evaluating the adequacy of the 
review process, checking for continuity 
across all elements of the program, and 
reviewing changes that NASA and its con-
tractors have made since the accident. 
A preliminary report was submitted to 
the NASA Administrator on January 13, 
1987, indicating that the committee has been 
favorably impressed with the results obtained 
from the FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis 
processes. While the committee's general 
impressions were favorable, it did make some 
suggestions for improvements. In summary, 
these suggestions are: (1) Criticality 1 and 1R 
items should be assigned priorities based on 
the probability of occurrence; (2) since many 
of the Criticality 1 and 1R items differ sub-
stantially in terms of the probability of fail-
ure, NASA should consider modifying the
definition of critical items to account for 
these differences; (3) NASA should incorpo-
rate its present system review procedures into 
an integrated system assessment process 
coupled closely with the FMEA/CIL reevalu-
ation now being undertaken; (4) linkage 
between the STS engineering change activi-
ties and the FMEA/CIL/HA processes 
should be provided. 
NASA has responded to these sugges-
tions in the following manner: 
1. Several candidate systems for prioritizing 
critical items have been evaluated by each 
of the projects. A hybrid system has been 
developed that incorporates the positive 
features of the candidate systems and spe-
cifically addresses probability of occur-
rence. The approach can be overlaid on 
the existing FMEA activity with mini-
mum perturbation, providing an effective 
measure of relative risk. 
In parallel with the development of 
prioritization techniques, an effort is 
under way to determine the applicability 
of probability risk assessment to the 
FMEA/CIL process. This technique is 
used in the nuclear power industry to pro-
vide relative-risk assessments. Two firms 
with expertise in probability analysis have 
been selected to perform detailed assess-
ments of the orbiter auxiliary power unit 
and the main propulsion engine pressur-
ization system. A decision to apply proba-
bility analysis techniques to other systems 
of the program will depend on the results 
of these assessments. 
2. The FMEA/CIL prioritization process 
will provide the necessary program focus 
and more definitive definitions in 
response to the committee's concern 
expressed in their second suggestion. 
3. Since the accident, NASA has reempha-
sized its risk management effort. An 
important feature of the revised effort is a 
"systems engineering" approach that inte-
grates the various elements of hardware 
and software failure analysis. Further dis-
cussion of risk management is included in 
the response to Recommendation IV. 
4. Engineering changes are processed 
through the same project and program 
control boards that conduct and approve 
the reviews of the FMEA/CIL. Each 
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change request will be assessed to deter-
mine if it affects any Criticality 1 or 2 
hardware to ensure that the required link-
age is provided. 
The NRC audit committee is reviewing 
additional areas to identify potential meth-
ods of reducing risk. These include the design 
qualification and flight certification pro-
cesses, launch commit criteria and waiver 
policy, and the generation, review, and 
approval of retention rationale for waivers to 
critical items. 
Also being reviewed are the overall 
safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality 
assurance program, the definition of struc-
tural analysis requirements, the establish-
ment and verification of analyses for margins 
of safety, the risk management processes for 
software, and the processes for analyzing pay-
load safety. 
Interim findings and recommendations 
from these reviews will be submitted to the 
NASA Administrator through letter reports, 
as required. The final report, anticipated in 
1987, will include an assessment of the proce-
dures reviewed and recommendations for 
improving the Shuttle risk management sys-
tem. As reports are received, any recommen-
dations included will be reviewed by NASA 
and responses will be provided to NRC. 
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Recommendation IV 
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Presidential Commission 
Recommendation IV 
Safety Organization. NASA should estab-
lish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Qual-
ity Assurance to be headed by an Associate 
Administrator, reporting directly to the 
NASA Administrator. It would have direct 
authority for safety, reliability, and quality 
assurance throughout the agency. The office
should be assigned the work force to ensure 
adequate oversight of its functions and 
should be independent of other NASA func-
tional and program responsibilities. 
The responsibilities of this office should 
include: 
• The safety, reliability and quality assur-
ance functions as they relate to all NASA 
activities and programs. 
• Direction of reporting and documenta-
tion of problems, problem resolution and 
trends associated with flight safety. 
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NASA IMPLEMENTATION OF

RECOMMENDATION IV 
NASA has established an Office of 
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Quality Assurance (SRM&QA). A new posi-
tion, Associate Administrator for 
SRM&QA, has been established, reporting 
directly to the NASA Administrator. 
Mr. George Rodney, previously with the 
Martin Marietta Corporation, was 
appointed to fill this position. The NASA 
Office of the Chief Engineer was abolished, 
and the appropriate functions and resources 
of that office were transferred to the Associ-
ate Administrator for SRM&QA. 
In December 1986, the Administrator 
signed and published NASA Management 
Instruction 1103.9A, Roles and Responsibili-
ties—Associate Administrator for Safety, 
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality 
Assurance (SRM&QA). This instruction 
(Appendix G) established the objectives, 
organizational setting, and responsibilities of 
the SRM&QA program, and provided for a 
separate and independent assessment 
function. 
The following goals have been set for this 
office: 
• Establish the-SRM&QA function as an 
aggressive contributor and as a check and 
balance for the overall NASA operation.
• Provide an independent assessment of 
the NASA development and operating 
process—design, development, manufac-
turing, procurement, test, and opera-
tions. 
• Develop and ensure implementation of 
firmly defined policies and procedures for 
SRM&QA on a uniform basis through-
out the agency. 
• Develop an SRM&QA work force that is 
manned with quality people who are 
properly trained and equipped, who are 
dedicated to superior performance and 
the pursuit of excellence, and who will 
provide the leadership in implementing 
this goal of excellence throughout the 
NASA/industry work force. 
• Provide, at all times, oversight directed 
toward 100-percent operational success in 
a safe manner. 
A short-range (2-year) SRM&QA Pro-
gram Plan has been published, and prepara-
tion of a long-range (5-year) program plan 
and a strategic (10-year) plan are under way. 
The short-range plan requires each NASA 
center to develop plans that document the 
goals and determine the resource require-
ments necessary to establish and maintain 
effective center programs. 
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SPACE FLIGHT 
SAFETY PANEL
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE 
ADMINISTRATOR FOR 
SYSTEMS ASSURANCE 
Five areas have been identified that will 
assist in accomplishing the goals of the new 
organization. Each is defined in the master 
plan, together with a schedule of milestones 
to be met in the implementation process. 
The following is an overview of each element 
and its role in the overall achievement of the 
SRM&QA mandate. 
ORGANIZATION 
The NASA Headquarters SRM&QA 
organization is shown in Figure 20, while Fig-
ure 21 reflects the previous organization of 
the Office of Chief Engineer. The center 
organizations are shown in Figures 22, 23, 
and 24. The Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Quality Assurance Division, the Safety Divi-
sion, and the Programs Assurance Division 
constitute the core organizational elements 
of the Headquarters Office. The first two of 
these divisions establish, document, and 
maintain the SRM&QA policies, plans, pro-
cedures, and standards for the agency. The 
Programs Assurance Division provides the 
necessary day-to-day support to the program
offices, reporting to the Associate Adminis-
trator on the status of those programs. 
The Deputy Associate Administrator for 
Systems Assurance is responsible for ensur-
ing that problems/trends are identified and 
communicated to the proper management 
level and that a strong system of independent 
checks and balances is established at head-
quarters and the centers. Other functional 
responsibilities include cognizance and con-
trol over system assessments, audits, and 
agency risk management. 
The maintainability functional responsi-
bility has been integrated into the headquar-
ters and Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC) organizations. Johnson Space Cen-
ter (JSC) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
are increasing their emphasis on this func-
tion and assessing where it should be located 
in their organizations. 
The Space Flight Safety Panel was estab-
lished to independently assess flying safety 
and the mission preparation and operations 
processes. Membership on this panel 
includes astronaut Bryan O'Connor, chair-
man, and a JSC flight director, KSC test 
director, and MSFC mission manager. The 
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Figure 20. SRM&QA Organization— NASA Headquarters 
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panel reports to the Associate Administrator 
for SRM&QA, who provides the Chief, 
Operational Safety Branch, as an advisor to 
the panel. This panel provides the Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight with an inde-
pendent assessment of NSTS operational 
issues.
RESOURCES 
The SRM&QA organization is defining 
its resource requirements in terms of man-
power and budget. A plan to upgrade the 
skills of the SRM&QA professional staff and 
to establish a career development intern pro-
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Figure 22. SRM&QA Organization— Marshall Space Flight Center 
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gram is being developed to attract high-
quality people to the agency. Recruitment of 
personnel to maintain adequate oversight at 
Government and contractor facilities and to 
provide the proper levels of internal coordi-
nation and review has been initiated. 
A preliminary manpower analysis has 
been conducted to determine NASA's total 
SRM&QA personnel requirements, includ-
ing civil service, support contractor, and 
Department of Defense (DOD) quality 
inspectors. This analysis has resulted in an 
estimate of baseline and projected require-
ments through Fiscal Year 1988. The NASA 
civil service SRM&QA work force will 
increase by approximately 24 percent in 1987 
and is expected to increase by about 35 per-
cent in 1988. The analysis is being continued 
to determine the long-term requirements. 
The centers are providing periodic 
reports on requirements and authorizations 
to the Associate Administrator for 
SRM&QA. These reports provide early 
identification of changes in requirements and 
highlight problems in acquiring qualified per-
sonnel, so that appropriate action can be 
taken. The centers will develop similar 
insight into their major contractors' 
SRM&QA capabilities to ensure that viable 
programs are maintained or developed.
POLICIES AND GUIDANCE 
One of the primary objectives of the 
SRM&QA Office is to establish firmly 
defined policies and procedures that will 
ensure the uniform application of standards 
throughout the agency. Areas being empha-
sized include systems assurance, safety, prob-
lem reporting and trend analysis, systems 
assessment, software assurance, nondestruc-
tive evaluation, and an electronic parts stan-
dardization program. Each of these areas is 
integrally tied to NASA's overall risk man-
agement policies. 
The basic concept of the NASA risk 
management program is to maximize safety 
and reliability within program constraints 
and operational limitations. New initiatives 
that provide a stronger, more centralized risk 
management capability have been initiated. 
Specific risk management directives and an 
overall risk assessment methodology are 
being developed. 
Problem reporting, corrective action, and 
trend analysis are closely related to risk man-
agement. NASA Management Instruction 
8070.3, Problem Reporting and Corrective 
Action, and Trend Analysis Requirements, 
establishes the responsibilities for this activ-
ity. The Deputy Associate Administrator for 
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Systems Assurance, whose organization con-
tains the Data Systems/Trend Analysis Divi-
sion and Systems Assessment Division, is 
responsible for implementing this activity. 
An intercenter problem reporting and cor-
rective action information system and a pro-
gram compliance assessment status system 
are being developed to assist in the analysis 
and reporting of significant problems and 
trends. 
This problem reporting and corrective 
action data base, developed by SRM&QA, is 
scheduled to become fully operational in 
October 1987. The system will contain all 
relevant "problem reporting" data for the 
NSTS and will provide access to the individ-
ual problem reporting data bases at JSC, 
KSC, MSFC, and selected contractors. 
A set of common data elements has been 
established to enable each center to display 
and analyze information collected at the 
other centers. This technique will increase 
visibility into significant problems and 
improve the ability to perform independent 
technical assessments and in-depth trend 
analyses.
The System Integrity Assurance Program 
(SlAP), being developed by the NSTS and 
described in the response to Recommenda-
tion IX, will contain information on require-
ments verification, risk decision/hazard anal-
yses, integrated problem assessments, trend 
analysis, and failure modes and effects analy-
sis (FMEA)/Critical Items list (CIL). The 
intercenter problem reporting system will 
interface with this system and will be the 
basis for the integrated problem assessments. 
SRM&QA is participating in the develop-
ment of requirements for the SlAP and will 
utilize information from it to support inde-
pendent technical assessments. 
Development of nondestructive evalua-
tion (NDE) methods for inspection, assess-
ment, and control of hardware is crucial to 
cost-effective risk analysis. An NDE Center 
of Excellence at the NASA Langley Research 
Center has been established to develop the 
needed tools. The major goals of the center 
are to develop one new NDE method or 
technique for field use each year and to 
develop and strengthen workmanship 
standards. 
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The NDE process being developed will 
enhance cost-effective methods for inspec-
tion, including assessment and control of 
hardware, and surveillance of manufacturing 
processes. Improvements in the NDE process 
are expected to provide a means of ensuring 
quality and integrity of products that have 
traditionally been difficult to test or that 
required testing to destruction. 
The requirements for on-orbit repair/ 
maintenance indicate the need to establish a 
policy on maintainability and its relationship 
with reliability and systems engineering. The 
specific engineering and analytical require-
ments for maintainability will be defined and 
published later this year. A preferred meth-
odology, and a series of training courses asso-
ciated with it, is being developed. 
Software assurance is an ongoing activity 
within the Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Quality Assurance Division. A software 
acquisition life-cycle management methodol-
ogy and software documentation standards 
are being developed, as are guide books and 
training courses for software acquisition and 
product assurance functions. 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
AND PROCEDURES 
A milestone schedule for release of proce-
dures to implement the SRM&QA policies 
and guidelines has been developed. The 
reviews, reassessments, reports, and other 
activities necessary to ascertain status, pro-
gress, and problem areas are identified in the 
schedule. This schedule will assist in review-
ing the implementation of policies, direc-
tives, and guidelines, and in determining any 
areas that require modification. 
A significant-problem report (SPR) has 
been developed to ensure adequate commun-
ication and assessment of problems and 
trends in the agency. Initial use of this report 
will be devoted to the Space Shuttle and 
associated payloads; however, it will be 
expanded in the future to include other 
areas. The categories of problems shown in 
Table 4 will be considered in the preparation 
of an SPR. 
The Office of the Associate Administra-
tor will play an integral role, along with cen-
ter SRM&QA offices, in the mission plan-
ning process. The center offices will be 
involved in the review of the day-to-day 
detailed planning process. The Headquarters 
Office will monitor the overall planning pro-
cess, ensuring that such areas as schedule, 
overtime rates, spares availability, and 
reviews do not adversely affect safety. Partic-
ular attention will be given to identifying any 
trends or indications of potential problem 
areas that result in undue schedule pressure. 
A plan for an enhanced safety program is 
being developed that includes the risk man-
agement safety program, the STS safety pro-
gram, and the Space Station safety program. 
Specific programs focusing on landing and 
crew safety are being instituted. 
An STS Safety Risk Assessment Ad Hoc 
Committee has been formed to review center 
and contractor risk assessment procedures 
and to provide comments and criteria for 
policy documents. 
A standardized mishap reporting and 
corrective action system is being imple-
mented agency-wide and will become fully 
operational by early next year. The system 
requires management review and approval of 
all corrective action plans and provides a 
mechanism for disseminating lessons-learned 
summaries through electronic communica-
tions. 
A supplemental safety information chan-
nel, the NASA safety reporting system, is 
being implemented to enable NASA and 
contractor personnel to notify SRM&QA of 
safety problems or hazards that could poten-
tially result in loss of mission capability. 
Using this system, individuals will be able 
to communicate safety concerns to an inde-
pendent agent when, in their opinions, stan-
dard reporting channels lack the proper 
degree of response to a critical problem. This 
system, patterned after the FAA's aviation 
safety reporting system, is not intended to 
replace normal management channels for 
reporting hazards or safety concerns. 
A NASA safety information system is 
being established. This system and a compre-
hensive review and upgrade of directives, 
handbooks, guidelines, and manuals are part 
of the overall strengthening of NASA's safety 
program. The safety information system will 
provide a complete, readily accessible, cen-
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tralized source of agency-wide information. It 
will compile information to allow the track-
ing and evaluation of known safety concerns 
and for the detection and identification of 
safety concerns not previously known. The 
system will respond to a wide range of spe- 
cific and general requests from headquarters, 
field installations, programs, and contrac-
tors. It will support risk, risk/benefit, and 
risk/cost/benefit analyses in the NASA risk 
management program. 
The Associate Administrator for 
SRM&QA has developed guidelines for con-
tract award fee criteria. Center offices will 
participate in award fee determinations and 
ensure that contractual provisions provide 
appropriate clauses and incentives to focus 
contractor attention and efforts on 
SRM&QA activities. 
To guide and execute the SRM&QA 
goals and tasks successfully, close coordina-
tion and cooperation between NASA and its 
contractors must be maintained. The NASA 
Excellence Award for Quality and Productiv-
ity will continue to be given in recognition of 
outstanding contractors and subcontractors 
who demonstrate continuing improvement 
in hardware and/or service performance.
PROGRAM REVIEW/EVALUATION 
Formal audits and evaluation of center, 
contractor, program, project, and special 
problem areas are planned. Audit teams 
composed of individuals from NASA, DOD, 
Other federal agencies, and industry will be 
formed under the direction of the Deputy 
Associate Administrator for Systems Assur-
ance. Team members will be selected for their 
experience and skills to ensure that thor-
ough, comprehensive inspections and audits 
are performed. 
Audit results will be reported to the 
Associate Administrator for SRM&QA and 
to the concerned center and program direc-
tor. The NASA Administrator and appropri-
ate associate administrators will be briefed on 
selected audit results. A corrective action 
response will be required from institutions, 
contractors, and programs on all unsatisfac-
tory or marginal findings. Critical problem 
areas will be entered into a tracking system to 
monitor progress and ensure prompt and 
proper resolution. 
These audits are intended to ensure com-
pliance with the established policies, to 
ensure prompt and correct identification of 
Table 4. Significant-Problem Report Source Data
NSTS: NSTS: 
Open Criticality 1 and 1 R problem reports, Unexplained anomalies on Criticality 1 and 1 R 
waivers, and associated trends hardware and software 
NSTS payloads or upper stages: 
Open problem reports, waivers, and associ- NSTS payloads or upper stages: 
ated trends that have the potential for causing Unexplained anomalies that have the potential 
critical failure modes or hazards for causing critical failure modes 
Selection guideline: SRM&OA management, Selection guideline: all problems in this cat-
in coordination with the management of egory should be included in the SPR. 
other center organizations, will, at each  
NSTS and NSTS payloads or upper stages: reporting level, determine which problems 
in this category warrant the attention of the System safety trends or specific safety 
next-higher level of management. problems 
Selection guideline: SRM&OA management, 
NSTS: in coordination with the management of 
In-flight anomalies and trends/problems other center organizations, will, at each 
related to Criticality 1, 1 R, 2, and 2R items reporting level, determine which problems 
Selection guideline: all problems in this cat- in this category warrant the attention of the . 
egory should be included in the SPR. next-higher level of management.
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any major problems, to provide assistance to 
other organizations for related SRM&QA 
programs, and to promote proper discipline 
among all NASA organizations. 
New or revised safety policies are being 
developed in such areas as explosives, soft-
ware, lasers, system safety, aviation, mishap 
investigation, radiation, range operations, 
facilities, and others. A major effort to estab-
lish software assurance policies and proce-
dures is under way. 
OTHER ACTIVITIES 
A new Director of SR&QA has been 
named at each of the centers, reporting 
directly to the Center Director. At MSFC 
and KSC, the reliability and quality assur-
ance functions have been removed from the 
engineering organizations and combined 
with safety in an organizational alignment 
similar to that which existed at JSC. 
SR&QA manpower has been increased at 
both MSFC and JSC and is being increased 
at KSC.
Several astronauts have been placed in 
key positions in the SR&QA offices, includ-
ing that of Safety Director at JSC and the 
Safety Operations Branch Chief at NASA 
Headquarters. Other astronauts are monitor-
ing safety-related activities at KSC and 
MSFC. 
The new SRM&QA organization is par-
ticipating actively and directly in specific 
NSTS activities, such as the hardware rede-
sign, failure mode and effects analysis, critical 
item identification, hazard analysis, risk 
assessment, and space flight system assur-
ance. This approach allows the NSTS Pro-
gram line management at headquarters and 
in the field to benefit, on a continuing basis, 
from the professional safety contributions of 
an independent office without interrupting 
the two different reporting lines to top 
management. 
Additional safeguards have been added 
by both the line project management and the 
SRM&QA organization to ensure that there 
is free, open, rapid communication upward 
and downward within all agency activities 
responsible for safety of flight. 
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Recommendation VI 
Landing Safety. NASA must take actions to 
improve landing safety. 
• The tire, brake and nosewheel steering 
systems must be improved. These systems 
do not have sufficient safety margin, par-
ticularly at abort landing sites. 
• The specific conditions under which 
planned landings at Kennedy would be 
acceptable should be determined. Crite-
ria must be established for tires, brakes 
and nosewheel steering. Until the sys-
tems meet those criteria in high fidelity 
testing that is verified at Edwards, land-
ing at Kennedy should not be planned. 
Committing to a specific landing site 
requires that landing area weather be 
forecast more than an hour in advance. 
During unpredictable weather periods at 
Kennedy, program officials should plan 
on Edwards landings. Increased landings 
at Edwards may necessitate a dual ferry 
capability. 
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RECOMMENDATION VI 
Prior to the accident, component and sys-
tems testing, simulations, and flight analysis 
results had identified a need to improve the 
landing system. The improvements included 
a requirement to increase brake capacity, 
eliminate mechanical and thermally induced 
brake damage, improve steering margin, and
reduce the effects of tire damage or failure. 
Subsequent analysis, test, and a series of sim-
ulations conducted at the Ames Research 
Center vertical motion simulator in April 
1987 addressed overall landing safety. 
As a result of this analysis and test activ-
ity, several design improvements (Figure 25) 
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Figure 25. Landing System Safety Improvements
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have been instituted to improve the margins 
of safety for the landing/deceleration system. 
Some of these improvements are modifica-
tions to existing designs and will be com-
pleted prior to the next flight. Other 
improvements involve the development of 
new designs to improve performance margins 
and the reliability of the overall system and, 
if certified and approved for flight, will be 
incorporated later in the program.
CARBON-LINED 
BERYLLIUM STATORS (3) 
CARBON-LINED 
BERYLLIUM ROTORS (4) 
PISTON ASSEMBLY 
BRAKING SYSTEM 
IMPROVEMENTS 
Two major brake improvement programs 
are currently under way: an interim brake 
system upgrade and a longer-term carbon 
brake development program. The interim 
program provides for an increased brake 
energy absorption capability, modification of 
the brake anti-skid system, modified brake 
wear-in procedures, installation of flow 
restrictors in the brake hydraulic piston 
housing, and a stiffened main gear axle. 
The energy absorption capability of the 
brakes is a concern. Localized hot spots in 
the brake cause reduced stator strength in 
the structural load reaction path and result 
in stator failure. Additional material is being 
added to two of the three beryllium stators 
(Figure 26) to increase heat sink capability 
and reduce the temperature rise rate. This 
change will increase stator load reaction abil-
ity and minimize resultant wear. 
Brake/anti-skid system tolerance build-
ups have resulted in unequal brake pressure 
application to adjacent brakes on the same 
landing gear strut. This pressure differential 
prevents full utilization of the brake capacity. 
Modification of the brake anti-skid system to 
provide an electrical adjustment method will 
ensure that the brake pressure is equalized or 
balanced. A second design modification will 
remove the anti-skid system sensory circuit 
that reduces the brake pressure to the oppo-
site wheel if a flat tire is detected. 
The thicker stators and the modified 
anti-skid system are expected to provide an 
overall brake system capacity of 65 million 
foot-pounds—an approximate 18-percent 
increase in energy absorption capacity over 
the present capability. Mission planning and
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Figure 26. Improved Main Landing 
Gear Brake Assembly 
landing performance analyses will continue 
to utilize a nominal energy capacity of 55 mil-
lion foot-pounds, thus providing an addi-
tional margin of safety for landing. 
The brakes will be exposed to wear-in 
runs with higher energy and pressure during 
acceptance tests at the supplier. This tech-
nique was used successfully for several flight 
brake sets prior to STS 51-L, with no indica-
tion of dynamically induced brake damage 
during subsequent landings. 
Analysis of flight data collected on the 
STS 41-G mission indicated the need to 
restrict the free flow of hydraulic fluid within 
the brake piston housing to eliminate the 
potential for a "whirl" phenomenon that can 
cause major dynamic loads to be imposed on 
the brake. Six orifices (flow reduction 
devices) are being added to the brake hydrau-
lic piston housing to provide the flow reduc-
tion and to reduce the dynamic loads and 
the resultant damage to the brakes. 
Stiffer landing gear axles are being 
installed to reduce wheel/brake relative 
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deflection and minimize the unequal brake 
loading and tire shoulder wear. 
Each of these modifications to the land-
ing system hardware is currently in work. 
The modified hardware will be analyzed, 
tested, and certified before being installed for 
the next flight. Engineering data obtained 
from instrumentation being added to the 
first flight vehicle will be used to analyze the 
overall brake system performance and to ver-
ify that these changes provide the desired 
safety margins. 
A tire pressure monitoring system, simi-
lar to that used during prelaunch on flights 
STS-1 through STS-5, is being installed on 
all vehicles. This instrumentation provides 
redundant strain gages on the nose and main 
wheels to indicate tire pressure. The tire pres-
sure data will now be available for in-flight 
monitoring by the flight crew and Mission 
Control Center. Knowledge of tire pressure 
prior to landing will enhance overall landing 
safety. If it is determined that a tire(s) has 
insufficient pressure to support the landing 
loads, steps can be taken to land on the safest 
runway for the particular situation. 
Development of a structural carbon 
brake (Figure 27) is under way. The "struc-
tural" carbon brake utilizes the carbon mate-
rial of each rotor and stator as the load-
reacting member. The design incorporates an 
additional rotor and stator and will provide 
an energy absorption capability of 85 million 
foot-pounds, which represents an approxi-
mate 55-percent increase over the present 
design. Overall capability and performance 
margin of this brake will be demonstrated by 
ground testing to 100 million foot-pounds. 
Key milestones include a critical design 
review in July 1987 and the beginning of 
qualification testing in February 1988. 
NOSE WHEEL STEERING 
Nose wheel steering is used for direc-
tional control (steering) of the orbiter during 
a crosswind landing and roll-out or in the 
event of a blown tire (or tires). The current 
system has the capability to provide the 
required steering but lacks complete redun-
dancy. Studies are under way to determine 
those features that could be incorporated
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Figure 27. Future Main Landing Gear 
Carbon Brake Assembly 
into the system design to maximize redun-
dancy. The current system is fail-safe in that 
several single failures can cause it to default 
to a free caster mode (no positive directional 
control), necessitating the use of differential 
braking to steer during roll-out. Design 
options being considered would enhance the 
system fault tolerance to a fail-operational/ 
fail-safe condition. 
TIRE IMPROVEMENTS 
A tire improvement/runway surface 
study is now in progress to determine how to 
decrease the tire wear experienced during 
KSC landings, while maintaining an accept-
able traction level in the event of landing on 
a wet runway. Because of the abrasive surface 
of the KSC runway, significant tire wear has 
been experienced at touchdown and during 
crosswind landings and roll-out. 
Analyses are being performed to deter-
mine what changes can be made to the KSC 
runway surface to reduce tire wear, while 
maintaining a limited wet runway capability. 
These analyses include potential techniques 
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for smoothing the surface, such as grinding, 
sandblasting, or painting. The program is 
committed to better understanding the con-
tribution of the surface to tire damage and to 
determining the options for modifying the 
surface prior to resumption of planned end-
of-mission landings at KSC. 
Extensive tire tests have been conducted 
at the Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility at 
the NASA Langley Research Center to 
obtain a data base for better understanding 
the orbiter tire wear and performance char-
acteristics. This facility provides the capabil-
ity to duplicate orbiter touchdown velocity, 
to simulate vehicle yaw angles experienced 
during a crosswind landing, and to simulate 
the tire loading during the landing roll-out. 
This capability, combined with the ability to 
change the runway surface finish, provides a 
base from which parametric tire-to-surface 
performance characteristics can be gener-
ated. The worn tires are then tested on a 
dynamometer at the Wright Patterson Air 
Force Base to determine the remaining useful 
life.
Modified tires were tested at the Langley 
facility. The modifications consisted of added 
tread rubber thickness and a change in the 
tread rubber compound to increase the wear-
resistant properties of the tire. Test results 
were favorable, and analysis is continuing; 
however, any change to the tire would 
require complete verification and would not 
support the early flights. 
OTHER STUDIES 
An end-of-runway barrier and a drag 
chute are being assessed to determine their 
potential contributions to increasing landing 
margin and safety. Other studies are evaluat-
ing changes to orbiter landing procedures to 
minimize tire wear and landing gear support 
for a failed tire. 
Orbiter Arresting System 
An orbiter arresting system (runway bar-
rier) is being developed. This system, which 
would be deployed approximately 600 feet 
from the roll-out end of the runway, is 
designed to safely stop a 260,000-pound 
orbiter traveling at 100 knots or less, without
injury to the crew. A preliminary design 
review is scheduled for June 1987 and first 
installation is planned for no earlier than 
February 1988. No decision has been made 
on which runways would incorporate such a 
capability. 
Drag Chute 
An orbiter drag chute deceleration sys-
tem study was initiated in October 1986. The 
study is determining the best location, 
method of attachment, size, and weight of a 
drag chute necessary to stop the orbiter 
within 7,500 feet after main gear touchdown. 
Testing performed at the vertical motion 
simulator determined that use of a drag 
chute, deployed at touchdown, can reduce 
roll-out distance, improve handling qualities, 
and reduce tire loads and required brake 
energies. Orbiter installation design options 
for the drag chute are being assessed; how-
ever, no decision to install the system has 
been made. 
Landing Gear Strut/Roll-on-Rim 
Capability 
Other studies are under way to determine 
potential improvements for landing safety. 
These include analysis of gear skids attached 
to the landing gear struts to provide a pro-
tective wear surface if a tire fails (Figure 28); a 
strengthened wheel rim to provide a roll-on-
rim capability in the event of tire(s) failure 
(Figure 29); and a main gear wheel spin-up 
technique to reduce the depth of the tire 
Figure 28. Main Landing Gear Skid 
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tread wear that occurs at touchdown. No 
decision to incorporate any of these potential 
improvements has been made. 
Landing Gear Load Reduction 
Methods for reducing the main gear roll-
out loads, to miiiirnize the potential for 
blown tires, are being assessed. Loads are 
generated by negative lift (aerodynamic 
down force on wings and fuselage) induced 
by the orbiter's nose-down rolling attitude. 
A computer software modification has been 
approved that will position the elevons auto-
matically to a down position after nose wheel 
touchdown. This will reduce the load on the 
main tires and will improve the safety mar-
gins on the landing gear assembly. 
LANDING CRITERIA 
Integrated landing system testing will be 
performed to satisfy detailed test objectives 
during early flights scheduled to land at 
Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB). The results 
of laboratory and simulator testing and 
orbiter landings will be used to develop and 
refine the appropriate flight mission rules 
and crew procedures associated with landing. 
Total understanding of all performance data, 
successful resolution of all significant anoma-
lies, and confidence in the enhanced weather 
prediction capability will be constraints to 
resuming planned end-of-mission (EOM) 
landings at KSC. 
WEATHER 
The Space Shuttle Weather Forecasting 
Advisory Panel, chaired by Dr. John Theon, 
was established by NASA Headquarters to 
review existing weather support capabilities 
and plans and to recommend a course of 
action to the NSTS Program. Included on 
the panel were representatives from NASA, 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the Air Force, and 
the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research. 
The panel examined skills, equipment, 
and techniques available to the Space 
Shuttle weather support staff. Panel recom-
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Figure 29. Proposed Roll-on-Rim Configuration 
mendations included improvements to fore-
casting procedures, personnel policies, and 
data communications as well as technological 
improvements. Key proposed equipment 
changes included airborne sensors, to quan-
tify precipitation in the Cape Kennedy area, 
and better wind forecasting equipment. 
NSTS representatives will continue to work 
with the advisory panel and with NOAA to 
ensure that the best forecasting equipment 
and procedures are available to the program. 
NASA has revalidated the statistical 
weather data base for all Space Shuttle land-
ing sites and has established minimum 
weather measuring equipment requirements 
for EOM and abort sites. Equipment require-
ments not currently in place are being 
reviewed for future implementation. 
For the transatlantic abort landing sites, 
the approved changes include the addition of 
both a ground-based and an airborne 
weather observer, availability of European 
weather satellite data at the Johnson Space 
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Center, and augmentation of on-site weather 
monitoring equipment such as remote sens-
ing stations and balloon release and tracking 
equipment. The capabilities of continental 
United States landing sites are being assessed 
to ensure that weather decisions are made 
with accurate and timely data. 
NASA has requested assistance from the 
National Academy of Sciences to identify 
concepts for equipping the Kennedy Space 
Center with the necessary instrumentation 
to provide a prototype forecasting facility 
capable of a 90-minute, high-confidence-level 
forecast. 
A second objective being discussed with 
the National Research Council is a program 
that would encourage the research commu-
nity to sponsor atmospheric activities, utiliz-
ing KSC as a test location, for the applica-
tion of state-of-the-science meteorological 
forecasting techniques and technology. The 
council has appointed its Mesoscale Research 
Panel to address this request and to provide 
NASA with an implementation plan. 
DUAL FERRY CAPABILITY 
NASA has assessed the requirements and 
initiated budgetary actions for an additional 
Boeing 747 aircraft to provide an NSTS dual 
ferry capability. Funding for the aircraft mod-
ification kit used to attach the orbiter to the 
aircraft has been approved, and funding for 
an additional aircraft has been requested. 
With the availability of the second aircraft, 
the dual ferry capability will be operational 
by 1990.
Recommendation VII 
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Recommendation VII 
Launch Abort and Crew Escape. The 
Shuttle program management considered 
first-stage abort options and crew escape 
options several times during the history of 
the program, but because of limited utility, 
technical infeasibility, or program cost and
schedule, no systems were implemented. The 
Commission recommends that NASA: 
• Make all efforts to provide a crew escape 
system for use during controlled gliding 
flight. 
• Make every effort to increase the range of 
flight conditions under which an emer-
gency runway landing can be successfully 
conducted in the event that two or three 
main engines fail early in ascent. 
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RECOMMENDATION VII 
LAUNCH ABORT 
NASA is assessing the operational 
aspects of the launch phase and its associated 
abort modes. Launch abort mode definition 
and the associated ground and crew proce-
dures, the range safety system, and the flight 
rules and launch commit criteria have been 
reviewed. 
The modes of powered-flight abort were 
reviewed to ensure that procedures have 
been defined to maximize the flight condi-
tions in which the crew can successfully 
achieve a runway landing or controlled 
escape, if an escape system is available. 
The following abort modes exist during 
the launch phase: return to the launch site, 
transatlantic abort landing, abort once 
around, and abort to orbit. Abort bounda-
ries for these conditions are defined for each 
mission and are a function of vehicle weight 
and performance. Figure 30 provides a sche-
matic representation of these modes. 
Each Shuttle flight has abort techniques 
to ensure that, if orbital insertion cannot be 
realized, a runway landing can be achieved. 
These techniques, which protect against the 
loss of major vehicle system capability or loss 
of a single Space Shuttle main engine 
(SSME), are called intact aborts. Each intact
bort trajectory is carefully tailored to avoid 
exceeding the vehicle structural and thermal 
load capability as a result of the aerodynamic 
forces encountered during atmospheric 
flight. 
The on-board computer contains soft-
ware for both the three SSME normal trajec-
tory profiles and the two SSME intact abort 
mode trajectory profiles. These profiles are 
evaluated for each launch to ensure that they 
are acceptable for the specific wind condi-
tions measured on the day of launch. 
The loss of two or three SSME's (contin-
gency abort) has always been recognized as a 
potential event for any Shuttle launch, and 
manual piloting procedures were in place to 
cover these engine failure cases. The proce-
dures were developed in the Shuttle mission 
simulator at the Johnson Space Center and 
were primarily designed to accommodate the 
pilot interfaces with the orbiter flight control 
system and on-board software. 
The contingency abort modes were not 
initially subjected to the formal program cer-
tification process because they were not 
included in the program design require-
ments. As part of the return-to-flight process, 
an assessment of all aspects of contingency 
aborts, including crew procedures, has been 
initiated. Emphasis is being placed on the 
determination of vehicle structural integrity 
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as it is exposed to the abort environments. 
Where striictural concerns are indicated, 
changes to the procedures are being evalu-
ated to determine their effectiveness in 
reducing the impacts. In those cases where 
piloting techniques are critical, with small 
tolerance for errors or deviations, automatic 
techniques are being evaluated for incorpora-
tion into the on-board software. The overall 
objective is to improve the probability of 
crew survival, either by achieving a runway 
landing at an abort site or by successfully fly-
ing the vehicle to within the conditions 
established for crew escape. 
Shuttle launches from the Kennedy 
Space Center normally place the vehicle in 
one of two orbital inclinations: 28.5 degrees 
or 57 degrees. The ascent ground track pro-
file for these typical launches is shown in 
Figure 31. Selected landing fields, as shown
in the figure, are provided on the European 
and African continents for use in the event a 
transatlantic abort mode is required. 
It is advantageous to have a landing site 
located near the ground track so that an 
abort landing can be achieved as quickly and 
safely as possible under minimum vehicle 
performance requirements. Dakar, Senegal, 
has provided this capability in the past for 
28.5-degree launches; however, Dakar has 
some unfavorable topographic features and is 
not now considered to be acceptable as the 
"nominal" 28.5-degree landing site location. 
Several alternate locations along or near the 
ground track were assessed, and the landing 
field at Ben Guerir, Morocco, was selected as 
the prime 28.5-degree site. Equipment 
requirements for Ben Guerir have been iden-
tified and are being implemented to support 
the first flight.
Figure 30. Space Shuttle Ascent Abort Modes
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Figure 31. Orbiter Abort Landing Sites 
The weather support equipment and 
landing aids at all transatlantic landing sites 
are being augmented to increase the poten-
tial for landing safely in the event of an 
abort. 
RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM 
The Commission suggested that NASA 
and the Air Force critically reexamine the 
need for retaining a destruct package on the 
external tank. A review team composed of 
NASA, Air Force, and range safety person-
nel has reviewed the total range safety sys-
tem, including the destruct package, and 
found that it will operate and perform as
designed. The issue of whether the external 
tank portion of the system could, or should, 
be removed is being assessed, and a decision 
is expected in mid-1988. 
The Naval Surface Weapons Center is 
participating in this review and performing 
analyses of potential solid rocket booster 
breakup scenarios to assess the probability of 
booster debris destroying the external tank. 
Guidelines and procedures governing 
range safety tasks at the launch site and in 
flight have been reviewed. Several issues 
require further action and are receiving 
attention from both NASA and Air Force 
management. Joint approval of updated 
range safety documentation will be obtained 
before first flight. 
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DOCUMENTATION REVIEWS 
Flight rules (which define the response to 
specific vehicle anomalies that might occur 
during flight) are being reviewed and 
updated. The Flight Rules Document is being 
reformatted to include both the technical 
and operational rationale for each rule. The 
review process is validating the performance 
limits set for each system and the data source 
for those limits. 
Launch commit criteria (which define 
responses to specific vehicle and ground sup-
port system anomalies that might occur dur-
ing launch countdown) are being reviewed 
and updated. These criteria are being modi-
fied to include the technical and operational 
rationale and to document any procedural 
work-arounds that would allow the count-
down to proceed in the event one of the cri-
teria was violated. 
CREW ESCAPE 
Although a final decision to implement a 
Space Shuttle crew escape system has not
been made, the requirements for a capability 
to provide crew egress during controlled glid-
ing flight have been established. Require-
ments for safe egress of up to eight crew mem-
bers were determined through a review of 
vehicle escape routes, time lines, escape sce-
narios, and proposed orbiter modifications. 
The options for crew egress involve manual 
and powered extraction techniques. Design 
activities and wind tunnel studies have been 
initiated for each of these options. 
Extraction techniques must ensure that 
the crew member does not contact the vehi-
cle immediately after exiting the crew mod-
ule. Several manual approaches being 
assessed for reducing the potential contact 
include a deployable tunnel that would pro-
vide sufficient initial velocity to preclude 
crew/vehicle contact and an extendable rod 
and/or rope that would place the crew 
release point in a safe region. 
In the rod concept (Figure 32), the crew 
module hatch would be jettisoned and the 
rod would be extended through the hatch 
opening. The crew member would attach a 
lanyard to the rod, exit the vehicle in a 
tucked position, release at the end of the rod, 
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Figure 32. Extendable Rod Escape System
and parachute to a ground or water landing. 
The powered extraction technique 
ensures that the crew will not contact the 
vehicle; however, it involves additional 
weight and crew compartment complexity 
and must be thoroughly evaluated to ensure 
that no safety hazards or additional risks 
would result from its implementation. 
A study to determine the optimum pow-
ered extraction system for crew member 
egress was initiated in April 1986. This inves-
tigation included a review of possible escape 
routes and time lines, the effect of potential 
escape scenarios on the crew, and the weight 
and cost impact of required vehicle modifica-
tions. The study goal was to define a safe 
egress concept for up to eight crew members 
with minimal vehicle modification and 
weight penalties. 
The study, completed in September 1986, 
considered ejection seats, tractor rocket 
extraction of seated crew members, bottom 
bail-out, and tractor rocket extraction 
through the side hatch. Each option consid-
ered the crew size, the required orbiter modi-
fications, and the implementation schedule. 
These options are summarized in the follow-
ing paragraphs. 
An ejection seat concept that would 
extract up to five astronauts was assessed. 
During operation, this concept would jetti-
son the tops of both the crew module and the 
forward fuselage before propelling the crew 
out of the opening in individual ejection 
seats. The addition of ejection seats would 
require major structural modification of the 
overhead consoles, flight deck floor, crew 
module structure, and forward fuselage 
structure. 
A new ejection seat design would be 
required because the ejection seats used dur-
ing the orbital flight test program are very 
large, and installation of five seats would 
affect orbiter aft flight deck payload station 
usage. The estimated first availability of the 
ejection seat concept is mid-1990. This con-
cept is not being pursued because of late 
availability, extensive vehicle modifications, 
and crew size limitations. 
Another extraction concept investigated 
was a tractor rocket system that would 
extract up to six seated crew members. Once 
activated, this system would jettison the tops
of the crew module and forward fuselage and 
extract the crew using tractor rockets. This 
concept would require modification of the 
crew module and forward fuselage structure, 
the flight deck floor, and overhead consoles, 
and would affect payload station usage. The 
earliest availability of this modification is 
mid-1990. This configuration is no longer 
being pursued because of late availability, 
vehicle modification requirements, and crew 
size limitations. 
A bottom bail-out concept that would 
provide safe egress for up to eight crew mem-
bers was also assessed. In this concept, a 
panel would be opened on the bottom of the 
orbiter to deploy a guide chute, permitting 
the astronauts to exit the orbiter through the 
chute. This concept would require extensive 
structural modifications, including installa-
tion of a deployable panel and pyrotechnic 
devices to open the panel, design and instal-
lation of the chute, and relocation of some 
subsystem components. Modifications could 
potentially be completed and certified by 
1989, but the concept is not being considered 
because of the highly complex vehicle 
changes required. 
The final concept evaluated was escape 
through the side hatch using tractor rockets 
to propel the astronauts out of the orbiter. 
This method, which could safely extract up 
to eight astronauts, would require early vent-
ing of the crew module to equalize the crew 
module internal pressure with the external 
pressure. After venting is completed, the side 
hatch would be jettisoned. The crew mem-
bers would then exit sequentially by using 
the tractor rockets. Required orbiter changes 
include addition of a cabin vent capability, 
modification of the side hatch structure to 
allow for hatch jettison, addition of pyro-
technic devices to jettison the hatch, and 
installation of the tractor rocket system. 
While a decision to implement the system 
has not been made, development of the side 
hatch extraction capability for use in a crew 
egress/escape system (CEES) has been autho-
rized by the Director, NSTS. The system 
consists of a jettisonable crew hatch (also 
applicable to the manual bail-out mode), 
individual rockets to safely extract the crew 
from the vehicle, and personnel survival 
equipment. The crew escape sequence (Fig-
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ure 33) would be initiated by venting the 
crew module to ensure that no pressure dif-
ferential exists prior to hatch jettison. The 
side hatch would then be pyrotechnically jet-
tisoned at approximately 22,000 feet (Figure 
34). Crew escape would be initiated during 
controlled gliding flight at an altitude of 
20,000 feet and a velocity of 200 miles per 
hour. 
After the hatch is jettisoned, the crew 
moves to the hatch area and climbs onto a 
guide ramp. Each crew member attaches a 
tractor rocket pendant to their parachute/ 
survival pack. The crew member then acti-
vates the tractor rocket, and is extracted 
from the orbiter (Figure 35). Each crew mem-
ber repeats this procedure until the com-
mander exits at an altitude of approximately 
10,000 feet. Minimum desirable ejection alti-
tude is 5,000 feet. 
Once the hatch is jettisoned, a crew of 
eight could nominally egress in less than 2 
minutes. Each parachute/ survival pack 
would include a parachute canopy, activated 
automatically at a predetermined altitude, a Figure 34. Side Hatch Jettison for Crew Escape 
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life raft, and other equipment required for 
survival while awaiting rescue. 
System certification of the CEES will be 
based on component testing, full-scale inte-
grated system tests, wind tunnel tests, and 
aircraft flight tests. Full-scale integrated sys-
tem tests will be conducted combining all 
components of the newly designed equip-
ment. Several tests will be performed to ver-
ify that the entire integrated system func-
tions properly. 
Aircraft tests are planned to verify design 
analysis and the operation of the tractor 
rockets during simulated flight conditions. 
During these tests, anthropomorphic dum-
mies will be extracted from the side of an air-
plane modified to represent the orbiter 
configuration. 
Although the decision on whether to 
incorporate the CEES, pursue one of the 
manual escape modes, or continue develop-
ment of other approaches has not been 
made, the jettisonable hatch modification
has been approved and will be installed prior 
to the first flight. 
FIRST-STAGE-BOOST 
ESCAPE SYSTEM 
A study to evaluate the feasibility of a 
future escape system to potentially enhance 
crew survival during first-stage flight (solid 
rocket boosters thrusting) has been initiated. 
Study objectives include determination of 
system cues required to indicate the need for 
escape, methods of escape initiation, and 
escape system design. 
In support of this study, NASA has 
requested that the Naval Air Development 
Center lead a team of industry and Govern-
ment escape system engineers in performing 
a detailed study of ejection seat concepts to 
determine the feasibility of using them in the 
Shuttle. NASA's Langley Research Center is 
performing a similar study of a system to pro- 
Figure 35. Tractor Rocket Crew Escape System
vide rocket extraction capability from seated 
positions. 
GROUND EGRESS 
Emergency egress procedures for both 
crew and support personnel during the pre-
launch period and after orbiter landing are 
being investigated. This assessment includes 
the hazards present during prelaunch and 
landing operations, the various systems for 
detecting the hazards, and possible egress 
routes. 
A number of areas in the emergency 
egress capability that require improvement 
or further testing or evaluation have been 
identified. An emergency egress rescue work-
ing group has been chartered to resolve these 
issues. 
A prelaunch pad egress simulation was 
conducted at the Kennedy Space Center in 
November 1986. In the test, an orbiter close-
out and rescue crew conducted an end-to-
end emergency egress with flight crew partici-
pation. Action items resulting from this 
exercise are being resolved. Another series of 
tests, to simulate postlanding egress, was con-
ducted in April 1987, and a night pad egress 
exercise was successfully completed in June 
1987. The results of both are being 
evaluated. 
The large number of actions generated by
these tests indicated that some of the existing 
equipment and procedures did not have ade-
quate redundancy or simplicity for emer-
gency use. Major modifications to the launch 
pad have been recommended, including a 
flame protection barrier for the access arm 
and launch pad structure, additional crew 
slide wire systems, and a new crew bunker. 
Other changes being considered include 
items such as improved armored personnel 
carriers for crew evacuation, new emergency 
breathing equipment, additional emergency 
lighting, and upgraded crew training. 
Modifications to the launch pad and 
landing emergency equipment will be 
retested in end-to-end simulations for flight 
readiness certification. Periodic retesting will 
continue as a permanent part of the training 
and qualification process for launch and 
landing operations support personnel. 
An egress slide (Figure 36) that can be 
used for emergency escape after landing is 
included in the CEES hardware develop-
ment activity. This slide, which is similar to 
those used in commercial aircraft, will pro-
vide quick and safe egress for all members of 
the crew. In an emergency situation where 
the side hatch cannot be readily opened on 
the ground, the hatch can be jettisoned and 
the slide activated by the crew. The slide can 
also be used in a postlanding emergency, 
when the hatch can be opened but standard 
ground egress equipment is not available. 
Figure 36. Crew Egress Slide Deployment
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Recommendation VIII 
Flight Rate. The nation's reliance on the 
Shuttle as its principal space launch capabil-
ity created a relentless pressure on NASA to 
increase the flight rate. Such reliance on a
single launch capability should be avoided in 
the future. 
NASA must establish a flight rate that is 
consistent with its resources. A firm payload 
assignment policy should be established. The 
policy should include rigorous controls on 
cargo manifest changes to limit the pressures 
such changes exert on schedules and crew 
training. 
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NASA IMPLEMENTATION
OF RECOMMENDATION VIII 
FLIGHT RATE REQUIREMENTS 
Several major actions taken in the last 
year have reduced the overall requirements 
for NSTS launches. Each of these actions 
reduces the reliance on the Space Shuttle as 
this nation's single launch capability and 
maximizes its availability for missions that 
require the unique capability of the vehicle 
and its crew. 
The addition of a fourth orbiter to the 
fleet will significantly improve the current 
program launch capability. However, a 
reduction in NSTS requirements must be 
achieved to ensure a launch rate consistent 
with the available resources. 
NASA and the Department of Defense 
(DOD) have jointly established, and are 
implementing, a mixed-fleet concept of 
expendable launch vehicles (ELV's) and the 
Shuttle to meet national requirements for 
access to space. Many of the DOD payloads 
previously scheduled on the NSTS can be 
launched on ELV's. NASA and DOD have 
identified these payloads and replanned the 
overall launch strategy to provide for their 
launches on ELV's. 
The initial step in this effort resulted in 
the identification of requirements for more 
than twice the number of Titan IV launch
vehicles (10 to 23) planned for DOD pay-
loads in the near term (through 1992). The 
Shuttle and the Titan IV are nearly equiva -
lent in launch capability; therefore each 
additional Titan IV launch reduces the DOD 
requirements for NSTS launches by one 
flight. 
The medium launch vehicle (MLV) being 
developed by DOD will be used to launch 
Navstar Global Positioning System satellites. 
Some 20 of these DOD satellites, previously 
scheduled for deployment from the NSTS, 
are now planned for the MLV. As part of the 
budget and manifest planning exercises cur-
rently under way, NASA and DOD are eval- 
uating options for additional offloading of 
payloads from the Shuttle to ELV's. 
The presidential decision to limit use of 
the NSTS for launch of communication sat-
ellites to those with national security or for-
eign policy implications has resulted in more 
than 20 of these satellites, previously sched-
uled on the NSTS, being reassigned to com-
mercial ELV's. NASA has worked actively 
with the United States commercial ELV 
industry and the commercial satellite owners 
and operators to ensure an orderly 
transition. 
The NASA Office of Space Flight con-
ducted a study to determine the civil payload 
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launch requirements that could be satisfied 
with a mixed fleet. This study concluded that 
approximately 25 percent of the NASA and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration payloads currently scheduled for 
launch on the NSTS could potentially be 
launched on ELV's. 
NASA has initiated the overall planning 
required to implement a mixed fleet, to 
define the required near- and far-term launch 
requirements, and to identify the number, 
type, and cost of the launch vehicles required 
to satisfy the requirements. 
For payloads in the post-1992 time 
period, the mixed-fleet study recommended 
further Shuttle offloading through the use of 
an unmanned Shuttle-derived vehicle 
(SDV). NASA is vigorously exploring SDV
concepts as a means of satisfying future pay-
load requirements. 
FLIGHT RATE CONSISTENT 
WITH RESOURCES 
In March 1986, Admiral Truly directed 
that a "bottoms-up" Shuttle flight rate capa-
bility assessment be conducted. To accom-
plish this, a Flight Rate Capability Working 
Group was established. Representatives from 
each NSTS Program element that affects the 
flight rate participated in the group. 
Ground rules were developed to ensure 
that projected flight rates were realistic. 
These ground rules addressed such items as 
overall staffing of the launch process work 
Key: 
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LAUNCH PAD 
force, work shifting, overtime, astronaut 
training, and maintenance/inspection 
requirements for the orbiter, main engine, 
solid rocket motor, and other critical 
systems. 
Based on these ground rules, a careful 
assessment was made of the vehicle proces-
sing cycle (Figure 37), the payload prepara-
tion process (Figure 38), and the mission 
planning process (Figure 39) to determine 
their capacity to support the flight rate. The 
actual flight rate that can be achieved at any 
time is dependent on a well-defined and sta-
ble set of requirements that allow all the 
activities portrayed in these figures to be 
accomplished on a carefully planned basis. 
The working group identified enhance- 
ments required for the Shuttle mission simu-
lator, the Mission Control Center, the 
Orbiter Processing Facility, and other areas 
such as training aircraft and provisioning of
spares. With these enhancements and the 
replacement orbiter, NASA projects a maxi-
mum capability of 14 flights per year (Fig-
ure 40). This capacity, considering lead time 
constraints, learning curves, and budget limi-
tations, is expected to be achieved by 1994. 
The experience gained after flights are 
resumed will be used to adjust future flight 
rate projections. 
Two independent assessments of Shuttle 
flight rate capability have been made. A 
National Research Council (NRC) report 
published in October states in part: 
"Three Orbiters can sustain a rate of 8 to 
10 flights per year after an initial buildup 
period of approximately 2 years provid-
ing: (1) no Orbiter is lost or becomes 
inoperable, (2) adequate logistics support 
exists, and (3) no problems exist that 
require extensive downtime. A surge rate 
of 12 flights per year should be possible 
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for short periods of time for simple pay-
loads and flight plans. 
"With a 4-Orbiter fleet the sustainable 
flight rate would be 11-13 per year with a 
surge rate of 15 flights per year only if 
appropriate ground support facilities are 
acquired. 
"In order to sustain such rates and take 
account of possible contingencies, the 
Shuttle scheduling should be based upon 
fewer vehicles than are actually in the 
inventory by almost one Orbiter:" 
The other independent assessment was 
made by the Aerospace Safety Advisory 
Panel. At the conclusion of their study, the 
panel concurred with the NRC report. Since 
these assessments are in close agreement with 
the NASA assessment, it is felt that the capa-
bility projections are realistic.
MANIFESTING POLICY AND 
RIGOROUS CONTROLS 
The manifesting and scheduling of pay-
loads on the NSTS will be consistent with 
the flight rate projections defined above. 
To ensure the stability of future cargo 
manifests, firm policies have been established 
and a formal control process has been imple-
mented. The control process provides for a 
series of "freeze points" (Figure 39), at speci-
fied intervals over the year and a half 
required to prepare for each flight, that rig-
idly define the vehicle, payload, and mission 
characteristics. 
Approximately 18 months before launch, 
the flight production process begins with a 
flight/cargo freeze point that baselines the 
primary payload assignments and defines the 
orbiter vehicle configuration. Only manda-
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tory changes required to ensure crew or vehi-
cle safety, or the accomplishment of primary 
mission objectives, will be made after this 
point. 
Eleven months before launch, the cargo 
integration freeze point baselines the detailed 
flight design, orbiter hardware and software, 
payload specialists assignments, if any, and 
secondary payloads. 
At 7 months, the flight planning and 
stowage freeze point baselines crew activities 
and crew compartment stowage. This is the 
last opportunity to add orbiter mid deck or 
small payload bay self-contained payloads 
that meet standard NSTS interface require-
ments. One month later, the ascent flight 
design-launch site flow review freeze point 
baselines the ascent trajectory and the 
launch site work plan. 
This freeze point process is conducted 
under the rigorous rules of the NSTS change 
control process. This ensures that changes 
receive the proper senior program manage-
ment review and are acceptable in terms of 
their effect on crew training, work schedules, 
and other elements that could adversely 
impact mission safety. 
Other facts that strengthen manifest sta-
bility include:
• Removal of the NSTS from competition 
with commercially available launch ser-
vices has substantially relieved the pres-
sure of payload demands that precipi-
tated many of the late manifest changes 
that occurred on the previous flights. 
• NASA policy regarding the role of pay-
load specialists is presently under high-
level management review. Although the 
completion of this review is scheduled for 
late 1987, firm decisions already made 
ensure that adequate time will be avail-
able to incorporate the payload specialist 
activities into the mission plans and to 
properly train the crew. 
• The presently approved planetary mis-
sions will be launched on the NSTS. The 
threat of the increase in program costs 
and loss of science that result from delay 
of one of these missions puts a heavy 
stress on the system, not only on the 
planetary launch itself but also on the 
preceding missions. To avoid the poten-
tial launch pressure from two planetary 
missions in sequence, NASA has estab-
lished manifesting rules that prohibit the 
scheduling of consecutive missions with 
fixed launch periods. New planetary mis-
77
sions will be strong candidates for launch 
by unmanned launch vehicles. 
The actions discussed above are being 
implemented, and the flight rate is now set at 
an achievable level, consistent with program 
resources, the four-orbiter fleet, and an 
agency-wide commitment to safety. With the 
mixed-fleet policy, many payloads have been
reassigned to other launch vehicles. Firm 
manifesting policies have been established, 
and rigorous change control procedures have 
been implemented. Any required manifest 
change that is not consistent with these 
defined policies will cause that payload to be 
scheduled on a later mission. The resump-
tion of flight is approached with confidence 
that these measures will prove effective. 
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Recommendation IX 
Maintenance Safeguards. Installation, test, 
and maintenance procedures must be espe-
cially rigorous for Space Shuttle items desig-
nated Criticality 1. NASA should establish a 
system of analyzing and reporting perfor-
mance trends of such items. 
Maintenance procedures for such items 
should be specified in the Critical Items List,
especially for those such as the liquid-fueled 
main engines, which require unstinting 
maintenance and overhaul. 
With regard to the Orbiters, NASA should: 
• Develop and execute a comprehensive 
maintenance inspection plan. 
• Perform periodic structural inspections 
when scheduled and not permit them to 
be waived. 
• Restore and support the maintenance 
and spare parts programs, and stop the 
practice of removing parts from one 
Orbiter to supply another.
NASA IMPLEMENTATION
OF RECOMMENDATION IX 
NASA has developed an improved integ-
rity assurance program to ensure that the 
performance of all systems meets the design 
requirements for each flight. 
System integrity assurance includes those 
configuration, inspection, maintenance, 
operations, and analysis activities, beginning 
with initial hardware acceptance tests and 
continuing through the life of the hardware, 
that are required to ensure safe and reliable 
operation of the NSTS. These activities are 
performed at the launch and landing sites, 
the design centers, element contractor facili-
ties, off-line repair and maintenance facili-
ties, and during flight operations. Informa -
tion management systems that provide the 
appropriate visibility into these activities are 
part of the overall program. 
Development of this capability is being 
complemented by a program-wide documen-
tation review to rebaseline the NSTS proces-
sing requirements and procedures. 
MAINTENANCE SAFEGUARDS 
NASA has developed and published the 
System Integrity Assurance Program (SlAP) 
Plan to ensure that the NSTS Program is sup-
ported by an integrated maintenance and
logistics program. The SlAP establishes the 
functional responsibilities and program 
requirements necessary to provide the proper 
configuration, operations, inspection, main-
tenance, logistics, and certified personnel to 
ensure that the NSTS is ready for flight. 
The SlAP includes a management infor-
mation system that provides the necessary 
insight into requirements verification, prob-
lems, anomalies, and performance trends to 
verify the status of readiness for the next 
flight. The Deputy Director, NSTS Program, 
is responsible for ensuring implementation of 
the SlAP Plan. 
The program compliance assurance and 
status system (PCASS), a relational data base 
and reporting system that provides the capa-
bility for data and problem communications 
and control across the program, is the key 
element of the SlAP. It compiles data from 
the project elements and provides NSTS 
management with visibility and access into 
program critical data, including require-
ments status, problem data, trends, risk deci-
sions, hazards, critical item history, and fail-
ure modes and effects analysis/critical item 
data. This system provides the information 
required by the safety, reliability, maintaina-
bility, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) 
organization to perform analysis and report 
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data independently of the NSTS. Figure 41 
reflects the major capabilities of the SlAP. 
The major elements of the PCASS are indi-
cated in Figure 42. 
Specific tasks and responsibilities for 
establishing format and data requirements 
have been identified for the NSTS Program 
and each project element, and are being 
implemented. These data will be collected 
and reported, using systems currently in 
place, until the system software can be fully 
developed. Data acquired will be used to ver-
ify that all configurations, operations, and 
maintenance requirements, structural inspec-
tions, problems, or actions have been closed 
out, or waivers have been written prior to 
each flight. 
The PCASS will provide visibility into 
the status of mission flow, flight hardware 
schedules, operational maintenance require-
ments, and launch constraints, and provide 
status, assessment results, and closure ration-
ale for Criticality 1 and 1R hardware and 
software anomalies. 
All anomalies occurring during flight 
vehicle prelaunch processing, flight, and 
turnaround and maintenance will be incor-
porated into the data base, as will anomalies 
occurring in the Shuttle mission simulator, 
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory, and 
off-line maintenance facilities. The data 
repository provides the capability to corre-
late actual failures with predicted failures and 
to generate critical item status and history 
reports. 
A risk decision history data base will be 
included in the system and will be used to 
assist program management in reviewing 
deferral actions, waivers, and exceptions. 
Trend analysis algorithms will be used to per-
form reliability, performance, and supporta-
bility trends and will form the basis for modi-
fying requirements, procedures, and/or 
spares inventories. 
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ANALYSIS AND REPORTING 
The SRM&QA organization will use the 
PCASS data to: 
• Support independent safety assessments 
of hardware and software that perform 
Criticality 1 and 1R functions 
• Review and update failure modes and 
effects analysis (FMEA)/Critical Items 
List (CIL)/hazard analysis (HA) 
• Establish mandatory quality acceptance 
criteria for work performed on the 
vehicles 
• Identify repetitive failures for manage-
ment visibility and action 
• Develop reliability trends and projections 
SRM&QA is responsible for implement-
ing an independent problem reporting and 
corrective action system for the NSTS Pro-
gram. The element projects are responsible 
for providing the data for this system. Utiliz-
ing the data compiled by the projects, 
SRM&QA will monitor the performance of, 
and perform trend analyses on, selected Crit-
icality 1, 1R, and 2 components. 
The NSTS will utilize the PCASS and 
the problem reporting and corrective action 
system to analyze the performance of all ele-
ment hardware and software systems. This
analysis will be performed at the system line 
replaceable unit (LRU) level. Specific "perfor-
mance change" criteria will be defined 
which, when exceeded, will result in a 
detailed review of the affected LRU or sys-
tem. Performance trend data will be used to 
extend the design life of the LRU's, when the 
data indicate such an extension is justified. 
Adverse performance trends will be used to 
define a reduced design life validation 
program. 
Performance trend data collection 
requirements will be defined, and the data 
collected will be analyzed and used to update 
such factors as turnaround time, mean time 
between failures/repairs, and maintenance 
demand rates. Equipment supportability 
trend data will be used for establishing logis-
tics requirements, which will ensure that ade-
quate spares and provisions are available to 
support the projected flight rate. Time/age/ 
cycle requirements developed from data com-
piled through the PCASS will be incorpo-
rated into the appropriate maintenance and 
operational documentation. 
A design life validation program is being 
developed which will verify that critical 
LRU's and systems meet their certified design 
life requirements. Factors such as time/age/ 
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life cycle, degradation/wear, and perfor-
mance comparisons with original acceptance 
test results will be considered in selecting 
components for teardown analysis. Results of 
the teardown analyses will be integrated into 
the processing requirements, design life certi-
fication, time/age/cycle limits, logistics 
requirements, FMEA/CIUs, and hazard 
analyses, as appropriate. 
SPARES AND MAINTENANCE 
A prime objective of the SlAP is to 
ensure a strong logistics (spares) and mainte-
nance function. Logistics support plans are 
being reviewed, updated, and implemented 
by the element projects in accordance with 
requirements contained in the SlAP. These 
plans will identify the requirements for spares 
and provisions necessary for supporting 
flight-to-flight reconfiguration, maintenance 
operations, and replacement of failed and 
limited-life LRU's, to preclude the need for 
using LRU's from other flight vehicle or 
ground systems. 
NASA has alleviated the requirement for 
routine removal of parts from one vehicle to 
supply another by expanding and accelerat-
ing various aspects of the NSTS logistics pro-
gram. The SlAP defines the ground rules for 
such removal of parts, which will be permit-
ted only when approved by the Program 
Requirements Control Board. 
An improved hardware inventory man-
agement system is being implemented to 
track hardware availability and inventory 
requirements. Spares and repair forecasting 
techniques are being updated Using projected
flight rate and trend analysis data. Spares 
and provisioning requirements to support 
replacement of failed or limited-life hardware 
are being addressed. 
Additional repair capability is being 
developed for the Shuttle Services Center to 
ensure that flight and critical ground hard-
ware can be repaired and maintained within 
design specification requirements in a timely 
manner. The center provides the capability 
to perform local test and repair of compo-
nents and reduces the need for sending items 
back to theoriginal equipment manufacturer 
for repair. Hardware status will be main-
tained through modification/repair cycles, 
and data will be recorded to support trend 
analysis. 
DOCUMENTATION REVIEWS 
Program-wide reviews of the vehicle pro-
cessing requirements and implementation 
documents are under way, and are discussed 
in Part 2 of this report. This review and revi-
sion of existing maintenance documentation 
by each NSTS project has resulted in the 
identification of new maintenance and 
inspection requirements, which are being 
incorporated into the appropriate documen-
tation after review and approval. The opera-
tional maintenance instructions are being 
modified to ensure that all procedures which 
involve Criticality 1 and 1R items are promi-
nently displayed. These documents must be 
approved by the appropriate NASA design 
center prior to use. Any changes that affect 
critical items or critical processes must 
receive appropriate design center concur-
rence. 
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RELATED RETURN-TO-FLIGHT ACTIONS 
Several activities are under way or 
planned to support the safe return to flight 
that are not directly related to the Commis-
sion recommendations. These include: 
• The program requirements for flight and 
ground system hardware and software are 
being updated to provide a clear defini-
tion of the criteria that the project ele-
ment designs must satisfy. 
• The NSTS system designs have been 
reviewed, and items requiring modifica-
tion prior to flight have been identified. 
• Existing and modified hardware and soft-
ware designs are being verified to ensure 
that they are compliant with the design 
requirements. 
• The program and project documenta-
tion, which implements the redefined 
program requirements, is being reviewed 
and updated. 
• Major testing, training, and launch prep-
aration activities are continuing or are 
being planned. 
MAJOR REVIEWS 
Design Requirements Review (DRR) 
The DRR process, begun in the spring of 
1986, is a programmatic review of NSTS 
07700, Volume X, Space Shuttle Flight and
Ground System Specification, and the 
Shuttle Interface Control Documents 
(lCD's). 
Volume X identifies the basic require-
ments that the element hardware must be 
designed and certified to meet. The lCD's 
define the electrical, fluid, and mechaniëal 
interfaces between the elements and between 
the elements and the ground support 
systems. 
Reviews are being conducted by each ele-
ment contractor, the system integration con-
tractor, and NASA. Proposed changes to 
amplify, add, or delete requirements are 
being presented to the element projects to 
establish a recommended list of changes. The 
list is reviewed by the NSTS Engineering Inte-
gration Office for resolution of the change rec-
ommendations. Changes approved by this 
office are submitted to the Program Require-
ments Control Board (PRCB) for approval. 
When complete, the DRR process will 
provide the NSTS Program with improved, 
updated documentation of the design 
requirements and will ensure that each proj-
ect element has a clear understanding of the 
criteria that its design must satisfy. 
System Design Review (SDR) 
The NSTS Program initiated the SDR 
process to ensure review of all concerns 
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related to hardware and software perfor-
mance in the mission environment and to 
identify items requiring redesign, analysis, or 
test prior to flight. Each organizational ele-
ment of the program participated in this pro-
cess. SDR items originated from design or 
test issues, prelaunch operations experience, 
in-flight operations or anomalies, postflight 
inspection or analyses, and other design or 
operations assessments. The review included 
a thorough description of the system issue, its 
potential consequences, recommended cor-
rective action, and alternatives. Three cate-
gories were established to prioritize the 
changes: 
• Category 1. Changes/studies required 
prior to the next flight because the cur-
rent design may not contain a sufficient 
safety margin. 
• Category 2. Changes/studies not 
required before the next flight but which 
should be implemented in the near term 
to increase the safety margin. 
• Category 3. Changes/studies required to 
enhance vehicle safety, performance, or 
operations. These items consist of modifi-
cations and studies that can be approved
in the normal project and program con-
trol boards and implemented under nor-
mal program schedules. 
The failure modes and effects analysis 
(FMEA)/Critical Items List (CIL) reviews of 
flight hardware, software, and ground sup-
port equipment also identified items requir-
ing redesign, analysis, and/or testing before 
first flight. The major system changes for 
each element project that resulted from the 
SDR and the FMEA/CIL reviews are sum-
marized below. 
Orbiter. The orbiter SDR identified 
approximately 60 Category 1 system or com-
ponent changes. Other changes were identi-
fied that will be installed on the vehicle for 
later flights. These changes are necessary to 
gain additional systems margin and to mini-
mize risk. Figure 43 reflects several of the 
more important orbiter modifications. 
Two of the changes for the first flight 
involve the main propulsion system and the 
reaction control system. A positive latch-
open design feature for the main propulsion 
system disconnect valve between the orbiter 
and the external tank is being developed to 
ensure that the valve remains open during 
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powered flight, even if an electrical failure 
occurs. The orbiter reaction control system 
engines, which provide on-orbit attitude con-
trol, are being modified to turn off automati-
cally if they experience thrust instability 
and/or chamber wall burn-through. 
Two significant design changes in the 
orbiter thermal protection system (TPS) have 
been approved. The TPS in the wing elevon 
cove region has been damaged on several 
flights, and a detailed redesign will be imple-
mented before the next flight. A new carbon-
carbon panel is being developed to replace 
the TPS tiles on the forward end of the 
orbiter between the nose cap and the nose 
wheel door. This panel will be phased into 
the flight vehicles after its verification pro-
gram is completed. 
Another first-flight design change in pro-
cess is the addition of an electrical interlock 
to the auxiliary power unit tank shut-off 
valves to preclude electrical failures that 
could overheat the valves and cause decom-
position of the fuel (hydrazine). Alternating-
current-motor valve bellows in the orbital 
maneuvering system that have leaked 
because of improper manufacturing proce-
dures are being replaced on a priority basis. 
An improved design for the fuel cell 
power unit subsystem is being implemented 
to provide an alternate path for removing 
water generated by the fuel cells. This new 
path provides greater physical separation 
from the other two paths and reduces the 
possible loss of water-removal capability for a 
single freezing incident. Blockage of all these 
paths would result in loss of the three cells 
and all orbiter power within a very short 
time. 
Space Shuttle Main Engines. Approxi-
mately 20 Category 1 changes to increase the 
operating life, safety, reliability, and quality 
of the Space Shuttle main engines (SSME's) 
are being implemented. The primary objec-
tive of these changes is to expand the engine 
operating margins in areas such as tempera-
ture, pressure, and operating time. This 
effort includes an enhanced engine ground 
test program to certify hardware improve-
ments for nominal operation at power levels 
of 104 percent for the initial flights. Figure 44 
shows several of the important SSME 
modifications. 
• STRUCTURAL HOUSING 
IMPROVEMENT 
Figure 44. Major Space Shuttle Main Engine Modifications
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These SSME changes include modifica-
tions to the high-pressure turbopump blades 
to significantly reduce the susceptibility to 
cracking in structurally critical areas. 
Improvements in structural capabilities of 
components such as the main fuel valve 
housing and the main combustion chamber 
outlet neck will result in significant increases 
(factor of 4) in useful life. 
Changes to the high-pressure fuel turbo-
pump coolant circuit will reduce the overall 
operating pressures and the redline (cutoff) 
values. The current hydraulic actuators are 
being replaced with actuators that have 
improved manufacturing cleanliness require-
ments and design modifications to reduce the 
susceptibility to electrical shorts. These 
changes will reduce the probability of launch 
pad aborts. 
The engine ground test program has been 
emphasized and accelerated in order to dem-
onstrate existing margins to the maximum 
extent possible and to certify those changes 
planned for incorporation prior to the return 
to flight. This emphasis will ensure maximum 
ground test exposure of the hardware, with a 
resultant increase in confidence prior to the 
resumption of flight.
External Tank. Eight changes to the 
external tank are required for first flight. 
These include strengthening the gaseous 
hydrogen pressurization line fairing and sup-
port structure, adding a freezer wrap to per-
mit visual detection of a hydrogen fire, and 
other changes to improve the overall system 
safety margin. 
Solid Rocket Booster. In addition to the 
solid rocket motor (SRM) redesign effort dis-
cussed under Recommendation I, several 
design changes are being implemented on the 
solid rocket booster (SRB) assembly in prepa-
ration for the next flight. These include 
changes in the ET aft attach ring structure, 
the SRB forward structural assembly, the aft 
skirt, and the ground interfaces. Figure 45 
identifies the location of the major SRB mod-
ifications. 
The SRB/ET aft attach ring structure is
being modified from the existing structure of
approximately 270-degree wraparound to a 
new structure with a 360-degree wraparound 
to increase the margin of safety. Hardware
design and planning for test verification for
the new attach ring are currently in progress. 
Design changes, special tests, and 
Figure 45. Major SRB Modifications
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studies/ assessments have been performed on 
the SRB forward assembly and the aft skirt 
structures. Improved analytical modeling 
techniques and better understanding of 
dynamic flight loads permitted identification 
of areas in the aft skirt structure that need to 
be strengthened. Structural capability is 
being improved by increasing the strength of 
selected bolts and by adding gussets and 
brackets. 
The SRB ground interfaces are being 
redesigned to provide prelaunch heater 
power and heated nitrogen purge gas for 
environmental control of critical 
components. 
Launch Processing and Ground Sup-
port Equipment. SDR activities at the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have resulted 
in several facility modifications. Special 
debris traps have been incorporated into the 
ground interfaces between the orbiter and 
the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen servic-
ing systems. These traps prevent the entry of 
potentially dangerous objects into the flight 
vehicle during propellant loading. 
Wire harness and fluid line covers are 
being incorporated into the orbiter aft com-
partment area to improve protection of criti-
cal orbiter subsystem elements during 
ground crew servicing. 
The hydrogen vent umbilical arm is 
being modified to increase the factor of 
safety, to add a more flexible vacuum-
jacketed flex line, and to reduce the weight of 
the retractable structure. Other design 
improvements for the hold-down post blast 
shield, the orbiter emergency-egress access 
arm, and miscellaneous ground interface 
hardware are in progress. 
Two new facilities, the Orbiter Mainte-
nance and Refurbishment Building and the 
SRB Refurbishment Building, have recently 
been completed. These facilities will house 
activities previously conducted in the Vehicle 
Assembly Building, thus enhancing orbiter 
and SRB turnaround operations. 
Design Certification Review (DCR) 
A DCR will be conducted approximately 
3 months prior to flight and will be similar to
the initial DCR held in April 1979. The 
objective of the DCR is to recertify the 
design of all NSTS hardware and software 
elements. The review will be based on the 
updated design requirements reflected in the 
Space Shuttle system specification, the 
Shuttle lCD's, and the major element con-
tract end item specifications. This effort will 
verify that the existing and new hardware 
and software designs are in compliance with 
the design requirements. 
A detailed evaluation will be made of the 
results of the testing and analysis performed 
to certify that the redesigned hardware and 
software satisfy the program requirements for 
each element. The DCR will certify that the 
NSTS element designs meet all requirements 
for safe return to flight. 
DOCUMENTATION IMPROVEMENTS 
The program and project documentation 
that implements the redefined program 
requirements is being reviewed and updated 
to ensure that documents are accurate and 
reflect the current return-to-flight NSTS 
design configurations. 
Master Verification Plans (MVP's) 
MVP's provide the guidelines and con-
straints and define the rationale that is used 
to verify that the hardware design meets con-
figuration, performance, inspection, and 
maintenance requirements. They identify 
the analysis and the development, accept-
ance, qualification, and system integrated 
testing that must be performed to certify the 
hardware for flight. 
MVP's were originally prepared for each 
subsystem and major element before STS-1. 
Each element subsystem manager submitted 
a verification completion notice (VCN) upon 
successful completion of all required tests 
and analyses. These VCN's have been 
rescinded by the Director, NSTS. 
Each project manager is required to 
reevaluate his element verification in light of 
the Volume X design requirement changes 
and any hardware design modifications made 
since the last subsystem certification and to 
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submit new and/or revised VCN's as part of 
the DCR. 
Operational Maintenance Requirements 
Specification Document (OMRSD) 
The OMRSD defines the specific require-
ments for inspection, test, and checkout veri-
fication of the program hardware systems 
and software prior to each flight. The 
requirements take into consideration the 
fundamental checkout philosophy defined in 
the MVP, the CIL retention rationale for 
each system, and design center checkout 
requirements to identify those activities nec-
essary to ensure safe operation of the vehicle 
during flight. 
One of the specific actions under way is a 
complete review of the OMRSD. This review 
will be completed prior to the next flight and 
will ensure that the requirements defined in 
the document are complete and are consis-
tent with the MVP and the results of the 
FMEA/CIL review. 
Operations and Maintenance 
Instruction (OMI) 
OMI's document the specific procedures 
used by KSC operational personnel to per-
form all activities on the flight hardware and 
associated ground support equipment. These 
instructions are being revised to include 
changes from the FMEA/CIL and OMRSD 
reviews and to improve the format. 
An OMI and CIL implementation plan 
has been developed to ensure that test and 
maintenance activities involving hardware 
items designated Criticality 1 or 1R are 
prominently identified in the OMI 
documents. 
Each operating procedure is being 
assessed by review teams made up of repre-
sentatives from the Shuttle processing con-
tractor, NASA (KSC and the design center), 
the design contractor, and SRM&QA. 
OMI's are approved by the appropriate 
NASA design center before being released. 
Any deviations that affect critical items or 
requirements must be approved by the 
appropriate design center.
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) 
Launch commit criteria define the launch 
countdown operating limits for the ground 
and flight systems and provide the actions 
required in the event one of the limits is 
exceeded. LCC are used by the launch team 
to monitor the readiness of the vehicle in the 
6-hour time period between external tank 
loading and lift-off. 
The LCC are being modified to include 
the technical and operational rationale and 
to document the procedural workarounds, if 
any, that would allow the countdown to pro-
ceed in the event one of the criteria was vio-
lated. The recommended changes to the 
LCC are then reviewed and approved by the 
appropriate management levels prior to 
being submitted to the PRCB for final 
approval and publication. 
NASA and its contractors began the 
LCC review in April 1987. The task includes 
assessment of results from the FMEA/CIL 
reviews and incorporation of all authorized 
hardware modifications to the vehicle. The 
LCC review is scheduled to be completed in 
November 1987. 
New Documentation 
The need for a set of formal element 
interface functional analyses to verify hard-
ware criticality classifications and to identify 
failure effects across the vehicle-to-ground 
interfaces during turnaround operations (i.e., 
landing, mate/demate, element/vehicle 
checkout, prelaunch, and launch) was identi-
fied early in the documentation review pro-
cess. These analyses have been initiated, and 
critical safety-related portions will be com-
pleted prior to the first flight. 
A functional fault tolerance analysis of all 
vehicle subsystems has been initiated. This 
analysis will determine the synergistic and 
multiple failure effects between each func-
tional subsystem and its interactive subsys-
tems, and the resulting impacts on the total 
system. For a system as complex as the 
Shuttle, this analysis requires an extended 
period of time for completion. Planning to 
make certain that priority is given to critical 
systems related to overall system safety has 
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been initiated, ensuring that analyses 
required for the first flight will be completed. 
KSC TESTING 
Because of the vehicle and launch facility 
modifications in progress, the long stand-
down period since the last Shuttle flight, and 
the need for launch team training, an 
unmanned Shuttle vehicle wet countdown 
demonstration test (CDDT) and a flight 
readiness firing (FRF) of the Space Shuttle 
main engines will be conducted. These tests 
are required to demonstrate vehicle integrity 
and to ensure a safe return to flight. 
Conditions to be demonstrated during 
these tests will be similar to the actual count-
down time line and launch preparations, 
except for periods of the wet CDDT where 
special test objectives will be accomplished. 
Both the wet CDDT and the FRF will use 
modified flight and ground software, and 
data recorded during the CDDT will be used 
to confirm launch hold and abort shutdown 
time lines. 
SSME start procedures during the FRF 
will be identical to those used in an actual 
launch, and the engines will be tested at 100-
percent rated power level for approximately 
20 seconds. 
A detailed test readiness review will be 
held approximately 2 weeks prior to the 
CDDT and FRF to assess the test configura-
tions and to ensure that all test preparations 
are in order to meet the requirements. It is 
planned to conduct the tests approximately 2 
months prior to launch. 
TRAINING 
NASA has continued the training of 
both flight crews and flight control teams to 
maintain proficiency. Training, which is 
being conducted in all facilities, ranges from 
the basic level for familiarizing new personnel 
with NSTS systems to the intermediate level 
using single-system trainers and water 
immersion facilities to the complex level 
using the Shuttle mission simulator (SMS). 
Integrated simulations are conducted weekly
using the SMS and the Mission Control 
Center (MCC). 
Flight controller training and certifica-
tion in the MCC has been strengthened and 
has become more rigorous. MCC personnel 
from each discipline are supporting the inte-
grated simulations and are validating their 
respective data programs and procedures. 
Flight crews are training at a reduced rate 
to sustain a required level of proficiency and 
to maintain the skills necessary to remain eli-
gible for flight status. The crew for the next 
flight is very experienced and does not 
require a high rate of training at this time. As 
the launch approaches, the maximum flight 
crew training time in the SMS will be limited 
to 16 hours per week to minimize the crew 
work load. 
Extended, integrated simulations are 
maintaining both flight crew and flight con-
trollers in a state of flight readiness. Full-up 
vehicle systems are simulated during these 
simulations and require crew and MCC 
activities similar to those for real-time flight. 
The training facilities are undergoing 
improvements. The SMS math models for 
the main propulsion system, landing and 
roll-Out, and auxiliary power unit have been 
significantly upgraded, and less extensive 
modifications have been incorporated into 
other models. 
Plans are being formulated to link train-
ing facilities at Johnson Space Center USC) 
and KSC to develop team coordination 
between flight controllers and launch con-
trollers. Regularly scheduled training coordi-
nation meetings between JSC and Marshall 
Space Flight Center have facilitated mission 
support and training activities at each center. 
LAUNCH SCHEDULE 
The launch date for the first flight 
(STS-26) is now planned for June 1988. The 
exact date will depend upon completion and 
certification of all mandatory vehicle and 
engine modifications, SRB hardware delivery 
to KSC, orbiter processing time, and 
launch/flight team readiness. 
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Hauck, Richard Covey, John Lounge, David 
Hilmers, and George Nelson. Hauck and 
Nelson have flown on two previous missions, 
and each of the others has flown once. The 
crew is intimately involved in all aspects of 
the return-to-flight activities. 
STS-26 FLIGHT CREW 
The five veteran astronauts (Figure 46) 
recently named to man the Discovery for the 
STS-26 mission are, right to left, Frederick 
Figure 46. STS-26 Flight Crew
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
CDDT countdown demonstration test NDE nondestructive evaluation 
CDR critical design review NOAA National Oceanic and 
CEES crew egress/escape system Atmospheric Administration 
CIL Critical Items List NRC National Research Council 
NSTL National Space Technology 
DCR design certification review Laboratories
 
DM development motor NSTS National Space Transportation 
 
DOD Department of Defense System
 
DRR design requirements review OMI Operations and Maintenance 
Instruction 
EAFB Edwards Air Force Base OMRSD Operational Maintenance 
EIFA element interface functional Requirements Specification 
analysis Document 
ELV expendible launch vehicle OSF Office of Space Flight 
EOM end of mission 
El external tank PCASS program compliance assurance 
and status system 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration PRCB Program Requirements Control 
FMEA failure modes and effects analysis Board 
FRF flight readiness firing 
FRR flight readiness review QM qualification motor 
SDR system design review 
HA hazard analysis SDV Shuttle-derived vehicle 
HDQRS headquarters SlAP System Integrity Assurance 
Program 
lCD Interface Control Document SMS Shuttle mission simulator
SRB solid rocket booster 
JES joint environment simulator SRM solid rocket motor
 
JSC Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center SR&QA safety, reliability, and quality 
assurance 
KSC John F. Kennedy Space Center SRM&QA safety, reliability, maintainability, 
and quality assurance 
SSME Space Shuttle main engine L-1 launch minus 1 day STA structural test article 
LCC launch commit criteria STS Space Transportation System LRU line replacable unit
TPS thermal protection system 
MCC Mission Control Center 
MMT mission management team USAF United States Air Force 
MSFC George C. Marshall Space Flight 
Center VCN verification completion notice 
MVP Master Verification Plan
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NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 
Panel on Redesign of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor 
In response to the first recommendation of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident, the NASA Administrator requested that the National Research Council form an 
independent committee of recognized experts to provide an overview of the activities of the solid 
rocket motor redesign effort. 
The overview committee was specifically requested to review and evaluate the certification require-
ments and to provide technical oversight over the design, test procedures, and manufacture and 
assembly of test motors. The committee was also asked to review and evaluate the test and certifica-
tion program, and to make recommendations to the NASA Administrator as to the adequacy of the 
design in meeting all requirements.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 
Panel on Redesign of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor 
H. Guyford Stever, Chairman 
Foreign Secretary 
National Academy of Engineering 
Laurence J. Adams 
Former President 
Martin Marietta Corporation 
David Altman 
Former Senior Vice President 
Chemical Systems Division, UTC 
Robert C. Anderson 
Former Vice President 
TRW Energy Development Group 
Electronics & Defense Sector 
Jack L. Blumenthal 
Chief Engineer 
TRW 
Materials and Chemistry Applications 
Robert C. Forney 
Executive Vice President 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. 
Administration Department 
Alan N. Gent 
Professor of Polymer Physics 
The Institute of Polymer Science 
University of Akron 
Dean K. Hanink 
Former Manager of Engineering 
Operations, Detroit Diesel 
James W. Mar, Vice Chairman 
Jerome C. Hunsaker Professor of 
Aerospace Education 
Dept. of Aeronautics & Astronautics 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Edward W. Price 
Regents' Professor 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Robert D. Watt 
Former Group Leader 
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
National Research Council Staff 
Myron F Uman 
Project Director 
Robert H. Korkegi 
Director 
Committee on NASA Scientific and 
Technological Program Reviews 
Panel Meeting Participants 
Melvin Stone 
Former Director of Structures 
McDonnell Douglas 
(Observer from NASA's Aerospace 
Safety Advisory Panel) 
Edward J. Barlow 
Former Vice President 
Varian Associates 
(Observer from NRC's Reports 
Review Committee) 
Russell Bardos 
Shuttle Propulsion Office 
(NASA Headquarters Liaison)
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NASA/INDUSTRY 
Solid Rocket Motor Team Overview Committee 
In support of the solid rocket motor redesign, the MSFC center director named an overview commit-
tee of NASA and industry executives to independently review the design activities. Dr. Allan Norton, 
Vice President of Martin Marietta/Orlando Aerospace, was asked to serve as chairman of the com-
mittee, and John Young was appointed as the representative from the Astronaut Office. 
This overview committee has actively participated in the redesign effort and has made specific rec-
ommendations concerning redesign approaches; development, qualification, and certification test 
requirements; and control of the production process to ensure the availability of a reliable and safe 
design. 
The committee has recommended programmatic approaches that should be considered in accom-
plishing the redesign and associated tasks in a responsible and timely manner. 
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NASA 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Reply to Attn of M
	
MAR 2 4 1986 
TO:	 Distribution 
FROM:	 M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
SUBJECT: Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight 
Status 
This memorandum defines the comprehensive strategy and major actions 
that, when completed, will allow resumption of the NSTS flight 
schedule. NASA Headquarters (particularly the Office of Space Flight), 
the OSF centers, the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) 
program organization and its various contractors will use this guidance 
to proceed with the realistic, practical actions necessary to return to 
the NSTS flight schedule with emphasis on flight safety. This guidance 
is intended to direct planning for the first year of flight while 
putting into motion those activities required to establish a realistic 
and an achievable launch rate that will be safely sustainable. We 
intend to move as quickly as practicable to complete these actions and 
return to safe and effective operation of the National Space 
Transportation System. 
Guidance for the following subjects is included: 
o	 ACTIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT 
o	 FIRST FLIGHT/FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 
o	 DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SAFE FLIGHT RATE 
ACTIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT: 
Reassess Entire Program Management Structure and Operation 
The NSTS program management philosophy, structure, reporting channels 
and decision-making process-will be thoroughly reviewed and those 
changes implemented which are required to assure confidence and safety 
in the overall program, including the commit to launch process. 
Additionally, the Level I/Il/Ill budget and management relationships 
will be reviewed to insure that they do not adversely affect the NSTS 
decision process. 
^c. 
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Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Joint Redesian 
A dedicated SRM joint design group will be established at MSFC, with 
selective participation from other NASA centers and external 
organizations, to recommend a programplan to quantify the SRM joints 
problem and to accomplish the SRM joints redesign. The design must be 
reviewed in detail by the program-to include PDR, CDR, DCR, independent 
analysis, DM-QM testing, and any other factors necessary to assure that 
the overall SRM is safe to commit to launch. The type and content of 
post-flight inspections for the redesigned joints and other flight 
components will be developed in detail, with criteria developed for 
commitment to the next launch as well as reusability of the specific 
flight hardware components. 
Design Requirements Reverification 
A review of the NSTS Design Requirements (Vol. 07700) will be conducted 
to insure that all systems design requirements are properly defined. 
This review will be followed by a delta DCR for all program elements to 
assure the individual projects are in compliance with the requirements. 
Complete CIL/OMI Review 
All Category 1 and 1R critical items will be subjected to a total 
review with a complete reapproval process implemented. Those items 
which are not revalidated by this review must be redesigned, certified, 
and qualified for flight. The review process will include a review of 
the OMIs, OMRSD's, and other supporting documentation which is 
pertinent to the test, checkout, or assembly process of the Category 1 
and IR flight hardware. KSC will continue to be responsible for all 
OMI's with design center concurrence required for those which affect 
Category I and 1R items. Category 2 and 3 CIL's will be reviewed for 
reacceptance and to verify their proper categorization. 
Complete OMRSD Review 
The OMRSD will be reviewed to insure that the requirements defined in 
it are complete and that the required testing is consistent with the 
results of the CIL review. Inspection/retest requirements will be 
modified as necessary to assure flight safety. 
Launch/Abort Reassessment 
The launch and launch abort rules and philosophy will be assessed to 
assure that the launch and flight rules, range safety systems/ 
operational procedures, landing aids, runway configuration and length, 
performance vs. TAL exposure, abort weights, runway surface, and other 
landing related capabilities provide an acceptable margin of safety to 
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the vehicle and crew. Additionally, the weather forecasting capability 
will be reviewed and improved where possible to allow for the most 
accurate reporting. 
FIRST FLIGHT/FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 
First Flight 
The subject of first flight mission design will require extensive 
review to assure that we are proceeding in an orderly, conservative, 
safe manner. To permit the process to begin, the following specific 
planning guidance applies to the first planned mission: 
o	 daylight KSC launch 
o	 conservative flight design to minimize TAL exposure 
o	 repeat payload (not a new payload class) 
o	 no waiver on landing weight 
o	 conservative launch/launch abort/landing weather 
o	 NASA-only flight crew 
o	 engine thrust within the experience base 
o	 no active ascent/entry DTO's 
o	 conservative mission rules 
o	 early, stable flight plan with supporting flight software and 
training load 
o	 daylight EDW landing (lakebed or runway 22) 
First Year 
The planning for the flight schedule for the first year of operation 
will reflect a launch rate consistent with this conservative approach. 
The specific number of flights to be planned for the first year will be 
developed as soon as possible and will consider KSC and VAFB work flow, 
software development, controller/crew training, etc. Changes to flight 
plans, ascent trajectories, manifest, etc., will be minimized in the 
interest of program stability. Decisions on each launch will be made 
after thorough review of the previous mission's SRM joint performance, 
all other specified critical systems performance and resolution of 
anomalies. 
In general, the first year of operation will be maintained within the 
current flight experience base, and any expansion of the base, 
including new classes of payloads, will be approved only after very 
thorough safety review. Specifically, 109 percent thrust levels will 
not be flown until satisfactory completion of the MPT testing currently 
being planned, and the first use of the Filament Wound Case will not 
occur with the first use of 109 percent SSME thrust level. Every 
effort will be made to conduct the first VAFB flight on an expeditious 
and safe schedule which supports national security requirements. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SAFE FLIGHT RATE 
The ultimate safe, sustainable flight rate, and the buildup to that 
rate, will be developed utilizing a "bottoms-up approach in which all 
required work for the standard flow as defined in the OMRSD is 
identified and that work is optimized in relation to the available work 
force. Factors such as the manifest, nonscheduled work, in-flight 
anomaly resolution, mods, processing team workloads, work balancing 
across shifts, etc., will be considered, as well as timely mission 
planning, flight product development and achievable software delivery 
capability to support flight controllers and crew training. This 
development will consider the availability of the third orbiter 
facility, the availability of spares, as well as the effects of 
supporting VAFB launch site operations. 
THE BOTTOM LINE 
The Associate Adminstrator for Space Flight will take the action for 
reassessment of the NSTS program management structure. The NSTS 
Program Manager at Johnson Space Center is directed to initiate and 
coordinate all other actions required to implement this strategy for 
return to safe Shuttle flight. 
I know that the business of space flight can never be made to be 
totally risk-free, but this conservative return to operations will 
continue our strong NASA/Industry team effort to recover from the 
Challenger accident. Many of these items have already been initiated 
at some level in our organizations, and I am fully aware of the 
tremendous amount of dedicated work which must be accomplished. I do 
know that our nation's future in space is dependent on the individuals 
who must carry this strategy out safely and successfully. Please give 
this the widest possible distribution to your people. It is they who 
must understand it, and they who must do it. 
r
 t-l-Richard H. Truly
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National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Reply to Attn of: M 
TO:	 Distribution 
FROM:	 M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
SUBJECT: Organization and Operation of the National Space Transportation 
System (NSTS) Program 
This memorandum defines direction for the organization and operation of the 
NSTS program. This direction has been reviewed by the NASA Management Study 
Group led by General Phillips and has the approval of the Administrator. This 
implements the NASA response to Recommendation II (Shuttle Management 
Structure) and Recommendation V (Communications) of the Presidential 
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. 
A crucial part of our strategy to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight 
status, as outlined in my memorandum of March 24, 1986 (and later reinforced 
by the Presidential Commission), has been a reassessment of the NSTS program 
management structure and operation. On June 25, 1986, in order to form the 
basis for a careful assessment of the management of the NSTS and required 
adjustments, if any, I directed Robert L. Crippen to lead a study of NSTS 
program operation and organization. This study has been presented to me and, 
subsequently, reviewed with all incumbent managers of the NSTS program through 
the project level; all involved field Center Directors (Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), and 
National Space Technology Laboratories (NSTL)); and staff members of the 
Headquarters Office of Space Flight.. 
Decisions relating to the following program areas have resulted from this 
deliberation: 
o NSTS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
o NSTS PROGRAM EXECUTION 
o IMPLEMENTATION 
o RELATIONSHIP OF THE CENTER DIRECTORS TO THE NSTS PROGRAM 
A detailed discussion of each of these subjects follows in this memorandum. 
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NSTS PROGRAM EXECUTION 
Flow of NSTS Program Direction and Response 
NSTS program direction and response Will flow from the Director, NSTS, through 
the Deputy Director, NSTS Program, to the various Project Managers and vice 
versa. 
In this programmatic chain, the managers of the project elements located at 
the various field Centers will report to the Deputy Director, NSTS Program. 
Depending upon individual Center organization, this chain is either direct 
(such as the Orbiter Project Office at JSC) or via an intermediate office 
(such as the Shuttle Projects Office at MSFC). The MSFC Shuttle Projects 
Office is a management integration function and does not preclude direct 
interaction between the MSFC Project Managers and the Deputy Director, NSTS 
Program. The Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, located at MSFC, will be a 
Headquarters employee reporting directly to the Deputy Director, NSTS 
Program. The MSFC Center Director will fully support the personnel and 
facility requirements of the Manager, Shuttle Projects Office. 
Budget Procedures and Control within the NSTS Program 
The NSTS program budget will continue to be submitted through the Center 
Directors to the Director, NSTS, who will have total funding authority for the 
program. The Deputy Directors, NSTS Program and NSTS Operations, will each 
provide an assessment of the budget submittal to the Director, NSTS, as an 
integral part of the decision process, and their recommendations will be key 
to the final budget decisions. Following the final budget mark by the 
Associate Administrator for Space Flight, the Centers will submit a mark 
implementation plan, reconciling budget and program content, which will also 
be reviewed and concurred in by the Deputy Directors, NSTS Program and NSTS 
Operations, then approved by the Director, NSTS. 
The Deputy Directors', NSTS Program and NSTS Operations, budgets will be 
established and managed directly as part of the NSTS budget. Their budgets, 
although not submitted as part of the Center budgets, will continue to be 
supported by the Center procurement and financial management organizations. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The Director, NSTS, is charged with implementing this direction for the 
organization and operation of the NSTS program by revising appropriate NASA 
Management Instructions and program documentation. In addition, the Program 
Director shall act on the detailed recommendations of the Crippen study, 
exclusive of the recommendation on Astronauts in Management, which will be 
acted on by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. 
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NSTS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
Director. NSTS 
The position of Director, NSTS, is established. In addition, the Director, 
NSTS, shall have two Deputies--Deputy Director, NSTS Program, and Deputy 
Director, NSTS Operations. This triad shall act as a single entity to manage 
the NSTS program. The Director, NSTS, is at the level of Deputy Associate 
Administrator and reports directly to me. He will have full responsibility 
and authority for the operation and conduct of the NSTS program. This will 
include total program control with full responsibility for budget, schedule, 
and balancing program content. The Director, NSTS, is responsible for overall 
program requirements and performance. He shall have sufficient staff/systems 
engineering support at Headquarters to accomplish this activity. The 
Director, NSTS, is the approval authority for top level program requirements, 
critical hardware waivers, and for budget authorization adjustments that 
exceed a predetermined level. 
Deputy Director, NSTS Program 
The Deputy Director, NSTS Program, who reports directly to the Director, NSTS, 
and his senior managers will be Headquarters employees. They are responsible 
for the day-to-day management and execution of the NSTS program. This 
includes detailed program planning, direction, and scheduling and STS system 
configuration management. Other responsibilities include system engineering 
and integration for the STS vehicle, ground facilities, and cargos. The NSTS 
Engineering Integration Office, reporting to the Deputy Director, NSTS 
Program, is established and directly participates with each NSTS project 
element (Space Shuttle Main Engine, Solid Rocket Booster, External Tank, 
Orbiter, and Launch and Landing System). The Deputy Director, NSTS Program, 
will be located at the Johnson Space Center. The JSC Center Director will 
fully support the personnel and facility requirements of the Deputy Director, 
NSTS Program. 
Deputy Director, NSTS Operations 
The Deputy Director, NSTS Operations, a Headquarters employee reporting 
directly to the Director, NSTS, is responsible for all operational aspects of 
the missions. This includes final vehicle preparation, mission execution, and 
return of the vehicle for processing for its next flight. The Deputy 
Director, NSTS Operations, will present the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
which will be chaired by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, manage 
the final launch decision process, and chair the Mission Management Team 
(MMT). He will be supported by a small staff located at KSC, MSFC, JSC, and 
Headquarters. These personnel shall remain employees of their respective 
Centers but report directly to the Deputy Director, NSTS Operations. The KSC, 
MSFC, and JSC Center Directors will fully support the facility and personnel 
requirements of the Deputy Director, NSTS Operations. 
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RELATIONSHIP OF THE CENTER DIRECTORS TO THE NSTS PROGRAM 
Responsibilities of the Center Directors to the NSTS Program 
As with other programs and projects located at their Centers, the Center 
Directors are responsible and accountable for the technical excellence and 
performance of each of the NSTS project elements at their respective Center. 
Further, the Center Directors will ensure that their institution provides the 
required support to the NSTS program. 
Revitalization of the OSF Management Council 
A key element of the ultimate success of the Office of Space Flight is a 
revitalization of the OSF Management Council. The OSF Management Council will 
consist of: 
Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight 
Director, Marshall Space Flight Center 
Director, Kennedy Space Center 
Director, Johnson Space Center 
Director, National Space Technology Laboratories 
The Council will meet on a regular basis, with agendas published in advance, 
and will oversee all OSF responsibilities, including the NSTS. 
4V,1-0^ IRichard H. TrI 
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1152 .66 
Effective Date _January 9, 1987 
Management	 Expiration Date January 9, 1990 
Instruction 
Responsible Office:	 M/Office of Space Flight 
Subject: NASA Space Flight Safety Panel 
1. PURPOSE 
This instruction establishes the NASA Space Flight Safety 
Panel and sets forth its functions, responsibilities, and 
membership. 
2. APPLICABILITY 
This instruction is applicable to all NASA installations 
and activities, particularly NASA space flight programs 
involving flight crews. 
3. ESTABLISHMENT 
The NASA Space Flight Safety Panel (hereafter referred to 
as the "Panel") is hereby established for promoting flight 
safety for all NASA employees associated with NASA space 
flight programs involving flight crews. The Panel reports 
to the Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, 
Maintainability, and Quality Assurance. 
4. FUNCTIONS 
The functions for the NASA Space Flight Safety Panel are 
to:
a. Promote a NASA Space Flight Safety Program for those 
space programs involving flight crews, and to advise 
and assist the appropriate Associate Administrators in 
the administration and monitoring of this program. 
The program's purpose is to preserve human and 
material resources in order to enhance efficient space 
flight operations. The scope of the Panel's purview 
will encompass all aspects of the manned space program 
which affect flying safety. 
b. Provide an independent communication link to the 
Associate Administrator for Space Flight, Associate 
Administrator for Space Station, Associate 
Administrator for Space Science and Applications, and 
the Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, 
Maintainability, and Quality Assurance, in matters 
pertaining to space flying safety. In this regard, 
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the Panel will publicize its functions and actively 
encourage all levels of personnel, government and 
contractor, to detect and eliminate hazards which 
could adversely affect the accomplishment of the 
manned space flight objectives. 
	
5.	 RESPONSIBILITIES 
a.	 The Chairperson is responsible for: 
(1) Reporting to the Associate Administrator for 
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality 
Assurance. 
(2) Actively participating in the development of the 
NASA Space Flight Safety Program and provide an 
independent assessment of its scope, 
implementation and effectivity. 
(3) Supporting the Associate Administrator for Space 
Station, Associate Administrator for Space 
Science and Applications, and the Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight in all matters 
pertaining to space flight safety. 
(4) Calling meetings of the Panel at least every 2 
months and approving the agenda for the meetings. 
(5) Attending all Level I Flight Readiness Reviews. 
b.	 Members of the Panel are responsible for: 
(1) Working with the Chairperson to ensure that a 
viable pervasive NASA Space Flight Safety Program 
is established and maintained. 
(2) Promoting the NASA Space Flight Safety Program. 
(3) Ensuring that the Panel properly reviews and 
comments on all launch commit criteria and 
mission rules. 
(4) Soliciting and responding to space flight safety 
concerns. 
	
6.	 MEMBERSHIP 
a.	 The Chairperson and Panel members will be appointed by 
the Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, 
Maintainability, and Quality Assurance and will 
include as a minimum:
2 
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(1) An astronaut who has flown on a NASA mission. 
(2) A Johnson Space Center Flight Director. 
(3) A Marshall Space Flight Center Mission Manager. 
(4) A Kennedy Space Center Launch Director or NASA 
Test Director. 
b.	 Membership, including the Chairperson, will be for a 
period of 2 years. Initial rotation shall be 
staggered by at least 4 months for each individual, 
commencing 1 year after formation of the Panel. 
7.	 MEETINGS 
The Panel will meet at least every 2 months at the request 
of the Chairperson or as requested by the Associate 
Administrator for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Quality Assurance. 
DISTRIBUTION:
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NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 
Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee 
In response to the third recommendation of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident, the NASA Administrator requested that the National Research Council form an 
audit panel to review the NSTS Program's criticality item and hazard analysis reassessment effort. 
The audit committee was specifically requested to audit the approach taken for the program review 
activity and to verify the adequacy of the overall reassessment, and report their conclusions and rec-
ommendations to the NASA Administrator.
122
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 
Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee 
General (USAF ret.) Alton D. Slay, Chairman 	 Dr. Norman R. Parmet 
Slay Enterprises	 Consultant 
(Former Commander, USAF	 (Former vice President—Engineering 
Systems Command)	 & Quality Assurance, TWA) 
Gerald W. Elverum, Jr.* 
Vice President and General Manager 
TRW 
Applied Technology Division 
Dr. Grant. Hansen* 
Consultant 
(Former Vice President 
Systems Development Corporation) 
Willis M. Hawkins* 
Senior Advisor 
Lockheed Corporation 
(Former Senior Vice President) 
Ira G. Hedrick* 
Senior Management Consultant 
Grumman Corporation 
(Former Senior Vice President) 
Dr. A. Bruce Hoadley 
Division Manager, Analytical Methods 
and Software Systems 
Bellcom 
Dr. William B. Lenior 
Space Systems Development & 
Commercialization of Space 
Booz-Allen & Hamilton 
(Former Astronaut) 
Dr. Artur Mager* 
Consultant 
(Former Group Vice President 
The Aerospace Corporation)
Dr. Robert E. Uhrig 
Distinguished Professor of 
Engineering 
Dept. of Nuclear Engineering 
University of Tennessee 
Dr. James J. Kramer 
(Ex Officio Chairman, 
Aeronautics & Space Energy Board) 
Manager, Advanced Technical Programs 
General Electric Company 
* Member, National Academy of Engineering 
PREGONG PAGE CLANK OT FILMED	
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NMI 1103.30A
Effective Date December 15, 1986 
Management	 Expiration Date December 15. 1989 
Instruction 
Responsible Office:	 Q/Off ice of SRM&QA 
Subject: ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES - ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY, 
RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (SRM&QA) 
1. OBJECTIVES OF POSITION 
a. Provide for the planning, direction, implementation, and 
evaluation of that part of the overall NASA program concerned 
with systems assurance including safety, reliability, 
maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA). 
b. Assure that the Administrator and other principal officials are 
aware of matters pertaining to the technical execution and 
physical readiness of NASA programs/projects. 
c. Provide for overall technical review of NASA programs/projects to 
ensure development efforts and mission operations are being 
conducted on a sound engineering basis with proper controls and 
attention to development risk. 
d. Provide NASA competition advocacy guidance and oversight in 
accordance with the provisions of NMI 1210.2. 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING 
a. Reports to the Administrator. 
b. The basic organization chart for the Office of SRM&QA is shown in 
Attachment A. 
3. RESPONSIBILITIES 
The Associate Administrator for SRM&QA has the following 
responsibilities and is delegated the authority to carry out these 
responsibilities: 
a. Responsible for a systems assurance program that provides focus 
to those activities that will enhance operational success of NASA 
programs/projects. Administratively responsible for SRM&QA 
functions related to NASA programs/projects, and assurance that 
SRM&QA and technical issues and lessons learned are fully 
considered during Design Reviews, Flight Readiness Reviews, Test 
Readiness Reviews, Operational Readiness Reviews, or equivalent 
formal reviews that are conducted prior to start-up of operations 
for ground facilities, manned and unmanned launch operations, 
aircraft flight programs, and acceptance testing of experimental 
1 
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facilities and hardware having significant risk to persons or 
property. The systems assurance program will monitor the status 
of equipment, software, validation of design, problem analysis, 
and system acceptability. 
b. Direction of reporting and documentation of problem 
identification, problem resolution, and trends. Ensure that a 
fully documented trend analysis program is conducted that 
includes accurate reporting of anomalies, thorough analysis and 
testing of problems, and implementation of corrective measures. 
c. Ensure that SRM&QA policies, plans, procedures, and standards are 
established, documented, maintained, communicated, and 
implemented. Perform SRM&QA surveys of field installations to 
assess the implementation of Headquarters policy and guidance. 
Provide policy interpretation to field installations and assist 
in their implementation as required (reference dotted line 
reporting of Center Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance 
Directors on attached organization chart). Participate with 
field installations in SRM&QA surveys of prime and subcontractors 
or wherever problems dictate need for such surveys. 
d. Ensure that field installation SRM&QA organizations are staffed 
with sufficient, qualified personnel to allow accomplishment of 
assigned tasks. 
e. Review safety practices and standards and their application to 
specific programs/projects. Conduct an organized, systematic 
approach to identify and control hazards, ensuring that safety 
factors are fully considered from conception to completion of all 
NASA activities. Analyze and categorize the potential of the 
hazards or failures, and ensure that detailed operating and 
emergency procedures or administrative controls are developed to 
overcome or reduce the hazards or the effects of the failures if 
they cannot be eliminated or reduced to acceptable levels by 
design or engineering changes. 
f. Provide policy and requirements for establishing a maintainabili-
ty assurance program, where applicable. Provide design inputs to 
promote maintainability by considering areas such as 
accessibility, testability, handling provisions, ease of 
installation, and work constraints. Develop spares provisioning 
requirements and supporting operational data. 
g. Direct the thorough, prompt, and accurate investigation, 
reporting, and analysis of all NASA mishaps, incidents, and 
accidents.	 Ensure resolution of all investigation-related 
recommendations. Serve as chair or ex-officio member of all 
mission failure review boards established by the Administrator, 
and participate as appropriate in the proceedings of all such 
boards established by other NASA officials. 
h. Conduct independent reviews of programs and programmatic controls 
within NASA and within the contractor structure. Perform special 
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NMI 1103.39A 
reviews at the request of the Administrator and support Program 
Offices in special review activities. 
I. On a selective basis, review the technical management and 
engineering aspects of those requests for proposals which are 
designated in the Master Buy Plan for Headquarters review and 
approval. On the same basis, as appropriate, review requests for 
proposals for Center-controlled programs. Participate in, or be 
represented at, Source Evaluation Board presentations which 
involve procurements with technical dimensions. 
j. Provide an oversight function to ensure NASA's advanced programs 
and long range plans recognize SRM&QA requirements, practices, 
and lessons learned. 
k. Provide an integrated focus for engineering standards and 
policies.	 Direct a program to review existing standards for 
application to specific programs/projects, and to develop new 
standards or policies, where appropriate. 
1. Provide NASA competition advocacy and oversight. As the NASA 
Competition Advocate, responsible for NASA-wide efforts to 
enhance competition, and for challenging barriers to, and 
promoting, full and open competition in the procurement of 
property and services. 
4. RELATIONSHIP TO OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 
Nothing in this Instruction shall be interpreted to diminish, 
denigrate, or limit the independent authorities and functions of the 
Office of Inspector General. 
5. LINE OF SUCCESSION 
Officials authorized to act for the Associate Administrator for 
SRM&QA are listed in Attachment B. 
6. CANCELLATION 
NMI 1103.1D dated August 6, 1982, and NM! 1103.39 dated 
July 3, 1986.
?S C. Fletcher 
Lnistrator 
ATTACHMENT: 
A. Organization Chart for the 
Office of SRM&QA. 
B. Authority to Act for the AA 
for SRM&QA.
ci 
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December 15, 1986	 ATTACHMENT B 
NMI 1103.39A 
SUBJECT: AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SRM&QA 
DURING NORMAL CONDITIONS OR IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON THE 
UNITED STATES 
1. DELEGATION 
a. Scope of Authority. Whenever the Associate Administrator for 
SRM&QA is unable for any reason to perform assigned duties during 
normal conditions or in the event of an attack on the United 
States, the permanently assigned incumbents of the positions 
listed in subparagraph b. are authorized to serve in the order 
listed as Acting AA for SRM&QA and to carry out all functions, 
powers, and duties of such position pursuant to law, except the 
duty of the AA for SRM&QA to succeed to any other NASA position. 
b. Officials Designated. 
(1) Deputy AA 
(2) Deputy AA 
(3) Director, 
2. REDELEGATION 
None authorized.
for SRM&QA 
for Systems Assurance 
Safety Division 
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Appendix H. 
Actions to

Implement the Recommendations
of the Presidential Commission on the

Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Report to the President 
Actions to Implement 
the Recommendations 
of The Presidential Commission 
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
July 14, 1986
	 PRFG W- N G P(,t. }LA;f( r.e1 "Liv. 
Washington, D.C.
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DEDICATION
Those of us at NASA, who have worked incessantly

since that day in January when the

CHALLENGER and her crew, our friends, were

lost, dedicate this report to those who will fly again

into space in the future. 
PROED1NG PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED) 
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THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
June 13, 1986 
Dear Jim: 
I have completed my review of the report from the Commission 
on the Space Shuttle CHALLENGER Accident. I believe that 
a program must be undertaken to implement its recommenda-
tions as soon as possible. The procedural and organizational 
changes suggested in the report will be essential to resuming 
effective and efficient Space Transportation System operations, 
and will be crucial in restoring U. S. space launch activities 
to full operational status. 
Specifically, I would like NASA to report back to me in 
30 days on how and when the Commission's recommendations 
will be implemented. This report should Include milestones 
by which progress In the implementation process can be 
measured. 
Let me emphasize, as I have so many times, that the men 
and women of NASA and the tasks they so ably perform are 
essential to the nation if we are to retain our leadership 
In the pursuit of technological and scientific progress. 
Despite misfortunes and setbacks, we are determined to press 
on In our space programs. Again, Jim, we turn to you for 
leadership. You and the NASA team have our support and 
our blessings to do what has to be done to make our space 
program safe, reliable, and a source of pride to our nation 
and of benefit to all mankind. 
I look forward to receiving your report on implementing the 
Commission's recommendations. 
Slicely, 
'z'& &{r 
The Honorable James C. Fletcher 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 20546
PRGEOW.i PAGE BLANK NOT f1LY3E 
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NASA 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Office of the Administrator 
The President 
The White House 
Washington, DC 20500 
Dear Mr. President: 
I am pleased to submit the NASA plan to implement the recommendations of the 
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. The Commission has 
rendered the nation an exceptional service in conducting a comprehensive and thorough 
investigation. NASA agrees with the recommendations and is vigorously implementing 
them.
An overview of our efforts, the milestones by which we will measure our progress, 
and a detailed response to the specific Commission recommendations are provided in the 
enclosed report. A status report on our implementation program will be submitted in 
June 1987. 
The men and women of NASA appreciate your continued personal support. 
t eAk-
James C. Fletcher 
Administrator 
Enclosure
pOEcflN PGEh( XTL1E 
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Executive Summary 
On June 13, 1986, the President directed 
NASA to implement, as soon as possible, 
the recommendations of the Presidential 
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challeng-
er Accident. The President requested that 
NASA report, within 30 days, how and 
when the recommendations will be imple-
mented, including milestones by which 
progress can be measured. 
In the months since the Challenger acci-
dent, the NASA team has spent many hours 
in support of the Presidential Commission 
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
and in planning for a return of the Shuttle 
to safe flight status. Chairman William P. 
Rogers and the other members of the Com-
mission have rendered the Nation and 
NASA an exceptional service. The work of 
the Commission was extremely thorough 
and comprehensive. NASA agrees with the 
Commission's recommendations and is vig-
orously pursuing the actions required to im-
plement and comply with them. 
As a result of the efforts in support of the 
Commission, many of the actions required 
to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight 
status have been under way since March. 
On March 24, 1986, the Associate Adminis-
trator for Space Flight outlined a compre-
hensive strategy, and defined major actions, 
for safely returning to flight status. The 
March 24 memorandum (Appendix A) 
provided guidance on the following 
subjects: 
• actions required prior to next flight, 
• first flight/first year operations, and 
• development of sustainable safe flight 
rate. 
The Commission report was submitted to 
the President on June 9, 1986. Since that 
time, NASA has taken additional actions 
and provided direction required to comply 
with the Commission's recommendations 
(Appendix B). A summary of the key mile-
stones is included at the end of the Execu-
tive Summary. 
The NASA Administrator and the Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight will partici-
pate in the key management decisions re-
quired for implementing the Commission 
recommendations and for returning the 
Space Shuttle to flight status. NASA will re-
port to the President on the status of the 
implementation program in June 1987. 
The Commission report included nine rec-
ommendations, and a summary of the im-
plementation status for each is provided: 
Recommendation I 
Solid Rocket Motor Design: On March 24, 
1986, the Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC) was directed to form a Solid Rocket 
Motor (SRM) joint redesign team to include 
participation from MSFC and other NASA 
centers as well as individuals from outside 
NASA. The team includes personnel from 
Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space 
Center, Langley Research Center, industry, 
and the Astronaut Office. To assist the 
redesign team, an expert advisory panel was 
appointed which includes 12 people with six 
coming from outside NASA. 
The team has evaluated several design alter-
natives, and analysis and testing are in 
progress to determine the preferred ap-
proaches which minimize hardware rede-
sign. To ensure adequate program contin-
gency in this effort, the redesign team will 
also develop, at least through concept defi-
nition, a totally new design which does not 
utilize existing hardware. The design verifi-
cation and certification program will be 
emphasized and will include tests which du-
plicate the actual launch loads as closely as 
feasible and provide for tests over the full 
range of operating conditions. The verifica-
tion effort includes a trade study which has 
been under way for several weeks to deter-
mine the preferred test orientation (vertical 
or horizontal) of the full-scale motor firings. 
The Solid Rocket Motor redesign and certi-
fication schedule is under review to fully 
understand and plan for the implementa-
tion of the design solutions as they are final-
kLAU 'r 
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ized and assessed. The schedule will be re-
assessed after the SRM Preliminary Design 
Review in September 1986. At this time it 
appears that the first launch will not occur 
prior to the first quarter of 1988. 
Independent Oversight: In accordance with 
the Commission's recommendation, the Na-
tional Research Council (NRC) has estab-
lished an Independent Oversight Group 
chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever and re-
porting to the NASA Administrator. The 
NRC Oversight Group has been briefed on 
Shuttle system requirements, implementa-
tion, and control; Solid Rocket Motor back-
ground; and candidate modifications. The 
group has established a near-term plan that 
includes briefings and visits to review in-
flight loads; assembly processing; redesign 
status; and other solid rocket motor de-
signs, including the Titan. Longer term 
plans are being formulated by the group in-
cluding participation in the Solid Rocket 
Motor preliminary design review in Sep-
tember 1986. 
Recommendation II 
Shuttle Management Structure: The Adminis-
trator has appointed General Sam Phillips, 
who served as Apollo Program Director, to 
study every aspect of how NASA manages 
its programs, including relationships be-
tween various field centers and NASA 
Headquarters. General Phillips has broad 
authority from the Administrator to ex-
plore every aspect of NASA organization, 
management and procedures. His activities 
will include a review of the Space Shuttle 
management structure. 
On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 
Crippen was directed to form a fact-finding 
group to assess the Space Shuttle manage-
ment structure. The group will report rec-
ommendations to the Associate Administra-
tor for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 
Specifically, this group will address the roles 
and responsibilities of the Space Shuttle 
Program Manager to assure that the posi-
tion has the authority commensurate with 
its responsibilities. In addition, roles and re-
sponsibilities at all levels of program man-
agement will be reviewed to specify the rela-
tionship between the program organization 
and the field center organizations. The re-
suits of this study will be reviewed with Gen-
eral Phillips and the Administrator with a 
decision on implementation of the recom-
mendations by October 1, 1986. 
Astronauts in Management: Rear Admiral 
Richard Truly, a former astronaut, has 
been appointed as Associate Administrator 
for the Office of Space Flight. Several active 
astronauts are currently serving in manage-
ment positions in the agency. The Crippen 
group will address means to stimulate the 
transition of astronauts into other manage-
ment positions. It will also determine the 
appropriate position for the Flight Crew 
Operations Directorate within the NASA 
organizational structure. 
Shuttle Safety Panel: A Shuttle Safety Panel 
will be established by the Associate Admin-
istrator for Space Flight not later than Sep-
tember 1, 1986, with direct access to the 
Space Shuttle Program Manager. This date 
allows time to determine the structure and 
function of this panel, including an assess-
ment of its relationship to the newly formed 
Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality As-
surance, and to the existing Aerospace Safe-
ty Advisory Panel. 
Recommendation III 
Critical Item Review and Hazard Analysis: On 
March 13, 1986, NASA initiated a complete 
review of all Space Shuttle program failure 
modes and effects analyses (FMEA's) and 
associated critical item lists (C IL's). Each 
Space Shuttle project element and associat-
ed prime contractor is conducting separate 
comprehensive reviews which will culminate 
in a program-wide review with the Space 
Shuttle Program Manager at Johnson 
Space Center later this year. Technical 
specialists from outside the Space Shuttle 
program have been assigned as formal 
members of each of these review teams. All 
Criticality 1 and 1R critical item waivers 
have been cancelled. The teams are re-
quired to reassess and resubmit waivers in 
categories recommended for continued 
program applicability. Items which cannot 
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be revalidated will be redesigned, qualified, 
and certified for flight. All Criticality 2 and 
3 CIL's are being reviewed for reacceptance 
and proper categorization. This activity will 
culminate in a comprehensive final review 
with NASA Headquarters beginning in 
March 1987. 
As recommended by the Commission, the 
National Research Council has agreed to 
form an Independent Audit Panel, report-
ing to the NASA Administrator, to verify 
the adequacy of this effort. 
Recommendation IV 
Safety Organization: The NASA Administra-
tor announced the appointment of Mr. 
George A. Rodney to the position of Associ-
ate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, 
and Quality Assurance on July 8, 1986. The 
responsibilities of this office will include the 
oversight of safety, reliability, and quality 
assurance functions related to all NASA ac-
tivities and programs and the implementa-
tion of a system for anomaly documentation 
and resolution to include a trend analysis 
program. One of the first activities to be un-
dertaken by the new Associate Administra-
tor will be an assessment of the resources 
including workforce required to ensure ad-
equate execution of the safety organization 
functions. In addition, the new Associate 
Administrator will assure appropriate inter-
faces between the functions of the new safe-
ty organization and the Shuttle Safety Panel 
which will be established in response to the 
Commission Recommendation II. 
Recommendation V 
Improved Communications: On June 25, 1986, 
Astronaut Robert Crippen was directed to 
form a team to develop plans and recom-
mended policies for the following: 
• Implementation of effective management 
communications at all levels. 
• Standardization of the imposition and re-
moval of STS launch constraints and 
other operational constraints. 
• Conduct of Flight Readiness Review and 
Mission Management Team meetings, in-
cluding requirements for documentation 
and flight crew participation.
Since this recommendation is closely linked 
with the recommendation on Shuttle man-
agement structure, the study team will in-
corporate the plan for improved communi-
cations with that for management restruc-
ture. 
This review of effective communications 
will consider the activities and information 
flow at NASA Headquarters and the field 
centers which support the Shuttle program. 
The study team will present findings and 
recommendations to the Associate Adminis-
trator for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 
Recommendation VI 
Landing Safety: A Landing Safety Team has 
been established to review and implement 
the Commission's findings and recommen-
dations on landing safety. All Shuttle hard-
ware and systems are undergoing design 
reviews to insure compliance with the 
specifications and safety concerns. The 
tires, brakes, and nose wheel steering sys-
tem are included in this activity, and fund-
ing for a new carbon brakes system has 
been approved. Runway surface tests and 
landing aid requirement reviews had been 
under way for some time prior to the acci-
dent and are continuing. Landing aid im-
plementattion will be complete by July 
1987. The interim brake system will be 
delivered by August 1987. Improved 
methods of local weather forecasting and 
weather-related support are being devel-
oped. Until the Shuttle program has dem-
onstrated satisfactory safety margins 
through high fidelity testing and during ac-
tual landings at Edwards Air Force Base, 
the Kennedy Space Center landing site will 
not be used for nominal end-of-mission 
landings. Dual Orbiter ferry capability has 
been an issue for some time and will be 
thoroughly considered during the upcom-
ing months. 
Recommendation VII 
Launch Abort and Crew Escape: On April 7, 
1986, NASA initiated a Shuttle Crew Egress 
and Escape review. The scope of this analy-
sis includes egress and escape capabilities 
from launch through landing and will 
provide analyses, concepts, feasibility assess-
3 
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ments, cost, and schedules for pad abort, 
bailout, ejection systems, water landings, 
and powered flight separation. This review 
will specifically assess options for crew es-
cape during controlled gliding flight and 
options for extending the intact abort flight 
envelope to include failure of 2 or 3 main 
engines during the early ascent phase. In 
conjunction with this activity, a Launch 
Abort Reassessment Team was established 
to review all launch and launch abort rules 
to ensure that launch commit criteria, flight 
rules, range safety systems and procedures, 
landing aids, runway configurations and 
lengths, performance versus abort expo-
sure, abort and end-of-mission landing 
weights, runway surfaces, and other land-
ing-related capabilities provide the proper 
margin of safety to the vehicle and crew. 
Crew escape and launch abort studies will 
be complete on October 1, 1986, with an 
implementation decision in December 1986 
Recommendation VIII 
Flight Rate: In March 1986 NASA estab-
lished a Flight Rate Capability Working 
Group. Two flight rate capability studies are 
under way: (1) a study of capabilities and 
constraints which govern the Shuttle proc-
essing flows at the Kennedy Space Center 
and (2) a study by the Johnson Space Cen-
tr to assess the impact of flight specific 
crew training and software delivery/ 
certification on flight rates. The working 
group will present flight rate recommenda-
tions to the Office of Space Flight by Au-
gust 15, 1986. Other collateral studies are 
still in progress which address Presidential 
Commission recommendations related to 
spares provisioning, maintenance, and 
structural inspection. This effort will also 
consider the National Research Council in-
dependent review of flight rate which is 
under way as a result of a Congressional 
Subcommittee request. 
NASA strongly supports a mixed fleet to 
satisfy launch requirements and actions to 
revitalize the United States expendable 
launch vehicle capabilities. 
Additionally, a new cargo manifest policy is 
being formulated by NASA Headquarters
which will establish manifest ground rules 
and impose constraints to late changes. 
Manifest control policy recommendations 
will be completed in November 1986. 
Recommendation IX 
Maintenance Safeguards: A Maintenance 
Safeguards Team has been established to 
develop a comprehensive plan for defining 
and implementing actions to comply with 
the Commission recommendations concern-
ing maintenance activities. A Maintenance 
Plan is being prepared to ensure that uni-
form maintenance requirements are im-
posed on all elements of the Space Shuttle 
program. This plan will define the structure 
that will be used to document (1) hardware 
inspections and schedules, (2) planned 
maintenance activities, (3) maintenance pro-
cedures configuration control, and (4) 
maintenance logistics. The plan will also de-
fine organizational responsibilities, report-
ing, and control requirements for Space 
Shuttle maintenance activities. The mainte-
nance plan will be completed by September 
30, 1986. 
A number of other activities are underway 
which will contribute to a return to safe 
flight and strengthening the NASA organi-
zation. A Space Shuttle Design 
Requirements Review Team headed by the 
Space Shuttle Systems Integration Office at 
Johnson Space Center has been assigned to 
review all Shuttle design requirements and 
associated technical verification. The team 
will focus on each Shuttle project element 
and on total Space Shuttle system design re-
quirements. This activity will culminate in a 
Space Shuttle Incremental Design Certifica-
tion Review approximately 3 months prior 
to the next Space Shuttle launch. 
In consideration of the number, complexi-
ty, and interrelationships between the many 
activities leading to the next flight, the 
Space Shuttle Program Manager at Johnson 
Space Center has initiated a series of formal 
Program Management Reviews for the 
Space Shuttle program. These reviews are 
structured to be regular face-to-face discus-
sions involving the managers of all major 
4
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Space Shuttle program activities. Specific 
subjects to be discussed at each meeting will 
focus on progress, schedules, and actions 
associated with each of the major program 
review activities and will be tailored directly 
to current program activity for the time pe-
riod involved. The first of these meetings 
was held at Marshall Space Flight Center on 
May 5-6, 1986, with the second at Kennedy 
Space Center on June 25, 1986. Follow-on 
reviews will be held approximately every 6 
weeks. Results of these reviews will be re-
ported to the Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight and to the NASA Administra-
tor. 
On June 19, 1986, the NASA Administrator 
announced termination of the development 
of the Centaur upper stage for use aboard 
the Space Shuttle. Use of the Centaur 
upper stage was planned for NASA plane-
tary spacecraft launches as well as for cer-
tain national security satellite launches. Ma-
jor safety reviews of the Centaur system 
were under way at the time of the Challeng-
er accident, and these reviews were intensi-
fied in recent months to determine if the 
program should be continued. The final de-
cision to terminate the Centaur stage for 
use with the Shuttle was made on the basis 
that even following certain modifications 
identified by the ongoing reviews, the re-
sultant stage would not meet safety criteria 
being applied to other cargo or elements of
the Space Shuttle system. NASA has initiat-
ed efforts to examine other launch vehicle 
alternatives for the major NASA planetary 
and scientific payloads which were sched-
uled to utilize the Centaur upper stage. 
NASA is providing assistance to the Depart-
ment of Defense as it examines alternatives 
for those national security missions which 
had planned to use the Shuttle/Centaur. 
The NASA Administrator has announced a 
number of Space Station organizational and 
management structural actions designed to 
strengthen technical and management capa-
bilities in preparation for moving into the 
development phase of the Space Station 
program. The decision to create the new 
structure is the result of recommendations 
made to the Administrator by a committee, 
headed by General Phillips, which is con-
ducting a long range assessment of NASA's 
overall capabilities and requirements. 
Finally, NASA is developing plans for in-
creased staffing in critical areas and is work-
ing closely with the Office of Personnel 
Management to develop a NASA specific 
proposal which would provide for needed 
changes to the NASA personnel manage-
ment system to strengthen our ability to at-
tract, retain, and motivate the quality work 
force required to conduct the NASA mis-
sion (Appendix Q.
5 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
Design. The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and 
seal must be changed. This could be a new design 
eliminating the joint or a redesign of the current 
joint and seal. No design options should be 
prematurely precluded because of schedule, cost 
or reliance on existing hardware. All Solid Rocket 
Motor joints should satisfy the following 
requirements: 
• The joints should be fully understood, tested 
and verified. 
• The integrity of the structure and of the seals 
of all joints should be not less than that of the 
case walls throughout the design envelope. 
• The integrity of the joints should be insensitive 
to: 
- Dimensional tolerances. 
—Transportation and handling. 
- Assembly procedures. 
—Inspection and test procedures. 
- Environmental effects. 
- Internal case operating pressure 
—Recovery and reuse effects. 
—Flight and water impact loads.
• The certification of the new design should 
include: 
—Tests which duplicate the actual launch con-
figuration as closely as possible. 
—Tests over the full range of operating con-
ditions, including temperature. 
• Full consideration should be given to conduct-
ing static firings of the exact flight configura-
tion in a vertical attitude. 
Independent Oversight. The Administrator of 
NASA should request the National Research 
Council to form an independent Solid Rocket 
Motor design oversight committee to implement 
the Commission's design recommendations and 
oversee the design effort. This committee should: 
• Review and evaluate certification require-
ments. 
• Provide technical oversight of the design, test 
program and certification. 
• Report to the Administrator of NASA on the 
adequacy of the design and make appropriate 
recommendations. 
NASA has formed a Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Joint Redesign team at the Marshall Space 
Flight Center. This team includes personnel from several NASA Centers, industry, and the 
Astronaut Office. Their activities are being reviewed by a NASA/industry advisory panel and 
an Independent Oversight Group from the National Research Council. 
The team has evaluated several design alternatives, and analysis and testing is in progress to 
determine the preferred approaches which minimize hardware redesign. In addition, an 
approach will be developed, at least through concept definition, for a new design which does 
not utilize existing hardware. The primary selection criteria will be development of an SRM 
joint design that is safe to fly. A secondary objective is to minimize schedule impact by use of 
existing hardware, if that can be done without compromising safety. 
Analysis and testing is being performed to support the design selection process and to ensure 
the adequacy of the verification and certification of the redesigned joint. The static test orienta-
tion and configuration is being analyzed, and a proposed method is scheduled to be selected in 
July 1986. The Solid Rocket Motor redesign and certification schedule is under review to fully 
understand and plan for the implementation of the design solutions as they are finalized and 
assessed.
PROEING PAGE' BLANK fJQT FILMED 
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NASA Implementation of 
On March 24, 1986, the Marshall Space 
Flight Center was directed to form a Solid 
Rocket Motor Redesign Team to include 
participation from Marshall, other NASA 
Centers, and the Astronaut Office, as well 
as individuals from outside NASA. To assist 
the redesign team, an expert advisory panel 
was appointed which includes 12 people, 
with six coming from outside NASA. The 
redesign team was directed to review the 
Commission findings and recommendations 
and develop a plan to provide a Solid 
Rocket Motor that addresses all the criteria 
in the Commission recommendations. The 
primary objective of the redesign effort is to 
provide a Solid Rocket Motor with field and 
nozzle joints that is safe to fly. A secondary 
objective will be to minimize the schedule 
impact by using existing hardware, if this 
can be done without compromising safety. 
To ensure adequate program contingency 
in this effort, the redesign group will also 
develop, at least through concept definition, 
a totally new design that does not utilize ex-
isting hardware. Key program milestones 
have been established. Emphasis is being 
placed on the verification effort to ensure 
its adequacy. As one part of the verification 
plan, a trade study is being conducted be-
tween vertical (nozzle up and down) and 
horizontal static tests to determine the 
preferred test firing orientation. 
At the request of the NASA Administrator. 
the National Research Council (NRC) has 
established an Independent Oversight 
Group chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever 
and reporting directly to the Administrator. 
The NRC Oversight Group has been 
briefed on Shuttle system requirements, im-
plementation, and control; Solid Rocket 
Motor background; and candidate modifi-
cations. The group has established a near-
term plan that includes briefings and visits 
to review in-flight loads, assembly process-
ing, redesign status, and other solid rocket 
motor designs, including the Titan. Longer 
term plans of the group are being formulat-
ed. 
Many design alternatives have been evaluat-
ed, analyses and tests have been conducted,
Recommendation I 
initial verification plans have been estab-
lished, and overall schedules have been de-
veloped. In parallel, major SRM subassem-
blies and many critical processes have been 
reassessed, and efforts to determine those 
requiring additional review or modifications 
are in varying stages of maturity. 
The team has evaluated several design alter-
natives and is conducting analyses and test-
ing to determine the best approach which 
will utilize either existing hardware or mod-
ification of that in the production flow. An 
alternate joint design that does not utilize 
existing hardware is also under way. Addi-
tional design and studies are considering 
modifications to ground support equipment 
to resolve transportation, handling, and as-
sembly difficulties encountered in the past, 
as well as ground and flight systems to com-
pensate for the environmental effects of 
temperature and inclement weather. Other 
design modifications to reduce criticality or 
to resolve prior difficulties relating to the 
ignition system, factory joints, and nozzle 
are being considered. Design solutions for 
these modifications have been identified, 
and programmatic assessments are being fi-
nalized. 
Analyses and tests have been performed to 
support design selection. The analyses re-
late to structural strength, dimensional tol-
erances, gas and thermal dynamics, elasto-
meric material behavior, and leak check ad-
equacy. Tests being conducted range from 
small scale cold gas 0-ring performance 
tests, to 70 pound motor hot gas insulation 
evaluation, to full size joint mating tests 
evaluating assembly aids. Further, 
thoroughly comprehensive analyses are 
under way and planned that will be test-
verified to fully understand the joint opera-
tion. The total verification program com-
prises analyses and an extensive test pro-
gram using subscale fixtures, full-size mated 
segments subjected to hot gas transient 
motor pressure, full-size segment assembly 
demonstrations, and four full scale static 
hot firing tests that will be either horizontal, 
vertical, or a combination of both. The 
static test orientation is being fully ex-
plored, and the preferred configuration is 
12	 152
anticipated to be proposed in late July 1986 
Two of these full-scale tests will contain all 
system changes. 
The Solid Rocket Motor design schedule is 
currently under review to fully understand
and plan for the implementation of the de-
sign solutions as they are finalized and 
assessed. The schedule will be reassessed 
after the Preliminary Design Review in 
September 1986.
13 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
RECOMMENDATION 
II 
Shuttle Management Structure. The Shuttle 
Program Structure should be reviewed. The proj-
ect managers for the various elements of the Shut-
tle program felt more accountable to their center 
management than to the Shuttle program organi-
zation. Shuttle element funding, work package 
definition, and vital program information fre-
quently bypass the National STS (Shuttle) Pro-
gram Manager. 
A redefinition of the Program Manager's respon-
sibility is essential. This redefinition should give 
the Program Manager the requisite authority for 
all ongoing STS operations. Program funding 
and all Shuttle Program work at the centers 
should be placed clearly under the Program 
Manager's authority. 
Astronauts in Management. The Commission 
observes that there appears to be a departure from 
the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating
to the use of astronauts in management positions. 
These individuals brought to their positions flight 
experience and a keen appreciation of operations 
and flight safety. 
• NASA should encourage the transition of 
qualified astronauts into agency management 
positions. 
• The function of the Flight Crew Operations 
director should be elevated in the NASA orga-
nization structure. 
Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should establish an 
STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting to the STS 
Program Manager. The charter of this panel 
should include Shuttle operational issues, launch 
commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and 
risk management. The panel should include 
representation from the safety organization, mis-
sion operations, and the astronaut office. 
NASA is reviewing all aspects of its management structure. The Administrator requested 
General Sam Phillips to return to NASA and review all aspects of the organizational manage-
ment structure and procedural activities. This activity is currently in process and is expected to 
continue for several months. 
Astronaut Robert Crippen is leading a study addressing the STS management structure and 
the roles of astronauts in that structure. Specifically, the primary objective of the study is to 
strengthen the programmatic authority of STS management, and to clearly define the roles 
and responsibilities between the STS program and the NASA field centers. In addition, ways of 
encouraging astronauts to assume management positions will be identified as well as assessing 
their respective positions in the overall organizational structure. The results of this study will 
be thoroughly reviewed with General Phillips prior to incorporating the recommendations. 
A Shuttle Safety Panel with direct access to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight as well 
as the NSTS Program Manager will be established by September 1, 1986. The exact structure 
of this group and its relationship with other NASA safety organizations is currently under 
study. 
14
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation II 
NASA Administrator 
NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher 
has appointed General Sam Phillips, who 
served as Apollo Program Director, to study 
every aspect of how NASA manages its pro-
grams, including relationships between the 
various centers and NASA Headquarters. 
General Phillips' review is not limited to the 
Challenger accident and operates with 
broad authority from the Administrator to 
examine all aspects of NASA's organization, 
management, and procedural activities. He 
will provide his findings and recommenda -
tions to the Administrator by the end of 
1986. 
Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 
Crippen was directed to form a fact-finding 
group to assess the National Space Trans-
portation System (NSTS) management 
structure including the Shuttle Program 
Manager's responsibilities, use of astronauts 
in management positions, and the function-
allocation of the Flight Crew Operations 
Director in the organizational structure. 
The fact-finding group consists of: 
Robert Crippen, Group Leader 
Richard Kohrs, Deputy Manager, NSTS 
Office 
Walter Williams, Special Assistant to the 
NASA Administrator 
George Page, LSOC, Director of STS 
Test Operations, Vandenberg Launch 
Site 
This group is supplemented by individuals 
representing each of the field center in-
stitutions reporting to the Office of Space 
Flight: 
Andrew Pickett, Kennedy Space Center 
William Sneed, Marshall Space Flight 
Center 
Clifford Charlesworth, Johnson Space 
Center 
Roy Estess, National Space Technology 
Laboratories 
The group is interviewing individuals at 
various management levels representing the 
STS program, the field center institutions,
NASA Headquarters, and the major Shuttle 
contractors. In addition, the group will in-
terview former senior program officials to 
gain their perspective from past program 
experience. Finally, the group will review 
the findings and proposals with a private 
consulting firm that is recognized as knowl-
edgeable in management techniques. 
As of this time, the group has completed in-
terviews at the Marshall and Kennedy Space 
Flight Centers, with subsequent interview 
trips scheduled to the Johnson Space Cen-
ter and various contractor locations. Presen-
tations of findings and recommendations 
from this study will be presented to the As-
sociate Administrator for Space Flight by 
August 15, 1986. The findings and recom-
mendations will then be reviewed with the 
Administrator to insure that they are consis-
tent with the overall recommendations be-
ing developed by General Phillips. The Of-
fice of Space Flight will then implement the 
recommendations as appropriate. 
Specifically, the Level I/Il/Ill program 
management concept will be reevaluated 
with changes implemented to strengthen 
the structure and to reduce the potential 
for conflict between the program organiza-
tion and the NASA institutional organiza-
tions. In accordance with the Commission 
recommendations, strong consideration will 
be given to placing all Shuttle program 
funding and work at the centers under the 
Program Manager's authority. 
In addition, means to implement the rec-
ommended use of astronauts in manage-
ment positions will be identified. There are 
astronauts or former astronauts in ten man-
agement positions in the agency at this time, 
including the Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight. This brings the number of as-
tronauts who have been included in man-
agement positions during the Shuttle pro-
gram to approximately thirty, of which half 
have been in positions outside the Flight 
Crew Operations Directorate. This process 
is expected to continue and to be strength-
ened as the program management is re-
structured after this review.
15 
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The Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight will form a Shuttle Safety Panel by 
September 1, 1986. This panel will have di-
rect access to the Associate Administrator 
for Space Flight and to the NSTS Program 
Manager. A detailed study to define the 
roles and responsibilities and the staffing of
this panel is currently under way. In partic-
ular, the relationship to the newly formed 
Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality As-
surance, as well as the independent Aero-
space Safety Advisory Panel, must be 
assessed. 
16
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
RECOMMENDATION 
III 
Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. 
NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors 
should review all Criticality 1, 1R, 2, and 2R 
items and hazard analyses. This review should 
identify those items that must be improved prior
to flight to ensure mission success and flight safe-
ty. An Audit Panel, appointed by the National 
Research Council, should verify the adequacy of 
the effort and report directly to the Administrator 
of NASA. 
NASA has initiated a review of all Space Shuttle Program Failure Modes and Effects Analyses, 
Critical Item Lists, and Hazard Analyses. Each Space Shuttle project element and its prime 
contractors are conducting independent reviews which will be integrated and assessed by the 
element project office. The results of these reviews and recommended actions will be provided 
to the NSTS Program Manager and to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight for final 
resolution. Technical specialists from outside the Space Shuttle program are assigned as for-
mal members of each review team. The teams are reassessing all Criticality 1, 1R, 2, 2R, and 3 
items. All Criticality 1 and 1 R critical item waivers have been cancelled and must be resubmit-
ted for approval after these reviews. The National Research Council has agreed to establish an 
Audit Panel to verify the adequacy of this effort and to report to the NASA Administrator on 
its findings.
17 
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NASA Implementation of 
All STS project offices and element contrac-
tors are required to review their hardware 
design to identify those systems or 
components which if they fail could present 
a risk to the safety of the crew or could re-
suit in loss of the vehicle or mission. This is 
accomplished through a process defined in 
NASA Handbook 5300.4 and which re-
quires the project to perform a Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and to 
develop a Critical Item List (GIL) and Haz-
ard Analysis (HA) for each element. The 
purpose of the FMEA is to identify the vari-
ous potential failure modes of the flight ele-
ment components and assess the effects on 
the specific flight element as well as the total 
launch vehicle and mission. The potential 
failure modes are derived from analyses of 
function, design, and related manufactur-
ing processes. The GIL identifies the critical 
failure modes and the rationale for reten-
tion. The items contained in the GIL are 
classified in five major categories commen-
surate with the degree of criticality. The 
five classifications of the GIL are as follows: 
1 - Loss of life or vehicle 
1 R - Failure of both redundant hard-
ware elements could cause loss of 
life or vehicle 
2 - Loss of mission 
2R - Failure of both redundant hard-
ware elements could cause loss of 
mission 
3 - All others 
The Hazard Analysis identifies the hazards 
and their status of resolution and catego-
rizes them as controlled (by design, proce-
dure, etc.) or as an accepted risk. This 
review process was conducted during the 
development phase of the STS program 
prior to the first flight and FMEA's, GIL's, 
and HA's existed at the time of the 51-L 
launch. 
The Commission recommended that a 
reassessment of the FMEA/CIL, in conjunc-
tion with the hazard analyses, be conducted 
to assure that Criticality 1, 1R, 2, and 2R 
items are reevaluated and that the hazard 
analyses properly identify the Criticality 1 
items. Thus, the associated risks and
Recommendation III 
hazards will be thoroughly understood and 
appropriate action can be taken to minimize 
their criticality. NASA accepts this recom-
mendation and the review is under way. 
The review was initiated by a March 13, 
1986, letter from the NSTS Program Man-
ager to all project elements requesting that 
each office review its GIL's and FMEA's. 
The purpose of the review is to affirm the 
completeness and accuracy of each FMEAI 
GIL for the current NSTS design. The 
March 24, 1986, memorandum from the 
Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
defining the strategy for safely returning 
the Space Shuttle to flight status, directed 
that Criticality 1 and 1R items be subjected 
to a total review with a complete reapproval 
process implemented and that those items 
which were not revalidated must be rede-
signed, certified, and qualified for flight. 
The memorandum also directed that all 
Criticality 2 and 3 GIL's be reviewed for 
reacceptance and proper categorization. On 
March 28, 1986, the NSTS Manager signed 
Program Directive S40019 which directed 
that all Criticality 1, 1 R, and payload safety 
waivers be reverified, signed, and resubmit-
ted for approval. 
Following this direction, teams for each 
NSTS element project office (Level III), in-
cluding the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Ex-
ternal Tank (ET), Space Shuttle Main En-
gine (SSME), Orbiter, Government Fur-
nished Equipment (GFE), Spacelab (SL), 
Kennedy Space Center (KSG), and Vanden-
burg Launch Site (VLS), have been formed 
and are reviewing the FMEA's, GIL's, and 
HA's which apply to their element hard-
ware to assure that: 
a. The failure modes, causes, and related 
effects are identified and documented. 
b. The criticality has been properly 
assigned. 
c. The retention rationale for each criti-
cal item is complete and accurate. 
The reviews are being conducted by techni-
cal teams at the appropriate NASA centers 
and the element prime contractors. The re-
sults of both reevaluations will be presented 
18
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to a Level III Configuration Control Board 
(CCB) Preboard which will review all NASA 
and contractor items and select those which 
require submittal to the Level III CCB for 
approval. The preboard will also review and 
recommend enhancements such as design 
and process changes, instrumentation and 
software additions, and testing or checkout 
changes which could be implemented to 
eliminate critical failure modes, reduce criti-
cality, or minimize the possibility of failure 
or the effect of the failure. The preboard 
will select those items which should be sub-
mitted to the Level III CCB for review. The 
preboard membership will consist of, at a 
mimimum, the following members: 
a. NASA engineering management rep-
resentative 
b. Safety representative 
c. Reliability representative 
d. Astronaut Office representative 
e. Outside representative (not affiliated 
with the NSTS). 
In addition to these project level reviews, 
selected independent contractors will review 
the ET, Orbiter, SRB, and SSME FMEAI 
GIL's and provide their assessment to the 
project manager. 
The Level III CCB will review the preboard 
data and submit those significant items, in-
cluding proposed enhancements, to the 
Level II Program Requirements Change 
Board (PRCB) for consideration by the 
NSTS Program Manager. 
The element interface functional analysis is 
being reevaluated by the Systems Integra-
tion contractor. After this systems integra-
tion review, the results will be coordinated 
with the ET, Orbiter, SRB, and SSME Proj-
ect Offices, and the coordinated results sub-
mitted to the Level II Systems Integration 
Review Board. The results will then be pre-
sented to the Level II PRCB for approval. 
The Level II PRCB, including membership 
from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, 
will review the Level III CCB significant 
items, GIL changes, and enhancement rec-
ommendations. The Level II PRCB may au-
dit the enhancements not selected by Level 
III. The Level II PRCB will review and rec-
ommend any GIL changes and enhance-
ments to Level I NASA Headquarters for 
approval. A summary of disapproved GIL 
changes and enhancements will also be doc-
umented and provided to Level I. 
To assist in this process, the NSTS Program 
Manager has instituted a Level II Overview 
Group to assure that prime contractor 
reviews are consistent and conform to the 
Level II FMEAICIL reevaluation plan. The 
ET contractor, Martin Marietta Corpora-
tion (MMC) at Michoud, was visited on June 
16-20, 1986, with satisfactory results. The 
Orbiter contractor, Rockwell International 
(RI) at Downey, CA, will be visited the week 
of July 14, 1986. Rocketdyne, Thiokol, 
United Space Boosters Inc. (USBI), and 
other prime contractors, will be visited in 
the following weeks. 
The Level II results and recommendations 
will be reviewed by Level I. The Level I 
board will be chaired by the NASA Associ-
ate Administrator for Space Flight and con-
sist of his designated representatives. Level 
I will approve all items on the revalidated 
Criticality 1 and 1R GIL lists. 
The overall reevaluation is planned to occur 
incrementally and is scheduled to continue 
through mid-1987. Each project manager 
will forward the results of their integrated 
review through the management approval 
cycle as each subsystem is completed. Safety 
engineering will present the results of the 
hazard analysis reevaluation to the Level III 
CCB, the Senior Safety Review Board, the 
Level II PRCB for approval, and NASA 
Headquarters for review. 
The Commission recommended that the 
National Research Council (NCR) appoint 
an Audit Panel to verify the adequacy of 
this effort and report directly to the Admin-
istrator of NASA. This request has been 
made by NASA and accepted by the NRC. 
The NRC is forming the panel and NASA 
will support them as required. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
Iv 
Safety Organization. NASA should establish an 
Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality 
Assurance to be headed by an Associate Ad-
ministrator, reporting directly to the NASA Ad-
ministrator. It would have direct authority for 
safety, reliability, and quality assurance 
throughout the agency. The office should be 
assigned the work force to ensure adequate over-
sight of its functions and should be independent 
of other NASA functional and program 
responsibilities.
The responsibilities of this office should include: 
• The safety, reliability and quality assurance 
functions as they relate to all NASA activities 
and programs. 
• Direction of reporting and documentation of 
problems, problem resolution and trends 
associated with flight safety. 
On July 8, 1986, NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher announced the appointment of 
Mr. George A. Rodney to the position of Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance. In this position Mr. Rodney will have overall responsibility for develop-
ment and oversight of all Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance functions within NASA. In 
addition, he will assume the responsibility of implementing a system for anomaly documenta-
tion and resolution to include a trend analysis program. 
20
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation IV 
A NASA Office of Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance (SR&QA) headed by an 
Associate Administrator and reporting 
directly to the NASA Administrator has 
been established. This position will be re-
sponsible for the oversight of safety, relia-
bility, and quality assurance functions relat-
ed to all NASA activities and programs. In 
addition, it will be responsible for the direc-
tion of reporting and documentation of 
problems, problem resolution, and trends 
associated with safety. 
Specifically, this office will be responsible 
for:
a. Establishment and implementation of 
agency SR&QA policies, plans, and 
procedures. 
b. Insuring that risks are minimized by 
engineering design and operating 
procedures.
c. Investigation of and reporting on all 
NASA mishaps, incidents, and 
accidents. 
d. Implementing a trend analysis pro- 
gram that includes accurate reporting 
of anomalies, analysis and testing of 
problems, and implementation of cor-
rective measures. 
e. Ensuring that SR&QA issues are fully 
considered at all design, flight, and 
test readiness reviews. 
f. Ensuring that all NASA SR&QA 
organizations are adequately staffed 
with qualified personnel. 
g. Maintaining an effective dynamic safe-
ty program. 
h. Providing an integrated focus for 
agencywide program assurance 
policies.
21 
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SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
Improved Communications. The Commission 
found that Marshall Space Flight Center project 
managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to 
management isolation, failed to provide full and 
timely information bearing on the safety of flight 
51-L to other vital elements of Shuttle program 
management. 
• NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate 
this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, 
whether by changes of personnel, organiza-
tion, indoctrination or all three.
• A policy should be developed which governs 
the imposition and removal of Shuttle launch 
constraints. 
• Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission 
Management Team meetings should be 
recorded. 
The flight crew commander, or a designated 
representative, should attend the Flight 
Readiness Review, participate in acceptance 
of the vehicle for flight, and certify that the 
crew is properly prepared for flight. 
NASA is reviewing this recommendation as part of the review of the program management 
structure (Presidential Commission Recommendation II). The results of this activity will be 
presented to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 
22
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NASA Implementation of 
On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 
Crippen was directed to form a team to 
develop plans and policies for the following: 
1. Implementation of effective manage-
ment communication at all levels. 
2. Standardization of the imposition and 
removal of STS launch constraints and 
other operational constraints. 
3. Conduct of Flight Readiness Review and 
Mission Management Team meetings, in-
Recommendation V 
cluding requirements for documentation 
and flight crew participation. 
Because this recommendation is closely 
linked with Recommendation II, the study 
team will incorporate its plan for improved 
communications with that for the Shuttle 
management review. An integrated presen-
tation of recommendations will be given to 
the Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight by August 15, 1986.
23 
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SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
RECOMMENDATION 
VI 
Landing Safety. NASA must take actions to im-
prove landing safety. 
• The tire, brake and nosewheel steering systems 
must be improved. These systems do not have 
sufficient safety margin, particularly at abort 
landing sites. 
• The specific conditions under which planned 
landings at Kennedy would be acceptable 
should be determined. Criteria must be 
established for tires, brakes and nosewheel 
steering. Until the systems meet those criteria 
in high fidelity testing that is verified at 
Edwards, landing at Kennedy should not be 
planned.
• Committing to a specific landing site requires 
that landing area weather be forecast more 
than an hour in advance. During unpredict-
able weather periods at Kennedy, program of-
ficials should plan on Edwards landings. In-
creased landings at Edwards may necessitate 
a dual ferry capability. 
NASA has established a Landing Safety Team to develop an implementation plan to comply 
with the Commission recommendation. Some improvements to the brakes and nosewheel 
steering systems had-been made and other changes were under way prior to the accident. 
These planned improvements are being reassessed and additional changes are under consid-
eration. Tire, brake, and runway surface tests are being conducted, and a plan to standardize 
landing aids and to install arresting barriers at all runways has been developed. An improved 
weather forecasting and reporting capability is being developed which will enhance the fore-
casting of weather in support of launch and landing decisions. Planned end of mission land-
ings at the Kennedy Space Center will occur only after adequate safety margins have been 
demonstrated by test and by landings at Edwards Air Force Base. 
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation VI 
The NSTS Program Manager established a 
Landing Safety Team to review the Com-
mission findings and recommendations on 
landing safety and to develop an implemen-
tation plan to comply with the Commission 
recommendations. This effort will include: 
a. Identification of improvements re-
quired in tire, brake, nosewheel steer-
ing, and other landing systems to as-
sure safe operation; 
b. Development of a plan to implement 
the required improvements and to 
certify the overall landing system; 
c. Determination of landing criteria for 
all potential landing sites, nominal and 
contingency; 
d. Documentation of landing weather 
criteria for each site, taking local and 
seasonal variability and unpredict-
ability into account. 
Until the program has demonstrated satis-
factory safety margins through high fidelity 
testing and during actual landings at Ed-
wards Air Force Base, the Kennedy landing 
site will not be used for nominal end-of-
mission landings. 
Two brake improvement programs, a tire 
improvement study, a runway surface study 
and other hardware-related studies are 
under way. Design activities to improve the 
redundancy of the nosewheel steering sys-
tem have been initiated. A plan to provide 
standard landing aids and other facilities in-
cluding arresting barriers at all runways is 
being developed. An improved weather 
reporting capability is being developed 
which will enhance the weather forecasting 
in support of launch and landing decisions. 
The two brake improvement programs 
currently under way include: an interim en-
ergy capability improvement to be imple-
mented by first flight and a longer term car-
bon brake development program. The in-
terim modification includes addition of six 
hydraulic system orifices, an improved 
brake wear-in procedure, and a stiffer axle 
to correct the dynamic oscillation phenome-
non seen on early flights. Also included are 
a pressure balance feature to evenly distrib-
ute the energy load between inboard and
outboard brakes and a thicker stator which 
promises to improve energy absorption ca-
pability. The long-term carbon brake pro-
gram is planned to increase energy absorp-
tion capability by 80-100%. 
The objective of the tire improvement study 
and runway surface study is to determine 
how best to decrease the tire wear experi-
enced during previous KSC landings and to 
improve crosswind landing capability. Addi-
tionally, tests are planned at Wright Patter-
son AFB to improve the ability to mathe-
matically model tire side force characteris-
tics in support of upcoming simulations. 
A major upgrade of the nosewheel steering 
system was accomplished prior to the STS 
61-A flight. The system to date has demon-
strated improved handling qualities but it is 
still characterized by several single point 
failure modes. Two design activities are 
under way to improve redundancy: fail op-
erational fail-safe avionics with the current 
single string hydraulic system and total fail-
operational fail-safe nosewheel steering (in-
cluding hydraulics). Either system will re-
quire substantial software changes and pilot 
in-the-loop simulations for verification prior 
to flight test. Other hardware related 
studies in progress include tire blowout 
protection, autobraking, tire pressure in-
strumentation, and anti-skid improvements. 
A thorough review (including clima-
tological statistics) of the available runways 
in Europe and Africa has been accom-
plished to assist in evaluating those runways 
which can improve Trans-Atlantic Abort 
Landing (TAL) safety margins. A site sur-
vey team will look at four Moroccan run-
ways in July. The findings of this team will 
be used to finalize the selection of a site and 
implement recommended improvements. 
In addition, a plan to provide standard 
landing aids and other facilities at all run-
ways has been adopted. This plan includes 
the procurement of arresting barriers to 
provide safe stops in the event of brake fail-
ures or unforecast wet runway conditions. A 
minimum weather reporting capability is 
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being developed which should ensure ac-
ceptable weather for abort and end of mis-
sion landings. 
The flight rules which govern the use of all 
landing sites, for both nominal and contin-
gency situations, are being reevaluated. Dif-
ferences in flight rules between nominal 
end-of-mission and abort landings may be 
necessary because of facility deficiencies at 
some abort landing sites; however, safety 
will not be significantly affected. This land-
ing safety review process is an ongoing
activity which will be refined as planned 
capabilities are implemented. 
Providing a dual Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 
(SCA) capability for the Orbiter has been a 
programmatic issue for some time. The 
plans for use of Edwards Air Force Base as 
the landing site until landing safety margins 
are improved, will increase the need for a 
dual ferry capability. This issue will be thor-
oughly considered during the upcoming 
months. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
VII 
Launch Abort and Crew Escape. The Shuttle 
program management considered first-stage abort 
options and crew escape options several times 
during the history of the program, but because 
of limited utility, technical infeasibility, or pro-
gram cost and schedule, no systems were im-
plemented. The Commission recommends that 
NASA:
• Make all efforts to provide a crew escape 
system for use during controlled gliding flight. 
• Make every effort to increase the range of flight 
conditions under which an emergency runway 
landing can be successfully conducted in the 
event that two or three main engines fail early 
in ascent. 
NASA has initiated a review of the STS Crew Egress/Escape and launch abort capability. The 
crew Egress/Escape analysis is considering concepts for the total mission profile which includes 
pad activities, launch through flight to orbit, and descent from orbit to landing. To analyze 
each aspect of the mission, design teams for ground egress, bail-out ejection systems, water 
landings, and powered flight separation have been established, as well as a systems engineering 
team to maintain study continuity and integrate the results of the proposed systems concepts. 
In conjunction with the systems engineering team, an envelope definition team is providing 
the appropriate trajectories to be used by each team. The trajectories are being overlaid with 
the physiological envelope limits of the crew; the combined trajectory and physiological enve-
lope are being evaluated against the capabilities of the various system concepts. From the data 
and preliminary analysis, the concepts determined to be most feasible will get further study. 
The teams will consider modifications to existing STS hardware and concepts which may be 
included in future vehicle designs. 
A launch abort assessment team has been established to review all aspects of the abort options 
available during the launch phase. This team is reviewing the abort mode software implemen-
tation, procedures, and navigation targeting as well as the groundrules and constraints that are 
used during the design of the ascent trajectory. This team is reviewing all aspects of the launch 
process to assure that when operations resume, they are as safe as possible and maximize the 
opportunity for achieving an emergency runway landing during launch phase aborts.
27 
167
NASA Implementation of Recommendation VII 
STS Crew Egress and Escape System.The 
NSTS Program Manager initiated a study 
effort in April of this year to consider all 
aspects of atmospheric crew escape from 
the time of crew ingress on the pad to post 
landing Orbiter egress. This study is being 
conducted by a team led by the Johnson 
Space Center Engineering Directorate with 
support from the Astronaut Office. Inputs 
have been solicited and received from es-
cape experts from the Navy and the Air 
Force as well as the Langley Research Cen-
ter and the Kennedy Space Center. The 
team is reviewing past studies as well as new 
and innovative concepts. A review of the 
design ground rules confirmed that the 
Shuttle was designed for intact (runway 
landing) abort for the case of loss of thrust 
in one main engine. These analysis require-
ments have been expanded to include two 
and three engine out cases. The number of 
crew that each concept could safely extract 
and the crew survival requirements will be 
identified. The Crew Escape study will be 
completed on October 1, 1986, with an im-
plementation decision in December 1986. 
The current escape mode for other than in-
tact abort is ditching. This study is empha-
sizing creation of an alternative to ditching 
and to expanding the escape envelope. The 
study team will identify the maximum alti-
tude of escape coverage for ascent, abort, 
and entry for each individual concept 
under consideration. Thermal protection, 
oxygen, and pressure suit requirements will 
be identified for the concepts covering the 
higher altitudes. 
The study effort is divided into teams cov-
ering first stage powered ascent, ejection 
systems, bailout, ditching, and ground 
egress. Consistent envelopes and costing 
techniques are being used to insure uni-
form assessment. Each team has derived 
several concepts and assessed the advant-
ages, disadvantages, cost, and vehicle 
changes associated with each. 
The preliminary conclusions resulting from 
the study are as follows: 
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• No concept provides complete coverage 
of the flight envelope. 
• Low-cost options provide less envelope 
coverage. 
• More costly concepts severely impact per-
formance capability due to additional 
weight. 
• Ditching is unpredictable and life 
threatening and should be avoided, if 
possible. 
The preliminary recommendations of the 
study team are as follows: 
• Initiate a study of manual and powered 
extraction bailout. Design goals should be 
early implementation, minimum weight, 
and maximum crew size. 
• Initiate a long-range study for combina-
tions of ejection seats and passenger 
compartments. 
• Continue ditching structural integrity 
studies and initiate crew simulation train-
ing for ditching. 
• Initiate a detailed feasibility study of 
aeroseparation during first stage (prior to 
SRB separation) flight. 
• Flame protection should be provided for 
the launch pad access area, the hazardous 
gas detection system should be reviewed, 
and TV coverage of the total crew egress 
route should be provided. 
• Reanalyze the slide system from platform 
to basket to bunker to transport vehicle. 
• Augment Orbiter post landing egress ca-
pability with a slide. 
• Assign a pad egress safety manager with
overall pad egress safety responsibility. 
The preliminary recommendations are be-
ing reviewed at this time, and hardware 
contractors will be requested to provide 
study plans, design proposals, and funding 
requirements for review by the NSTS Pro-
gram Office prior to any final implementa-
tion decision. 
Launch/Abort Reassessment. A Launch/Abort 
Reassessment Team was formed to perform 
a total review of the launch phase and abort 
options available within that phase. This 
team will insure that all available options to
provide emergency runway landing cap-
ability are defined. These options will then 
be reviewed by the NSTS Program Manager 
prior to any implementation decisions being 
made. 
This team has been formed and is divided 
into subgroups. These sub-groups and their 
work are described in subsequent para-
graphs. The initial thrust of this team has 
been directed toward those long-lead 
decisions required for the first flight; 
namely, an evaluation of the Trans-Atlantic 
Abort mode, participation in the flight de-
sign process, and a review of the required 
flight software changes. The flight design 
baseline is now complete, and a report cit-
ing the acceptability of the Trans-Atlantic 
Abort mode has been provided to the Pro-
gram Manager. 
The Abort Mode Implementation subgroup 
has focused on the first flight activities. This 
group is reviewing the final submittal of 
flight software modifications, the certifica-
tion history of the ascent abort modes, the 
verification process for both onboard and 
ground software, contingency procedures, 
and abort targeting. 
The Ascent Design subgroup is reviewing 
the ground rules and constraints that are 
used to shape the ascent trajectory, as well 
as the methods of predicting ascent perfor-
mance margin. Flight product development 
processes and the verification of these 
products are also being reviewed. The tech-
niques and procedures for assuring the abil-
ity of the vehicle to perform in the ascent 
environment, as it is observed to exist on 
launch day, will also be assessed.
The Systems Management subgroup is 
reviewing all vehicle systems and their oper-
ational management. Issues uncovered dur-
ing these review sessions are being resolved 
by the group, where possible, and, when re-
quired, issues are fowarded to the appropri-
ate level of management. Changes are being 
made to vehicle requirements, ground and 
flight documentation, flight rules, flight 
software, and where necessary, flight hard-
ware changes are being proposed. 
The Range Safety subgroup, which also in-
cludes Air Force personnel, will assure the 
adequacy of the tools, procedures, and rules 
for developing the proper blend of flight 
and ground safety during the ascent phase. 
The group is reviewing the Space Shuttle 
range safety hardware to evaluate the need 
for carrying destruct charges on both the 
External Tank and Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Other subgroups of this team are reviewing 
weather statistics and forecasting tools and 
techniques as they pertain to launch and 
landing operations. The process of imple-
menting flight software products to meet 
flight requirements is also being reviewed. 
The Launch Commit Criteria and Flight 
Rule review groups have begun a systematic 
review of the decision making criteria used 
to commit a vehicle to launch and to govern 
the decision making processes used in 
flight. 
This Launch/Abort Reassessment Team will 
review every aspect of the launch process 
and assure that when operations resume, 
they are as safe as possible. The Launch/ 
Abort study will be complete on October 1, 
1986, with an implementation decision in 
December 1986. 
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Flight Rate. The nation's reliance on the Shut-
tle as its principal space launch capability created 
a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the 
flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch 
capability should be avoided in the future.
NASA must establish a flight rate that is consis-
tent with its resources. A firm payload assignment 
policy should be established. The policy should 
include rigorous controls on cargo manifest 
changes to limit the pressures such changes exert 
on schedules and crew training. 
NASA has formed a Flight Rate Capability Working Group to assess a safe, sustainable flight 
rate and to identify the constraints to this rate. The flight rate capability study will consider all 
required work for the standard vehicle processing flow and assure that the work is optimized in 
relation to the available workforce considering such factors as the manifest, nonscheduled 
work, in-flight anomaly resolution, mods, processing team workloads, and work balancing 
across shifts. The flight production study will review the requirements for mission planning, 
flight production development, payload assignment policy and controls and achievable soft-
ware delivery capability to support flight controllers and crew training. These studies will 
consider the availability of the third Orbiter Processing Facility, the availability of spares, as well 
as the effects of supporting the Vandenberg Launch Site to determine the maximum achiev-
able safe flight rate. 
A cargo manifest policy is being formulated by NASA Headquarters which will establish 
manifest groundrules and impose constraints to late changes. 
NASA supports increased emphasis on a mixed fleet and action to revitalize the United States 
expendable launch vehicle capability. 
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NASA Implementation of 
The assessment of a safe sustainable NSTS 
flight rate capability was initiated in March 
1986 with the establishment of a formal 
Flight Rate Capability Working Group. This 
group includes representation from John-
son Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, 
Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA Head-
quarters, Vandenberg Launch Site and Air 
Force Space Division. 
Under the direction of this working group, 
flight rate capability studies are under way 
at Kennedy Space Center and Johnson 
Space Center. These studies will assess the 
best estimate of flight rate capability and 
will identify potential constraints to that 
rate. An integral part of the flight rate plan-
fling mechanism will be the identification 
and implementation of program enhance-
ments (facilities, manpower, support equip-
ment, procedures, production improve-
ments) required to achieve the flight rate. 
The flight rate assessment will also consider 
flight software development and design, crew 
training requirements, spares provision-
ing, as well as maintenance and structural 
inspection requirements. Flight rate analy-
ses tools and procedures that will support 
both accurate flight rate projection and 
detailed operations schedules at the Ken-
nedy Space Center are planned. The Na-
tional Research Council is conducting an
Recommendation VIII 
assessment of the flight rate capability at the 
request of the Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agen-
cies. NASA is supporting this analysis and 
will incorporate the results into the assess-
ment of flight rate. 
NASA has participated in Senior Interag-
ency Group discussions on overall United 
State space launch strategy. NASA supports 
increased emphasis on a mixed fleet and 
actions to revitalize the United States ex-
pendable launch vehicle capabilities. 
A cargo manifest policy is being formulated 
by NASA Headquarters which will establish 
manifest ground rules and impose con-
straints to late changes. Cargo manifest 
change control is being pursued through 
the generation of a set of manifest stability 
groundrules and policies which will apply to 
both NASA Headquarters and the program 
level. Proposals are being formulated at the 
Johnson Space Center for submission to 
NASA Headquarters in November 1986. In 
addition, manifest change impact prediction 
and measurement tools are being devel-
oped. Integrated scheduling and resource 
prediction concepts have been defined and 
the necessary software programming initiat-
ed.
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Maintenance Safeguards. Installation, test, and	 With regard to the Orbiters, NASA should: 
maintenance procedures must be especially 
rigorous for Space Shuttle items designated	 • Develop and execute a comprehensive 
Criticality 1. NASA should establish a system of 	 maintenance inspection plan. 
analyzing and reporting performance trends of 	 • Perform periodic structural inspections when 
such items.	 scheduled and not permit them to be waived. 
Maintenance procedures for such items should 	 • Restore and support the maintenance and 
be specified in the Critical Items List, especially 	 spare parts programs, and stop the practice of 
for those such as the liquid-fueled main engines, 	 removing parts from one Orbiter to supply 
which require unstinting maintenance and 	 another. 
overhaul. 
NASA is developing an NSTS Maintenance Plan to ensure that uniform maintenance 
requirements are imposed by all program elements. This plan will define inspection require-
ments and frequency, periodic maintenance requirements and schedules, configuration con-
trol requirements and organizational responsibility, and reporting requirements. All existing 
test and checkout requirements documents are being reviewed and will consider the results of 
the ongoing Critical Items List (GIL) reviews to ensure consistency between the GIL require-
ments and Operations and Maintenance Instructions at the Kennedy Space Center and the 
Vandenburg Launch Site. NASA is actively reviewing its policy and future planning for pro-
gram logistics including spare parts provisioning. 
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NASA Implementation of 
The NSTS has established a Maintenance 
Safeguards Team with representatives from 
the Johnson USC), Kennedy (KSC), and 
Marshall (MSFC) Space Flight Centers to 
develop a comprehensive plan for defining 
and implementing actions in compliance 
with Presidential Commission Recommen-
dation IX. This team will serve as the focal 
point for all the NSTS maintenance activity 
and will ensure that an adequate mainte-
nance program is in place and well under-
stood by all elements of the program. 
A National Space Transportation System 
Maintenance Plan is being prepared to en-
sure that uniform maintenance require-
ments are imposed by all elements of the 
NSTS Program. This plan will define the 
documentation and implementation re-
quirements for (1) hardware inspections 
and schedules, (2) planned maintenance ac-
tivities and schedules, (3) maintenance 
procedures configuration control, and (4) 
maintenance logistics. The plan will also de-
fine organizational responsibilities, report-
ing, and control requirements for NSTS 
maintenance activities. 
Maintenance requirements for checkout, 
tests, inspections, servicing, and repair will 
be validated for both vehicle processing and 
depot level repair activities. The effort for 
the vehicle processing activity is defined and 
scheduled after completion of the Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items 
List Review currently under way. Planning 
for a Depot Level Repair Requirements 
Review has been initiated. The Operations 
Maintenance Requirement Specification 
Document (OMRSD) which defines all test 
and checkout requirements is being re-
viewed to ensure that the requirements are 
complete and that the required testing is 
consistent with the results of the Critical 
Items List (CIL) review. 
Maintenance procedures used by the launch 
sites and repair agencies are being validated 
by technical teams including membership 
from the design centers and element con-
tractors to ensure proper implementation 
of requirements. Verification of Shuttle ve-
hicle checkout and processing procedures is
Recommendation IX 
currently being accomplished in the Opera-
tions and Maintenance Instruction (OMI) 
review. An activity to establish methods to 
rigorously control baselined procedures for 
safety-related critical items and to obtain 
design center concurrence on any changes 
to these critical procedures is in place. 
The problem reporting and corrective ac-
tion systems presently being used by JSC, 
KSC, and MSFC are being consolidated and 
reviewed for uniformity in documentation, 
reporting, and trend analyses requirements 
based on failure and process non-
conformance experience. Safety, reliability, 
and quality assurance activities will be an in-
tegral part of the NSTS Maintenance Pro-
gram. These activities will be closely coordi-
nated with the newly formed office of the 
Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliabil-
ity, and Quality Assurance. 
Maintenance Inspection Plans are being de-
veloped by each NSTS Project. The Space 
Shuttle Main Engine Project has a program 
approved inspection plan in place. This 
plan will be examined and its adequacy veri-
fied. The Orbiter Project has submitted, for 
program baselining, an inspection plan 
resulting from studies done by a major air-
line company. This plan establishes 
rigorous requirements, schedules, and a 
closed loop feedback mechanism for 
providing launch site inspection results to 
project personnel. Inspection plans for the 
External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster 
Projects are being developed. 
The logistics program for the Orbiter vehi-
cle has been a concern of the program since 
the completion of developmental flights. 
The lack of sufficient spare parts led to 
practices such as removal of parts from one 
Orbiter to supply another. NASA has initi-
ated an assessment of spare parts require-
ments to adequately support the flight rate 
planning. Progress has been made with the 
construction of a large logistic facility at 
KSC in which all available parts can be sto-
red. Additionally, the Orbiter Prime Con-
tractor has established a Logistics Service 
Center near Kennedy Space Center which 
provides field maintenance capability for a 
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number of Orbiter subsystem elements. 
Contractual and government management 
changes have been made which will improve 
the logistics planning. Measurement criteria 
for monitoring the availability of spare 
parts are being developed and given proper
attention by program management. A 
rigorous, closed-loop, accounting system 
that provides the discipline to assure com-
pliance with all program approved check-
out, tests, inspections, servicing, and repair 
requirements is being established. 
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Appendix A 
March 24, 1986 Memorandum from the Associate Administrator for Space Flight: 
Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Status
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National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Reply to Alin of: M
	
MAR 2 4 1986 
TO:	 Distribution 
FROM:	 M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
SUBJECT: Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight 
Status 
This memorandum defines the comprehensive strategy and major actions 
that, when completed, will allow resumption of the NSTS flight 
schedule. NASA Headquarters (particularly the Office of Space Flight), 
the OSF centers, the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) 
program organization and its various contractors will use this guidance 
to proceed with the realistic, practical actions necessary to return to 
the NSTS flight schedule with emphasis on flight safety. This guidance 
is intended to direct planning for the first year of flight while 
putting into motion those activities required to establish a realistic 
and an achievable launch rate that will be safely sustainable. We 
intend to move as quickly as practicable to complete these actions and 
return to safe and effective operation of the National Space 
Transportation System. 
Guidance for the following subjects is included: 
o ACTIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT 
o	 FIRST FLIGHT/FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 
o DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SAFE FLIGHT RATE 
ACTIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT: 
Reassess Entire Program Management Structure and Operation 
The NSTS program management philosophy, structure, reporting channels 
and decision-making process will be thoroughly reviewed and those 
changes implemented which are required to assure confidence and safety 
in the overall program, including the commit to launch process. 
Additionally, the Level I/Il/ill budget and management relationships 
will be reviewed to insure that they do not adversely affect the NSTS 
decision process.
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Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Joint Redesign 
A dedicated SRM joint design group will be established at MSFC, with 
selective participation from other NASA centers and external 
organizations, to recommend a program plan to quantify the SRM joints 
problem and to accomplish the SRM joints redesign. The design must be 
reviewed in detail by the program to include PDR, CDR, DCR, independent 
analysis, DM-QM testing, and any other factors necessary to assure that 
the overall SRM is safe to commit to launch. The type and content of 
post-flight inspections for the redesigned joints and other flight 
components will be developed in detail, with criteria developed for 
commitment to the next launch as well as reusability of the specific 
flight hardware components. 
Design Requirements Reveri fi cti on 
A review of the NSTS Design Requirements (Vol. 07700) will be conducted 
to insure that all systems design requirements are properly defined. 
This review will be followed by a delta OCR for all program elements to 
assure the individual projects are in compliance with the requirements. 
Complete CIL/OMI Review 
All Category 1 and 1R critical items will be subjected to a total 
review with a complete reapproval process implemented. Those items 
which are not revalidated by this review must be redesigned, certified, 
and qualified for flight. The review process will include a review of 
the 0MIs, OMRSD's, and other supporting documentation which is 
pertinent to the test, checkout, or assembly process of the Category 1 
and 1R flight hardware. KSC will continue to be responsible for all 
OMI's with design center concurrence required for those which affect 
Category 1 and 1R items. Category 2 and 3 CIL's will be reviewed for 
reacceptance and to verify their proper categorization. 
Complete OMRSD Review 
The OMRSD will be reviewed to insure that the requirements defined in 
it are complete and that the required testing is consistent with the 
results of the CIL review. Inspection/retest requirements will be 
modified as necessary to assure flight safety. 
Launch/Abort Reassessment 
The launch and launch abort rules and philosophy will be assessed to 
assure that the launch and fliqht rules, range safety systems/ 
operational procedures, landing aids, runway configuration and length, 
performance vs. TAL exposure, abort weights, runway surface, and other 
landing related capabilities provide an acceptable margin of safety to 
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the vehicle and crew. Additionally, the weather forecasting capability 
will be reviewed and improved where possible to allow for the most 
accurate reporting. 
FIRST FLIGHT/FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 
First Flight 
The subject of first flight mission design will require extensive 
review to assure that we are proceeding in an orderly, conservative, 
safe manner. To permit the process to begin, the following specific 
planning guidance applies to the first planned mission: 
o	 daylight KSC launch 
o	 conservative flight design to minimize TAL exposure 
o	 repeat payload (not a new payload class) 
o	 no waiver on landing weight 
o	 conservative launch/launch abort/landing weather 
o	 NASA-only flight crew 
o	 engine thrust within the experience base 
o	 no active ascent/entry 010's 
o	 conservative mission rules 
o	 early, stable flight plan with supporting flight software and 
training load 
o	 daylight EDW landing (lakebed or runway 22) 
First Year 
The planning for the flight schedule for the first year of operation 
will reflect a launch rate consistent with this conservative approach. 
The specific number of flights to be planned for the first year will be 
developed as soon as possible and will consider KSC and VAFB work flow, 
software development, controller/crew training, etc. Changes to flight 
plans, ascent trajectories, manifest, etc., will be minimized in the 
interest of program stability. Decisions on each launch will be made 
after thorough review of the previous mission's SRM joint performance, 
all other specified critical systems performance and resolution of 
anomalies. 
In general, the first year of operation will be maintained within the 
current flight experience base, and any expansion of the base, 
including new classes of payloads, will be approved only after very 
thorough safety review. Specifically, 109 percent thrust levels will 
not be flown until satisfactory completion of the MPT testing currently 
being planned, and the first use of the Filament Wound Case will not 
occur with the first use of 109 percent SSME thrust level. Every 
effort will be made to conduct the first VAFB flight on an expeditious 
and safe schedule which supports national security requirements.
39 
179
4 
DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SAFE FLIGHT RATE 
The ultimate safe, sustainable flight rate, and the buildup to that 
rate, will be developed utilizing a "bottoms-up" approach in which all 
required work for the standard flow as defined in the OMRSD is 
identified and that work is optimized in relation to the available work 
force. Factors such as the manifest, nonscheduled work, in-flight 
anomaly resolution, mods, processing team workloads, work balancing 
across shifts, etc., will be considered, as well as timely mission 
planning, flight product development and achievable software delivery 
capability to support flight controllers and crew training. This 
development will consider the availability of the third orbiter 
facility, the availability of spares, as well as the effects of 
supporting VAFB launch site operations. 
THE BOTTOM LINE 
The Associate Adminstrator for Space Flight will take the action for 
reassessment of the NSTS program management structure. The NSTS 
Program Manager at Johnson Space Center is directed to initiate and 
coordinate all other actions required to implement this strategy for 
return to safe Shuttle flight. 
I know that the business of space flight can never be made to be 
totally risk-free, but this conservative return to operations will 
continue our strong NASA/Industry team effort to recover from the 
Challenger accident. Many of these items have already been initiated 
at some level in our organizations, and I am fully aware of the 
tremendous amount of dedicated work which must be accomplished. I do 
know that our nation's future in space is dependent on the individuals 
who must carry this strategy out safely and successfully. Please give 
this the widest possible distribution to your people. It is they who 
must understand it, and they who must do it. 
&ar.Trul 
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Appendix B 
NASA memoranda directing the implementation of the Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Accident Recommendations
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NASA 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Office of the Administrator
JUN 20 1986 
TO:	 M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
FROM:	 A/Admini strator 
SUBJECT: Presidential Commission Recommendations Action Plan 
The President has reviewed the report from the Commission on the Space 
Shuttle CHALLENGER accident and on June 13 directed NASA to undertake a 
program to implement its recommendations as soon as possible. The 
President directed me to report to him in 30 days on how and when the 
Commission's recommendations will be implemented. This report should 
include milestones by which progress in the implementations process can be 
measured. 
The Office of the Administrator assumes responsibility for recommendation 
number 4 on safety organization. I have previously announced NASA's 
establishment of the Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance 
to answer this recommendation. The Office of Space Flight is directed to 
take the action for all other Commission recommendations and to prepare 
the NASA report to the President. 
I plan to report to the President on July 11, 1986. Please status me on 
yo r progress on a weekly basis. 
es C. Fletcher
PREO€OING PAGE BLANK £40T flLW&D 
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TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE 
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T0 
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 
HOUSTON, TX 
ATTN:	 GA/MR. A. ALDRICH 
ATTN:	 AA/MR. J. MOORE 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FL 
ATTN:	 CD/MR. R. SMITH 
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, AL 
ATTN:	 DAO1/DR. LUCAS 
NATIONAL SPACE TECHNOLOGY LABORATORIES 
NSTL STATION, MS 
ATTN:	 MOO/MR. I. HLASS 
SUBJECT:	 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS  
ND_IT OANPCATNH 
FAGS MD.	 MD. OF MS. 
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P--- MUM	 hobw am@&  
_IUN 11-0 
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NAME OF AGeICY 
NASA HEADQUARTERS
AMM
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em
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M$SSAGI TO II TRANSMZTT 	 (Us. 4.iJ,	 and ea s.pàd  
TO: 
IN A MEETING TODAY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE NASA ADMINISTRATOR, 
PRESIDENT REAGAN DIRECTED THAT A PROGRAM BE UNDERTAKEN TO IMPLEMENT 
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 
THE PROCEDURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES SUGGESTED IN THE REPORT WILL 
BE ESSENTIAL TO RESUMING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SPACE TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEM OPERATIONS, AND WILL BE CRUCIAL IN RESTORING U.S. SPACE LAUNCH 
ACTIVITIES TO FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS. 
NASA WILL REPORT BACK TO THE PRESIDENT IN 30 DAYS ON HOW AND WHEN THE 
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED INCLUDING MILESTONES BY 
WHICH PROGRESS CAN BE MEASURED. 
SPECIFIC DIRECTION REGARDING THOSE ACTIONS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT EACH 
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION WILL BE FORTHCOMING WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL 
DAYS.	 RECOMMENDATION 4 (SAFETY ORGANIZATION) WILL BE ADDRESSED BY THE 
ADMINISTRATOR.
	 RECOMMENDATION 2 (SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT STRUCTUR.F.
 
D	 QMImCATmN 
mm NO.	 NO. OF
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,	 , 	 14.
.vI$ 11-s 
QM41101-33@1	 * U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1203 0 - 301-526 ($273) 
45 185 
TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE
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TO: 
ASTRONAUTS IN MANAGEMENT, SHUTTLE SAFETY PANEL) AND RECOMMENDATION 5 
(IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS) WILL BE ADDRESSED BY LEVEL I. 	 ALL OTHER 
RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE WORKED THROUGH LEVEL II, NSTS PROGRAM MANAGER. 
THE STS 51-L TASK FORCE ACTION CENTER IS HEREBY REDESIGNATED THE NSTS 
ACTION CENTER.	 I INTEND THAT THE NSTS ACTION CENTER SHALL BE USED TO 
COORDINATE AND TRACK THE PROGRESS OF EACH OF OUR ACTIONS AND TO BE THE 
NSTS POINT OF CONTACT FOR ORGANIZATIONS EXTERNAL TO THE NSTS RELATING 
TO THE COMMISSION REPORT. 
AS PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED TODAY IN HIS LETTER TO DR. FLETCHER, 
"...THE MEN AND WOMEN OF NASA AND THE TASKS THEY SO ABLY PERFORM ARE 
ESSENTIAL TO THE NATION IF WE ARE TO RETAIN OUR LEADERSHIP IN THE 
PURSUIT OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS."	 DR. FLETCHER AND I 
HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO ORGANIZE OUR RESPONSE TO 
THLROGERS COMMISSION REPORT AND TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO RETURN TO 
A SAFE FLIGHT STATUS.
UCaW 
fICHARDaH. TRULYQ
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NASA 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Reply to Attn of:
TO:	 Johnson Space Center 
Attn: GA/Manager, NSTS Office 
FROM:	 M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
SUBJECT: Implementation of Presidential Commission Recommendations 
This direction amplifies my TWX of June 13, 1986, same subject. You are 
hereby assigned responsibility for the action associated with the Presidential 
Commission Recommendations I, III, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. In fulfilling these 
actions, you will be responsible directly to the Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight. 
Specific actions required for each recommendation are enclosed. You should 
develop a reporting plan that provides me regular visibility into the status 
of all actions. Action status will be routed through the NSTS Action 
Center. My point of contact is Mr. J. Honeycutt, FTS 453-1261. 
In order to support the Administrator's initial report to the President, your 
first status is required not later than July 3, 1986. Mr. D. Branscome, FTS 
453-1125, is my point of contact to develop this report. Please work directly 
with him to reach an agreement on format and-content of the portion which 
concerns your actions. 
This work is of the utmost importance to return the U.S. safely to manned 
space flight. Its importance cannot be overstressed to those who accomplish 
the work associated with these actions. 
4Richard H. Trul 
Enclosure
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NASA 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Reply to Attn of: 
M 
TO:	 M/Robert L. Crippen 
FROM:	 M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
SUBJECT: Implementation of Presidential Commission Recommendations 
This direction amplifies my TWX of June 13, 1986, same subject. You are 
hereby assigned responsibility for the action associated with the Presidential 
Commission Recommendations II and V. In fulfilling these actions, you will be 
responsible directly to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. 
Specific actions required for each recommendation are enclosed. You should 
develop a reporting plan that provides me regular visibility into the status 
of all actions. Action status will be routed through the NSTS Action 
Center. My point of contact is Mr. J. Honeycutt, FTS 453-1261. 
In order to support the Administrator's initial report to the President, your 
first status is required not later than July 3, 1986. Mr. D. Branscome, FTS 
453-1125, is my point of contact to develop this report. Please work directly 
with him to reach an agreement on format and content of the portion which 
conerns your actions. 
This work is of the utmost importance to return the U.S. safely to manned 
space flight. Its importance cannot be overstressed to those who accomplish 
the work associated with these actions. 
Richard H. Trul 
Enclosure 
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Appendix C 
NASA letter to the Office of Personnel Management on revitalization of NASA through 
concepts contained in the President's proposed Civil Service Simplification Act
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NASA 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington. D.C. 
20546 
Office of the Administrator JUL 10 196 
Honorable Constance Homer 
Director, Office of Personnel 
Management 
1900 E Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20415 
Dear Mrs. Homer: 
We appreciate the offer you made in the June 13, 1986, meeting 
with Dr. Fletcher and myself to help in revitalizing NASA. The 
timing could not be better for us to explore jointly innovative 
ways to manage NASA personnel matters. 
Since our initial meeting, we have taken steps to work with 
your office to develop an approach to implement the concepts 
contained in the President's proposed Civil Service 
Simplification Act, with the support of both the Administration 
and the Congress. Gaining the flexibility to better challenge 
and reward our personnel would greatly help NASA's effort to move 
forward. 
We plan to work with your staff to refine these efforts and 
keep the project moving on a very fast track. 
Your continued efforts in partnership with NASA will be vital 
to our success.
Sincerely, 
4/p -^  ^?- &""04- 
William R. Graham 
Deputy Administrator 
RrODING PQ CLANK NOT FILMEI 
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